PL J 1996 Peshawar 45

Present: sardar muhammad raza, J.

SYED MUHAMMAD SHAH JEHAN SHAH & others-Appellants

versus

FAZAL UR REHMAN & others-Respondents RFANo. 31 of 1994, accepted on 6.3.1996

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Act V of 1908)-

-—-O.XXXIX, R. 2 (b)--Whether temporary injunction ceases to exist onexpiration of six months in view of amendment in Order 39 CPC--, uestion of~Persual of Act XIV of 1994 omulgated 31.7.1994 woulde that it is amendment in procedural law which has to be retrospective-Thus one has no escape from consequence that temporary injunction issued by trial court ceases to xist--Held :' Trial court is at liberty to hear parties again and pass any order deemed fit within contemplation of Order 39, Rule 2 (b) CPC--Petition accepted.

[Pp. 46 & 47] A, B & C

Syed Muhammad Shah Jehan Shah, Advocate by Petitioner. Date of hearing: 6.3.1996.

judgment

The plaintiffs Fazal-ur-Rehman etc, in their suit for declaration of title qua 9225 kanals 2 marlas of land situated in Mauza Jaba, Mansehra, were granted a temporary injunction 1.2.1993, to the effect that Syed Muhammad Shah Jehan etc. the defendants shall not receive compensation of this land and shall not alienate the same in any manner whatsoever and also shall furnish bond to the effect that the amount of compensation received by them shall be refused to the plaintiffs, in case the latter succeed. The aforesaid order was partially upheld, by the learned District Judge^ Mansehra on 11.4.1993 and was confined only to the maintenance of status quo. Defendant has come up in revision.

2.                The learned counsel for the petitioner raised a substantial  bjection to the effect that in view of rule 2 (b) added to Order 39 C.P.C. through Civil Laws (Reforms)' Act, 1994, the temporary injunction in the instant case having been granted on 1.2.1993 and partially upheld on 11.4.93 ceases to have effect on the expiration of six months, without being extended by the Court after bearing the  arties again and without reasons to be recorded for such extension.

3.                A perusal of the aforesaid Act XIV of 1994 promulgated on 31.7.1994 would provide that it is an amendment in a Procedural Law which has to be retrospective. Thus one has ixo escape from the consequence that the temporary injunction issued by the trial Court ceases to exist at present. The very language of newly added Rule 2 (b) of Order 39 C.P.C. would undoubtedly indicate that such powers of extending the injunction can be exercised by the Court either suo-moto or on the application of any party interested. Rather the idea indicating suo-moto exercise of power by the trial Court is more dominant in view of the very scheme of the amendment that requires every Civil Court to be conscious of and viligent about all the temporary injunctions issued by it.


 

4.          Having the aforesaid view, the temporary injunction has ceased to exist but the trial court is at liberty to hear the parties again and to pass any order deemed fit within the contemplation of Order 39 rule 2 (b) C.P.C. 

5.          The petition is accepted and the trial Court is directed to re-hear the parties in connection with the temporary injunction already issued. Parties to appear before the trial court on 21.3.1996.

(B.T.)                                                                               Petition accepted