P L J 1983 Tr, C

(vll Evidence Act (I of 1872)—

--------------- S. 114, Illustration (g)—Evidence—Withholding of—Presumption regarding—None of petitioners except one appearing in witness box to prove execution of document by coercion—Held: Evidence withheld to be presumed to be unfavourable to person withholding same. [P. 257]/

(Til) Evidence Act (I of 1872)—

-------------- S. 115—Estoppel—Doctrine of—Applicability—Htld : Petitioners deriving substantial benefits under agreement to be estopped from assailing same subsequently. [P. 260]Af

(Tiii) Interpretation of Statutes—

-------------- Words defined in other statutes—Construction of—Held : Cori-ext and requirements of every statute being different from other, definition of words occurring in one statute not to be imported into another. [P. 25\]A

PLD 1961 SC 215 & Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th ^v Edn. P. 55) ref.

(in Words & Phrases—

-------------- Coercion—Meaning of [P. 253]D

40 I L R (Appeal) 56 (PC) ;Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (P. 205) ; New Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary of English Language (P. 159) ; Mozley WMteley's Law Dictionary (9th Edn. P, 63); Words and Phrases Legally Defined (Vol. \, P. 272)*; Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edn.. P. 342) & Ballemtne's Law Dictionary (3rd Edn. p. 213) ref.

Malik Muhammad Asghar, Advocate on behalf of Petitioners. Mr. Asadullah Siddiqi, Advocate on behalf of Respondents. Dates of hearing : 6/7-4-1983.

decision

The full bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission was pleased to refer the following question of fact to this bench for recording its findings :—

"Whether appellants No. 1 & 4 were coerced into signing the argre«-ment dated 20-4-198? and whether the remaining appellants were so coerced on subsequent dates"For this ourpose evidence of four petitioners' witnesses, two defence witnesses and one court witness were recorded. Besides record of National Industrial Relations Commission and Implementation Tribunal for Newspapers Employees was produced and arguments of the counsel was heard.

2. The counsel for the appellant urged that the term 'Coercion'had not been defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, although it has been used in Section 15 (I) (i) and Section 16 (1) (d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 196^. Though term 'Coercion' had been defined under section I 5 of the Contract Act, yet the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 being a beneficiary law it could ndt be equated with property laws m terms o! she dictum iaid down by the Supreme Court in Marker Employee*. Union , Marker al-Kaloidx Limited and Others in Supreme Court Moruhly Review 1976 page 82. He stated that the definition of 'Coercion' in Contract Acs could not be read into the Industrial Relations Ordinance. r>&9. Lv'cn otherwise, he submitted, words in one statute , were not to he uuerpreted with regards 10 the same word occurring in another statute. He said that 'he <vords in a statute were to be interpreted in the contexi in which they occurred, la his support he relied on ihe dictum ot the Supreme Court in Government of West Pakistan v. Walt Muhammad Hahib and another iPLD 1961 S.C page 22), Commissioner Income Tax Rawalpindi v. Noon Sugav Mills (PLJ Iv75 Lahore, page 359). He siaica that there were a chain of authorities to hold that the words not defined in a statute were ;o be given their plane and ordinary dictionary meanings. For his support he relied on Shaft Corporation Ltd Karachi v Government of Pakistan (PLJ 1982 Karachi page 256 at p. 263), and Muhammad Adam v. Umer Bibi (PLD 1960 Lahore P 312 at page 320). He said thai .here was no ambiguity about the term 'coercion' and where there was no ambiguity, the words were to be interpreted according to their ordinary meanings. He cited Muhammad Iqbal Khan Niazi v. Vice Chancellor University of Punjab (PLJ 1978 SC page 439), Ghulam Sarwar v. Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC page 142 atjpage 228) & Pakistan Textile Mil/ Owners Association v. Admtnis-iraior of Karachi (PLD !963 SC page 137 at page 146) for support.

The learned counsel for respondents stated that Section 15 of the Contract Act defined word 'coercion* as follow :—

"Coercion is the committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by Pakistan Penal Code or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement. Section 19 of the Contract Act states that when consent to an agreemen is caused by coercion the agreement shall be voidable at the option of the party entering into it He states that the Appellants* case in appeal before the Full Bench of National Industrial Relations Commission was that since the agreement dated 20-4-82 had been got executed under coercion from appellants No 1 and 4 besides other appellants, the same was voidable at the option of the appellants. This was a principle of the Contract Act. So therefore, the provisions of the Contract Act will have to be necessarily read into the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, He stated that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 did not lay down that the agreement arrived at, under coercion, would be voidable. It was only the Contract Ace which laid down that provision. Since the appellants had invoked that provision themselves therefore, they were bound by the implications of the definition of coercion as given in the Contract Act. He said that ixMh Sections 15 (f) and 16 (1) (d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 used word 'Coercion' aiongwith word 'pressure and threat' etc. This referred to exercise of physical force in the objective sense, as has been held by the National Industrial Relations Commission itself in a case reported as Sher Muhammad v. Adamjee Papers and Board Mllh Nowshera (PLC 1978 page 328). Precisely speaking that judgment related to pressure, which is lesser degree of coerction. Coercion in itself meant show of physical force, to subject j. worker or employer, as the case ' may be, to physical restraint.

4. I have seen the case reported as Karher Employees Union v. Marker Alkaloids Limited. It would be too categorical a statements to say that the Supreme Court had observed that the Labour Laws were beneficial laws and they could not be equated with the property laws. The case before the Supreme Court was about the provision of Ordinance, 1969. In that context the Sup.eme Court had observed as follows :

'The interpretation placed by the learned Judge on Section 26 of the Ordinance has not commended to us. The period of 10 days perscribed in subsection (2) are intended to expedite settlement of induslrtal dispute The Ordinance does not contemplate that if the employer and collective bargaining agent of the workers enter into negotiations beyond the period of 10 days or the negotiations continue beyond the period the entire process under section 26 shall exhaust itself. The same is true if notice of strike is given beyond the period of 7 days after the negotiations have failed.

The learned Judge has held that the word 'may'in section 26 of the Ordinance is used in compulsive and not permissive sense. We are unable to agree with him. The provision of a notice in a beneficial statute such as the Ordinance should not be equated with similar provisions in laws dealing with rights in property. For example, if notice terminating a tenancy is not given by the landlord to a tenant in time the tenant acquires the right to renewal of the tenancy. There are similar provisions in the Electricity *ct. If the notice terminating the licence is not given to the licensee in time, the licence is renewed for a further period of 20 years. The Ordinance with which we are dealing is however, designed to promote harmony between the workers and the employer and does not deal with property rights."

5. Consequently lam constrained to observe that the dictum of Supreme Court in Marker Employees Union v. Marker Al-Kalolds Limited was not of genera! application but was limited to the notice under section 26 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. and could not therefore be construed in such broad context. However I do find some force in the submissions of the counsel for the appellants that it would be dangerous! to import the definition of a word occurring in one statute into anotherL because the context and the requirements of every statute are different| from .he other. It was observed in Government of West Pakistan v.| Wall Muhammad Habit) and Others (PLD 1961 SC page 215) that the meanings attached to terms and phrases used in one statute as aid in support of interpretation of a different statute meant for different purposes and dealing with a wholly different subject matter was always unsafe. Consequently recourse was advised to ordinary dictionary meanings in interpretating a statute. It is true that as Lord Coleridge stated "dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of wards used in Acts of Parliament, bui it is a well known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense and we are therefore, sent for instruction to these books." (Maxwell

on the Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition page 55).

6. As for the definition of coercion under section 15 of the Contractl Act, it may be stated that the ConUact Act itself was not intended to bag exhaustive. The preamble which is the object of the Act, stated it ta be| an Act ;"to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contracts".

The definition under section 15 of the Contract Act is introduced merely for the purpose of Chapter II of the Contract Act of which it forms part, which deals with voidable contracts. This is evident from the wording of Section 14 which refers to'coercion' as defined in section 15 of the Contract Act. Thus the definition of word'coercion'in section 15 of the Contract Act which was introduced merely for the limited purpose of Chapter II of the Contract Act—which in i (self is an Act tc define and amend only certain parts of the law relating to contracts, could not be of general application. The Privy Council had an occasion to consider the import of word coercion' in Seth Kannayalal v. The Notional Bank of India reported as 40 Indian Law Reports Appeal 56. Delivering the Judgment Lord Moutban had stated that.

"The word 'Coeidon' must therefore be used in general and ordinary sense as an English word and its meaning is not controlled by the definition in section 15. That definition of'Coercion' is expressly inserted for the special object of applying to S 14 i.e. to define what is the criterion, whether the agreement was made by means of consent extorted by coercion and does not control the interpretation of coercion when the word is used in other surroundings,'.

5. As for the dictionary meaning of word' coercion' the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, (Revised Edition) page 205 states as follows :

'Coercion, restraint ; government by force ;"

The New Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary, of the English Language page

159 states as follows :

"Coercion, koershon, n. The act of coercing ; restraint; compulsion ; constraint.—"

Mozley Whiteley't law Dictionary. (Ninth Edition) by John B Saunders Butterworths states at page 63 as under :

"Coercion. The threat of taking away from another something that he possesses, or of preventing him from obtaining an advantage he would otherwise have obtained, by influence or duress. See Ellis v. Barker [(1878), 40 LJ Ch. 603J "Coercion involves something in the nature of negation of choice" Hodges v. Webb, [(1920) 2 Ch. 70].

Words and phrases legally Defined. follows:

"Coercion' is word of ambiguous import. In one sense anyone is coerced who under pressure does that which he would prefer not to do : but a reluctant debtor who pays under stress of proceedings is not coerced within the legal meaning of the word...'Coercion* .nvolves something in the nature of the negation of choice...An employer cannot properly be said to be coerced if, having two alternative courses presented 10 him, he follows that course which he considers conductive to his own interest. Hodges v. Well, 1(1920)2 Ch. 72] per Peterson, J., at pp 85-87" Black's Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth Edition) page 342 states as follows : "Coercion. Compulsion : constraint ; compelling by force or arms. Flkhany v. Fluhorty. Del. Super, 8 W.W- Harr. 487, 193 A. 838 840 ; Santer v. Santer, 115 Pa. Super. 7, 174 A. 651.652.

It may be actual, direct, or positive, as where physical force is used to compel act against one's will, or implied, legal or constructive as where one pariy is constrained by subjugation to other to do whit his free will would refuse, Metro-Civ App. 56 S.W. 2d. 489. Fluharty,% W.W. Harr. 387,193 A 838, 840. It may be auuai or threatened exercise of power possessed, or supposedly possessed. If. re New York Tille & Mortgage Co. 271 NYS 433. 150 Misc. 827 ; Weir v. Me Grath, D C. Ohio, 52 F 2d 201,203.

As used in testimentary law, any pressure by which testator's action ii restrained against his free will in the execution of his testament. Max Art Mach. Co. v. International Ass'of Machinists, Bridgeport Lodge, No. 30. 92, 500, 181 P. 200, 203, 5 ALR 817. -

Duress and coercion are not synonymous though their meanings often shade into one another. Mekenzle Hagus Co. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corporation, C.C.A. Minn. 73 F2d, 78, 85*' Baiienttne's Law Dictionary third Edition page 213 states as follows : Coercion. Compulsion by the application of physical or mental force or pemiation. A word descriptive the result of an act rather than a
deisgnation of an act. NLR B v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Asso. [(CA9) 122 F2d 368]. A form of abuse of process (1 Am, J2d P & 9). The
compulsion, presumed by some, especially older, authorities, to have been exercised by a husband upon the wife for the commission of a
crime which was committed by her in his presence. (21 Am J2d Crim L&102) As a defence to an action upon a written instrument:- import
unity which destroys the free agency of person, subjected and substitutes the will of another in place of his own, Gomlllion v. Forsythe, (218,
SC 211,62SE2d 297, ALR 2d !69) ; As an unfair labour practice physical or mental persuation by affirmative conduct > (31 Am J Revised Lab & 226) ; As an exuse for the commission of an act, otherwise criminal a present, imminent, and impending physical or mental force of such a nature as to induce a well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done. State v. St. Clalr (Mo) (262 SW2d 25, 40 Air 2d 903)."Thus the meanings of the words coercion as noun and coerce as verb commonly understood are the act of coercing, restraint, compulsion or constraint or the act of compelling by physical or mental force or arms ; d to repress, to compel to compliance. A person is coerced who under pressure does that which he would prefer not to do. a negation of choice and free will etc.8. Sections 1 5 (1) (f) and 16 (d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1%9 where word 'coercion' occurs run as follows :

"15 Unfair labour practices on the part of employers (1) No employer or trade union of employers and no person acting on behalf of either shall (f) compel or attempt to compel any officer of the collective bargaining agent to arrive at a settlement by using intimiation, coercion, pressure, threat, confinement to a place, physical injury, disconnection of water power and telephone facilities and such other methods.

"16. Unfair Labour practice on the part of workmen

(1) No workmen or other person or trade union of workmen! shall—

(</) compel or attempt to compel the employer to accept any demand by using intimidation, coercion, pressure, threat, confinement, or ouster from a place, dispossession, assault, physical injury, disconnection of telephone, water or power facilities or such other methods.

9. Here one could sec the the words of the same kind keeping their own company. The use of word 'coercion' alongwith words 'intimidation, ^pressure and threat in both these clauses, particularly words "pressure Sand threat" is very significant, and provides an example of Noscitur a Sociis. Coercion, therefore, means not only the constraint or compulsion [or pressure etc, by application of physical force but also mental force with the intention to occasion negation of free will and choice, through affirmative action. Thus threat to unlawfully cause injury or actually causing an injury unlawfully in respect of employment including removal, discharge, dismissal or transfer of a workman in order shat he executes a settlement would also amount to coercion and unfair labour practice under the IRO, 1969.

10. In this context it was urged that the evidence of P.W.I, PW2 and PW3 corroborated with each other in material detail to establish that after the stay order issued by Member-I NIRC on 27-3-82.

The petitioners were made to sit in a separate room in the establ ishment with effect from 28-3-1982.

A new attendance register was introduced on which a line was drawn against column of attendance meant for them for the
period from 9th to 27th March, 1982. The impression was given that the petitioners were absent for those days.

The petitioners were not given any work or assigned any duty.

The petitioners were denied wages from 9-3-1982.

The petitioners were asked malafide to attend office at 6.00 am
which practice is not resorted to in any other newspapers.

(/) The petitioners were not allowed to go to kitabat Section in the same establishment.

Or) The special Pay of Rashid Qamar Head Katab PW. 1 was stopped w. e. f. 1-4-1982.

(h) Abdul Rashid Qamar, Mohammad Jam eel Qaiser and the petitioners including Javed Akhtar and Ghulam Yasin were either issued show cause notices or charge sheets or were threatened of being issued the show cause notice or charge sheets for conducting strike, instigating strike and riotous behaviour etc. even though the statutory period of one month during which such action could be taken had expired.

(f) Rashid Qamar and Jamil Qaisar were suspended from 15-4-1982 to 18-4-1982 the period immediately proceeding the signing of agreement Exh, C/l which was signed on 20-4-1982.

()) The attendence marked by Jamil Qaiser was converted into absence.

(k) Ch. Rahmat AH threatened that DW 2 being an ex-police officer, he shall implicate them (petitioners) in false cases under section 182 PPC.

11. On this basis the counsel for the petitioners urged that each of these acts amounted to application of pressure and force amounting to coercion. He stated that the giving of the charge sheets after the expiry of a period of one month to these 12 petitioners (h) was an exercise inculca ting a state of mental terror and fear among the petitioners amounting to coercion for the purpose of executing a settlement. For after a period of one month, the offence of illegal strike, even if he admitted it to be the case for 'he sake of argument, had lost its culpability. He stated that after ihe order of th e court the action of the respondent in not assigning
the duties to the petitioners, (c), seating them in a separate room (a), denying them free movement inside the establishment and not allowing them to go to the Kltabat section (/), requiring them to observe such odd hours as were not in practice in any newspaper establishment located in the area (e). were the unfair labour practices calculated to coerce the petitioners which a view to making them execute the agreement Exh. C/l. Similarly introduction of a new attendence register in which & line was drawn against the names of the petitioners giving them impression of beicg absent for those days (6), and denying them wages for that period (d), were also blatent exercises in coercion. Similarly stoppage of special pay of Head Katib Abdul Rashid Qamar and suspension of Jameel Qaiser Vice President of the Union as well as that of Rashid Qamar had their own demonstration impact. He said that the management of Daily Jang was clearly -he beneficiary of this agreement. By this agreement the petitioners lost their permanent status and future of employment in the establishment. Therefore it could not be said that this was an agreement under free will.

12. He said that giving appointment Setters to Mohammad Rafiq and Ehsanullah Jora workers who were also locked out with the rest of the petitioners was another discriminatory tactic against the petitoners and A the petitioners were discriminated because they were members of the trade union. Even if it is admitted for the sake of argument that the petitioners had conducted strike, then the guilt of the petitioners as well as Mohammad RaSq and Ehsanullah Jora was the same. They were, however, treated differently because they forsook the union. This was a tactic to demonstrate to the workers that those who exercised their free will were in the process of being punished and those who did not were rewarded

13. Apart from that there was harassment of workers through frequent visas of police in which officers of the union were subjected to the process of polios investigation. Then there was almost open collusion between the respondents and the Kattbs engaged by them who threatened Javed Akatar etc. petitioners with breaKing his legs. Thus an atmosphere T~ -of oppeession and isrror persisted in which the free wiii and choice of petitioner* has been negated and could do nothing else but sign the agreement. Labour Department. The evidence of DW 1 is contradicted by DW 2 in respect of assignment of duties. DW 1 stated thai when the 12 petitioners came back with stay order they were assigned work. Later on he said that he used to assign work and he used to assign duties. About Abdul Rashid Qamar he stated that actually he had been giving work to him. DW 2 stated on the other hand that he and not D. W. 1 used to assign work to these petitioner Katibs. About Rashid Qamar he said that he used to give matter for calligraphy to him. There was contradiction also in the statements relating to seating of petitioners after they came with stay order dated 27-3-82. D.W. 2 stated that the petitioners were allowed to sit in the same usual place reserved for Katibs in the Hall where the rest of them used to sit. While D. W. 1 stated that only 3 of them were accommodated in the calligraphy section and the rest in magzine Section. In reply to a court question that he was deposing in that manner because he was to lose his own job if the petitioners succeeded, D. W, 1 denied the suggestion, while D. W. 2 was of the opinion that if the petitioners were issued permanent appointment letters D. W. I and others appointed on 10-3-1982 would have been retrervJ «.A. This makes D. W. 1 an interested witness.

Ts,.e counsel for the petitioners further stated that it was incorrect to assert that the petitioners had conducted any strike. The plea of illegal strike by the petitioners was merely acounter blast to the submissions of petitioners that the respondents had conducted an illegal lockout on 9-3-1982. This is merely an afterthought to cloak their illegal
action for neither National Industrial Relations Commission nor Labour Department nor Police nor any other authority bad been informed of any illegal strike having been conducted by petitioners.

A perusal of Exh. P. W. 1/17 gives the history of the dispute from the workers* point of view. It states that the union was formed on S-3-1982 and the workers demanded that they should be issued permanent appointment letters at least in the computer section on 6-3-1982. The management refused and conducted lock-out in computer section. There fore all the work had to be done by the calligraphists who numbered only 40 while atleast 100 were needed. Of these 40 only 19 had been issued
permanent appointment letters while 2i calligraphists working since 1-10-1981 against permanent vacancies had not been issued appointment letters. They demanded extra staff to be provided. On that Mir Shakeel- ur-Rehman evicted them from their place of work. On the intervention of Nisar Usmani, Mir Shakeelur Rehman allowed the workers to go back to their duties and assured to lift the lock out. He also promised that he was issuing permanent appointment letters to all of them, but while in the office he went back on Ms word. This shows that the real dispute was about issuance of permanent appointment letters.

17. Apart from that Exh. P.W. 2/3 being the complain filed by Akhtar Hayat President of the union (which inter alia lead to the stay order by NIRC on 27-3-1982 under which petitioners derived benefits and made claims) shows that the dispute was aboute issuance of permanent appoint ment letters to workers. Same would appear from Exh. P. W. 1/3 Exh. P. W. 1/16 Exh. P. W. 2/5 and Exh, P. W. 4/2 (demand No. 4). Further Javed Akhtar P. W. 3 makes it very clear in his statement ; he says "on the
9th of March, 1982 the Union had demanded from Cb. Rahmat Ali, Mir Shakeelur Rehman and Abdul Rab Sajid that the 12 petitioners may be given appointment letters. On this Ch. Rehtnat Ali said that we will not be given any appointment letter. The police was called and we were forced to set down from the place of our work—". In other words the petitioners demanded to be issued appointment letters, when already the computer machine operators were not working. At that time it is asserted that the respondents conducted lockout. This, on the very face of it seems to be > false because it is highly improbable that an employer whose establishment is already partially closed should conduct a lockout without making a demand on the workers. On the other hand it is very much probable thai seeing the employer under pressure the petitioners also pressed for '.heir demand of being issued appointment letters, at ;hai opportune moment and conducted illegal strike for the acceptance of their demand. Further it is not asserted anywhere that the respondents/employers had made any demand at all which they required to be accepted by workmen. Thus why should respondents have conducted an illegal lockout when they were to gain nothing and on the contrary were left to procure staff from open market at a short notice of a few hours. That it was the petitioners, who had given up work to press for their demand for appointments is also staled by C. W. 1 the official conciliator of 'he Area who said "One issue was that appointment letters had not been issued to the Katibs. On that all the Katibs had given np work—". I have therefore no doubt in my mind that the petitioners had

18. In this light, after the National Industrial Relation Commission had issued a stay order in favour of the petitioners the conduct of respondents as listed in clauses (a) to (i) at para 10 ante does not appear to me to be mala fide in the circumstances of the case. As for the allegations listed at clause (j), Jamil Qaser was able to point out only one instance viz on 29-3-1982 when confronted with his attendance register, which does not prove his claim. Also coercion on P. W. 2 is beyond this reference. Similarly about the allegation listed in clause (k) it is strange that although Ch. Rahmat Ali had been threatening them and gunmen used to be with him, yet not a single report was lodged with the police or anv other authority against him D. W. 2, about whom it was stated that he was a Police Officer turned out to be an ordinary clerk in the Central Police Office in the Civil Secretariate of the Punjab. This is therefore nothing more than an allegation which is not proved. Thus none of the allegations listed in para 10 ante are prove-!

19. As for the alleged incident of 20-4-1982 in getting the agreement Exh. Cj 1 signed by the petitioners No. I and 4 under coercion and coercing rest of the petitioners subsequently, it may be stated that except Javed Akhtar none of the petitioners has appeared before me. They could have! appeared before me but have not appeared Accordingly to illustration (g)|_yof Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the Court may presume tbatj evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be}
unfavourable to the person who withholds it.

20. As for the evidence of Javed Akhtar P. W. 3, his evidence is self contradictory and does not inspire any confidence whatsoever. He states for Distance that a blank paper was put on the contents of Exh. C/l when it was put up (o him for signature in the presence of the conciliator C. W. I Javed Akhtar did not sign the agreement in isolation. Neither Rash. Qamar nor Jameel Qaiser have stated in their evidence that signature of Javed Akhtar was obtained by putting blank paper on the agreement and requiring him to sign underneath. Rashid Qamar stated in He also did not tell his counsel this most material fact even a day before the execution of agreement under coercion /. e. 19-4-1982 about the execution of agreement. This evidence does not inspire any confidence for atleast his own counsel was not among those coercing him, he could have been taken into confidence.

The statement of C. W. I Afzal Hussain is also very significant. He is a public functionary and an independent witness. A presumption of legitimacy attaches to the functions of public functionaries. His cross- examination shows that the agreement was excuted before him and no pressure of threat or show of force was used, no pistol, weapon or arms were shown to those signing the agreement,

A perusal of Exh. C/l would show thai it binds the management to issue appointment letters to the Katibs working on computer error correction and on daily wage basis. After 9-3-1982 when the petitioners had conducted illegal strike and the respondent had resruiied their sub stitutes, obviously they lost their status as workmen. By virtue of this agreement it came to be thai of temporary Katibs. By virtue of this agreement the management withdraw the show cause notices and charge sheets given to Katibs who had taken ihe position before the conciliator that they were absent without leave, while the position of the management
was that they had conducted strike. The management agreed 10 treat them as on leave. Incase of non-entitlement to leave, wages for those days were to be paid gratis and no action was to be taken against them on this account. On the other hand the working Katibs agreed to wiihdraw the case, if any, filed by them in National Industrial Relations Commission or any other court. It was an agreed stipulation of the agreement that computer error correction being a job of temporary nature, their services would be dispensed with according to law as the volume of work decreased.

28. Now it is an admitted fact that under this agreement each of the petitioners received wages for 9th to 27th March 1982 when they did not perform any work. The petitioners who were oJherwise rendered unemployed and sustained only by stay order of National Industrial Com mission received appointment letters under this agreement showing them to be employed on correcting computer mistakes and on the understanding that as soon as computer script improved their services could be terminated on 15 days notice according to law. They signed the acceptance of thesr above stated terms and conditions of appointment. Under this agreement the charge of conducting strike was dropped against them. None of them, as was put by the counsel for respondent, said that he did not accept the •agreement Exh : C/l as it was signed under coercion and was ready and willing to face the charge of illegal strike. Thus petitioner derived benefits junder the very agreement which they now assail. They received wages (amounting to thousands of rupees in consequence of this agreement. They are estopped from assailing the agreement under the Evidence Act, 1872. The counsel for the petitioner said that since no charge sheet was issued within the statutory period of one month from 9-3-1982 the date of incident, the charge sheets would have been void in law in any case. Even if that is granted still there were other benefits like payment of wages for the days they did not work, besides being not prosecuted and taken back into temporary employment respectively. Also it was in consequence of this agreement that Akhtar Hayat President of the union fulfiilled the part of conttact on beli alf of petitioners Katibs by withdrawing his complaint from National Industrial Relations Commission, It was an agreement on which both parties acted. The appellants are thus also estopped by their own conduct to challenge this agreement.

29. In view of the above discussion I find no substance in she assertion that appellants No. 1 and 4 were coerced into signing the agreement dated 20-4-1982 and the remaining petitioners were so coerced on subsequent dates.

(TQM) Declared accrodingly.