PLJ 2000 SC 1863

[Appellate Jurisdiction]

Present: ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHARY AND

abdul hamid dogar, JJ. STATE and another-Appellants

versus

MUHAMMAD YAQOOB and another-Respondents Criminal Appeals Nos. 49/99 and 173/2000, decided on 18.9.2000.  <0n appeal from the judgment/order dated 24.6.1998, of the Lahore High  Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, passed in Cr. Appeal No. 85-T/98/M.R. No. 62-T/98)

(i) Anti Terrorism Act, 1997--

-—S. 26--Murder of six persons-Acquittal-Challenge to-Keeping in view rule laid down in Mehram All case (PLJ 1998 SC 1415), High Court discarded confession of respondent made before police-Contention that such confession was admissible in evidence U/S. 26 of Anti Terrorism Act, and dictum in Mehram Ali case delivered on 15.6.1998 while saving past and closed transaction did not apply to present case, which was decided earlier thereto i.e. on 4.4.1998-Held: Present occurrence could not be termed as past and closed transaction, because High Court decided it as an appeal by convict and Murder Reference by State and Supreme Court was now dealing with it an appeal by State-Rule laid down in Mehram Ali case would fully apply to present case, and on the strength of that judgment, confession made before police being inadmissible could not be made basis for conviction—Appeal dismissed.[Pp. 1881 & 1882] G & H PLJ 1998 SC 1415 rel.

(ii) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973-- —Art. 185(3)-Supreme Court is always reluctant to interfere in acquittal order, which does not suffer from mis-reading/non-reading of evidence and which cannot be termed so perverse as to have caused miscarriage of justice.   [P. 1883] J  iii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-- —S. 540-Calling of additional evidence-Discretion and Duty of trial Court-Distinction between-Section 540 has two parts; in first part, discretion lies with Court to examine or not to examine any person as witness, but according to its second part, Court is bound to examine any person as witness, if his evidence appears to be essential for just decision of case irrespective of fact that any party had requested for it or not.    [P. 1876] C PLD 1984 SC 95; PLD 1985 SC 357 rel. (iv) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--  S. 540—Murder of six persons—Conviction—Challenge to—According to prosecution, appellant was arrested on 22.10.1997, whereas according to defence, he was arrested on night between 16/17.10.1997-In leading newspapers published on 18.10.1997 & 19.10.1997, it had appeared that he was arrested on night between 16/17.10.1997-Source of such news items was shown to be police officers of rank of SSP, SP and Provincial Minister having given statement in Provincial Assembly about arrest of appellant-Feeling importance of said witnesses, appellant made application for their examination U/S. 540, Cr.P.C., but trial Court dismissed it while considering their evidence not essential for just decision of case-Held: These two conflicting versions were not about a minor/insignificant matter, but it was about very crucial and important
piece of evidence-Perusal of statements of prosecution witnesses clearly showed that almost every one of them had been cross-examined about date of arrest of appellant as shown in newspapers, which indicated the efforts being made by appellant to lay basis for his arguments that he was arrested on night between 16/17,10.1997 and before his remand to judicial lock-up, he was shown to witnesses-If trial Court had accepted his application, then appellant's plea would have also appeared on record; and keeping the stand of prosecution and defence side by  ide, trial Court would have been able to resolve controversy in accordance with law-Case remanded.     [Pp. 1868 to 1870, 1875 & 1876] A & B

(iv) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-- —-S. 540 Additional evidence-Duty of Court-After rejection of appellant's application for summoning witnesses named therein, he made statement that he would not produce defence, though a day earlier in his statement U/S. 342, Cr.P.C,, he had stated that he could produce defence-In these circumstances, whether appellant was debarred from seeking any redress from Court--Held: Calling of additional evidence was not conditioned on making application by defence or prosecution, but it was duty of Court to do complete justice between parties and carelessness or ignorance of one party or other or delay that might result in conclusion of case should not be a hindrance in achieving that object-If on facts of a particular case, it appeared essential to Court that additional evidence was necessary for just decision of case, then under second part of Section 540, Cr.P.C., it was obligatory on Court to examine such a witness ignoring technical/formal objection in this respect as to do justice and to avoid miscarriage of justice—Held further: It is salutary principle of judicial proceedings in criminal cases to find out truth and arrive at correct conclusion and see that an innocent person is not punished merely  because of certain technical omission on his part or on the part of Court- ase was remanded to trial Court.           [Pp. 1880 & 1881] D & E  PLD 1985 SC 357 rel (vi) Recovery- -—Contention that High Court erred in discarding evidence of recovery of Klashinkov at behest of accused as it matched with empties picked up from spot—Held: In absence of any other incriminating evidence, mere recovery on pointation of respondent/accused would not be sufficient to  old him guilty.  [Pp. 1881 & 1883] F & I Sahibzada Ahmad Raza Khan Qasuri, ASC arid Mr. Karam Elahi Bhatti, AOR for Appellant in Cr.A. 173/2000 and for Respondent in Cr. A.-49/99. Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, A.G. Punjab; Mr. Nasim Sabir and Mr. Tariq Khokhar, Addl. Advocates General, Punjab; Ms. Yasmin Saigol, Asst. A.G. Punjab, and Rao M. Yousaf Khan, AOR for Appellant in Cr. A-49/99 and for Respondent in Crl. A-173/2000. Date of hearing: 12 to 15 and 18.9.2000. judgment Abdur Rahman Khan, J.-The above two appeals with leave of the Court arise from the common judgment of a learned Division Bench of the High Court delivered on 24.6.1998; whereby the appeal preferred by Muhammad Yaqoob accused/respondent in Cr. Appeal No. 49 of 1999 against the judgment dated 4.10.1998, of the learned Judge Special Court Anti-Terrorism was accepted and consequently his conviction and sentence were set aside while Cr. Appeal No. 173 of 2000 is by convict Muhammad Asif whose appeal was dismissed by the High Court and consequently his conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Special Judge, were maintained. As the above common judgment of the High Court has been impugned in these two appeals, therefore, they are decided together by this single judgment.

2. Muhammad Yaqoob accused/respondent in Appeal No. 49 of 1999, and Muhammad Asif appellant in Appeal No. 173 of 2000, alongwith Qari Muhammad Siddique (acquitted accused) and the absconding accused Qari Sarfraz, Muhammad Ajmal alias Akram Lahori and Rashid, were charged for six murders. The learned Special Judge Anti-Terrorism tried Muhammad Yaqoob, Muhammad Asif and Qari Muhammad Siddique for the said murders as the other three accused remained absconder. On the conclusion of the trial by judgment dated 4.4.1998, he convicted Muhammad Asif and Muhammad Yaqoob under Section 302/34/109 PPC read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act and sentenced each of them to death on six counts and to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- on each count but the third accused Qari Muhammad Siddique was acquitted; while the remaining three accused were declared absconders. Muhammad Asif and Muhammad Yaqoob impugned the judgment of the learned Special Judge before the High Court and the State also filed appeal against acquittal of Qari Muhammad Siddique. All the three matters were decided by the impugned judgment by a learned Division Bench of the High Court, whereby the appeal of Muhammad Yaqoob was accepted and that of Muhammad Asif and the State were dismissed. Leave to appeal was granted to the State against the acquittal of Muhammad Yaqoob and Muhammad Asif against his conviction whereas the appeal of the State against Qari Muhammad Siddique was not pressed and was, accordingly, dismissed.

3.          The learned Advocate General for the State in both the appeals and Mr. Ahmed Raza Qasuri, ASC representing the respondent in Appeal No. 49/99 and the appellant in Appeal No.  173/2000, agreed between themselves that let Appeal No. 173/2000, although fixed at No. 2 may be heard first and, therefore, we would first deal with the said appeal.

4.          The FIR in this case was lodged by a Traffic Police Constable, namely Gul Muhammad (PW-19) on the spot. It was stated in this report that he alongwith Muhammad Saghir (PW-20) were present on Traffic duty at Chohar Chowk when at about 7.00 a.m. he noticed Hiace Vehicle No. RPT 1145 coming from Peshawar side. When it reached Chohar Chowk a person
32 years of age of 5'-6" size with whitish colour having beard wearing black shirt and shalwar armed with Kalshnikov all of a sudden came before the said vehicle and fired a burst with Kalshnikov at the driver which hit the driver and the vehicle stopped. He then fired at the other six passengers in the vehicle who were dressed in Uniform. In the meantime his another companion 26/27 years of age with red colour of 5'-9" size and having a white cap on his head and wearing a light 'badami colour' clothes, armed with Kalshnikov appeared there who also fired at the passengers present in the vehicle. The firing by the two accused killed five persons on the spot and one received serious injury. People in the Chowk ran away with the firing  nd the said two accused proceeded towards east to the opposite side of the road where a boy of 22/23 years age with red colour wearing shalwar and Kamees riding on Honda Motor Cycle of black colour without number plate came near them from the other side of the road and two said persons rode on the motor cycle which proceeded to eastern side. The incident was stated to  ave been seen by many persons. It was claimed that he and PW Asghar would be able to identify the assailants. An official Car in which some army officers were travelling soon after reached the spot from Peshawar side and took the dead bodies and the injured to CMH. He then conveyed the information to Police Control on which the Inspector/SHO Westridge reached the spot  nd recorded his report.

5.          The prosecution relied for conviction on the following pieces of evidence:--


 (iv) The incident occurred in the Chowk of the main G.T. Road in presence of numerous persons but none was examined from the public to support the prosecution case.

(v) Munir Ahmed, an independent witness and Kazim Ahmed the injured were not produced which rendered the prosecution case doubtful.

(vi) No internal postmortem of the 5 deceased was conducted, therefore, cause of their death could not be ascertained.

(vii) There was blackening, burning/tatooing over some of the injuries on the persons of the deceased which could not be caused from the distance shown by the eye-witnesses in their statements and the site plan of the spot of occurrence and this discredits the eye-witness account.

8.          As on consideration of the above first point we have decided to remand the case to the trial Court, therefore, we would deal only with this point and discuss its merits and effect and would not comment on the other points in order to avoid any possible adverse affect about the culpability or otherwise of the appellant lest it may prejudice the case of one side or the
other.

9.          It is necessaiy to give factual background about Point No. 1 in order to understand the view point of both the sides to resolve this controversy in its correct perspective.

On 28.3.1998 during the trial of the case the appellant submitted an application  under   Section  540  Cr.P.C.   for  summoning/examining  the witnesses named therein alongwith the relevant record. In view of the mportance of this issue for our discussion the contents of this application are reproduced verbatim:—

"That petitioner Qari Muhammad Siddique is accused in the above mentioned case and allegations levelled by the prosecution against him are that he harboured the co-accused. The allegations are totally incorrect and false. There is no truth in the prosecution story.

2.                  That prosecution have produced witnesses in this Honourable Court and no other witness mentioned in the Calendar is left for evidence.

3.                  That it is case of the prosecution that the accused persons Asif was arrested from the mosque of Qari Muhammad Siddique on 22.10.1997, on his pointation co-accused Muhammad Yaqoob was arrested. It is also mentioned in the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. that present petitioner Qari Muhammad Siddique
was arrested on 6.11.1997.

4.         That all the major newspapers of the countiy published main head lines in their issues of 18.10.1997   and 19.10.1997, that  accused Asif and Yaqoob alongwith Qari Siddique had been arrested on the night between 16-17 October, 1997 but their arrest in the police record is on the mid night of 22.10.1997, so if it is proved the accused persons as well as the petitioner were arrested on the night of 16.10.1997 and 17.10.1997, then the prosecution case stands no where as published in the daily newspapers of the country and the recovery subsequently effected from the co-accused on 23.10.1997 is also seems to be fake because accused were already in the custody of the police So it would be appropriate for reaching on a just conclusion o: the case to call the relevant witnesses as CWs in the interest o; justice.

5.     That following witnesses as CW shall be mandatory for the just decision of the case:-

(i)    Tahir Mughal,  Crime Reporter,  Daily Khabrain,  Head Office, Sitara Market, Islamabad.

(ii)   Asghar Mehmood,  Crime Reporter,  Daily News,  Jang Plaza, Murree Road, Rawalpindi.

(iiii Secretary Provincial Assembly Punjab, Lahore alognwith  record dated 16-17.10.1997.

(iv)  Mr.  Zulfiqar Ahmed  Khosas,  Senior Minister,  Punjab Secretariat, Lahore.

(v)   Ch. Mushtaq Warraich, S.P. Khanewal.

(vi) District Reporter, Associated Press of Pakistan, Lahore who is giving coverage to the Punjab Assembly.

In view of the above it is most respectfully prayed that the above salt persons may kindly be called as Court witnesses for reaching on just conclusion of the case.

Petitioner

Through MALIK WAHEED ANJUM
Dt. 28.3.1998          Advocate High Court"

This application was dismissed by the trial Court by order dated 30.3.1998 which order is reproduced:

"During the investigation, the witnesses mentioned in both the applications never appeared before any Investigating Officer, nor their statements U/S. 161 or 162 Cr.P.C., were recorded. Even otherwise, to my mind, evidence of these witnesses in Court is nol essential for the just decision of the case and the case can be decided  judiciously and justly, without these witnesses being examined in Court, so both the applications are dismissed." The importance of examining the witnesses mentioned in the application was felt as in the leading newspapers with large publication it had appeared on 18.10.1997 and 19.10.1997 that the appellant was arrested on the night of 16/17.10.1997. The source of such item of news was shown to be the Police Officers of the rank of SSP, SP and Provincial Minister having given a statement in the Provincial Assembly about the arrest of the appellant. The clippings from the news-papers have been Marked on the case file and they are reproduced:-

1. English Newspaper "The News" dated 18.10.1997 marked Exh.DE by the trial Court, where the heading of the relevant News reads:

"3 arrested for murder of Iranians". "RAWALPINDI: Law enforcing authorities have arrested three alleged killers of the five Iranian cadets and their Pakistani driver, who were ambushed in Rawalpindi last month. A few Kalashnikovs and two hand-grenades have also been recovered from the arrested killers who were identified by police as Asif Kashmiri, Muhammad Sadiq and Muhammad Sher. SSP Rawalpindi Rao Muhammad Iqbal confirmed the arrest of the three the Iranians killing case and said two of them were directly involved in the killing. We are also trying to recover the motorcycle which was used in crime, "said Iqbal, who was leading the investigation team. He said a team has been despatched to Lahore to detain those who had allegedly masterminded the act of terrorism. Sources in police said one of the accused was arrested from Pirwadhai area, who later disclosed the presence of his other accomplices in Dhoke Matkal. A bag containing weapon  allegedly used in the killings was also seized by the raiding police paity, the source added. Police sources told The News that the accused had left Rawalpindi soon after the killings and then returned here about three days ago between Wednesday and Thursday. The accused were produced before some of the eye-witnesses who the police claimed have seen the murderers fleeing on the day of incident." Some witnesses have identified the accused" the investigation officer said." to lay basis for his arguments that he was arrested on the night between 16/17.10.1997 and before his remand to judicial lock up he was shown to the witnesses. If the trial Court had accepted the application of the appellant U/S. 540 Cr.P.C. then the plea of the appellant would also have appeared on record; and keeping the stand of the prosecution and the defence side by side the Court would have been able to resolve the controversy in accordance with law. Section 540 Cr.P.C. reads: "Powers to summon material witness or examine person present-­Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or re-call and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or re-call and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case." This section has two parts; in the first one the discretion lies with the Court to examine or not to examine any person as a witness but according to second part of the Section the Court is bound to examine any person as a witness if his evidence appears to be essential for just decision of the case irrespective of the fact that any party had requested for it or not. This legal proposition has been exhaustively explained/clarified in the case of "Muhammad Azam vs. Muhammad Iqbal and others" reported in PLD 1984 S.C. 95). Therefore, 1'eference to various portion of the judgments would be helpful. It had been observed at page 118 of the judgment: "The duty nevertheless lay squarely on the trial Court to summon the entire available evidence on this controversy and record/admit the same by virtue of power under Section 540, Cr.P.C. It reads as follows: "Power to summon material witness or examine person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case." "This provision is divided into two parts: one where it is only discretionary for the Court to summon a Court witness suo motu or on application, and the second part where it is mandatory for the Court to do so. The main condition to be satisfied with regard to the second part is that the evidence to be summoned under this part should appear to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case. As has already been observed the evidence in question relating to Nikah was undoubtedly essential for the just decision of the case. In the circumstances of this case the failure of the learned trial udge to act under the said part of Section 40, Crl.P.C. has not only deprived the Appellate Courts of essential material for the just decision of the appeal, but has also occasioned miscarriage of justice." The observation at page 120 of the said judgment reads: "The failure of the parties to produce sufficient evidence after introducing this subject should not have deterred the trial  ourt in performing the duty under the second part of Section 540, Crl.P.C. The trial Court has, as discussed about, failed to do so and therefore on this account also the case merits remand for fresh trial. The legal position was further explained at page 121 which is reproduced: "It needs to be observed that for purpose of acting under Section 540, Crl. P.C. (whether the first or second part), it is permissible to look into the material not formally admitted in evidence, whether it is available in the records of the judicial file or in the police file or elsewhere. The perusal of both these records would show that if evidence, in connection with the items already noticed, would have been properly entertained the reasoning and decision of the learned two Courts might have been different." The often repeated objection that such an exercise would amount to filling up the lacuna has been clarified in this way in the judgment: "Sometimes apprehension is expressed that any action by the trial Court under Section 540, Criminal Procedure Code would amount to filling the gaps and omissions in the version or evidence of one or the other party. It may straightaway be observed that in so far as the second part of Section 540 goes, it does not admit any such qualification. Instead, even if the action thereunder is of the type mentioned, the Court shall act in accordance with the dictates of the law. In fact the Court has no discretion in this behalf. It is obligatory on it to admit evidence thereunder if it is essential for the just decision of the case. It was held in Syed All Nawaz Gardezi vs. Lt. Col. Muhammad Yusufd) that even if a witness who is ultimately to be produced by the accused in his defence is examined by the trial Court as a Court witness at an earlier stage then notwithstanding the fact that the defence would have an extra advantage of putting leading questions to the witness when standing in the witness-box as a Court witness, it would not effect the power of the Court (under Section 540, Crl.P.C.) to summon and examine the witness if, of course, as was observed in that case, it was in the interest of justice and this presumably essential for the just decision of the case. Again in The State vs. Maulvi Muhammad Jamil and other (2) when examining the effect of change in the criminal procedure, regarding right to further cross-examination, during the transitional period, this Court held that even though it would be for the benefit of the defense, the trial Court could avoid any prejudice to the defense by acting under Section 540, Cr.P.C. After holding so a very weighty observation was made which needs to be reproduced: "This section empowers a Court at any stage of inquiry, trial or any other proceeding under the Code, to summon any person as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined, and it is obligatory for the Court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person, if his evidence appears to it essential for the just decision of the case  In yet another case Rashid Ahmad vs. The State (1), this Court made it more clear that "a criminal Court is fully within its rights in receiving fresh evidence even after both the sides have closed their evidence and the case, is adjourned for judgment, for, till then the case is still pending. The only question therefore, is as to whether in the interest of fairness further opportunity should have been given to the accused"; and, it was held that "there is not bar to the taking of additional evidence in the interest of justice, at any stage of inquiiy or trial as provided by the provision? of Section 540, Cr.P.C." In these cases if the question regarding so-called filling of the gaps would have been raised more squarely, the answer in view of what has been noticed about wouiil have been the same as already rendered namely, that if it is essential for the just decision of the case, then the same is the command of the law under the second part of Section 540, Cr.P.C. It would not be possible to canvass that when the action under the said provision amounted to so-called filling of a gap, the Court would for this reason, avoid its duty to admit the additional evidence." Thus the legal position about examining of additional evidence was fully elucidated in the judgment as: The use of the expression "appears to it" in the second part of Section 540 gives ample indication that even when it is not possible to give a conclusive verdict with regard to the item of evidence being essential or otherwise, yet it taking action under the said part of Section 540. And for that matter as observed earlier, it would not be necessary for the trial Court to hold a separate inquiiy so as to reach a conclusion whether an item of evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. It would be enough if it appears so to the Court from any material or inference from the material including that which is already available to the Court in any from admitted evidence or material otherwise lying on the judicial and other files before it. It is in the foregoing context that another judgment namely Abdul Latif and other vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1), has to be viewed. It was held therein that if there is a finding of the High Court that the evidence of any witness is not necessaiy for just decision of the case, it is a finding of fact and unless there is some substantial error in the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court would not interfere in a case of special leave. I agree with the proposition but would, with respect, add that if the High Court itself commits an error interpreting the second part of Section 540, Cr.P.C. in a manner contrary to what has been stated earlier, it might become a case for interference by this Court. The question regarding so called bar against filling of gaps, has to be considered in another context also. If it is found to be a salutary rule, then the same, without any distinction vis-a-vis the nature of the offence, should be applicable in all criminal trials. It would be noticed that in murder cases; the application of this rule, when the controversy is with regard to the filling or otherwise of a gap in the defense evidence by the resort to Section 540, and in case denial thereof would result in conviction and no other sentence than would not be possible to canvass that in observation of the so called rule of avoidance to fill the gaps, evidence which is essential for the just decision of the case, would not be admitted for this reason. It would not only be the negation of justice in a general sense, but would also contravene another rule namely that no party should suffer on account of mere technicalities. The procedural law is not enacted to trap individual parties through technicalities and has to be interpreted always as acting in aid of justice and fair play. The objection regarding prejudice, filling up gaps in the case and failure of a party to apply for additional evidence in time was further explained in these words: "On more aspect needs to be clarified regarding the exercise of power under Section 540 Cr.P.C. It is in addition to three main aspects already noticed namely: that, it is divided into two pails one discretionary and the other obligatory; that, the obligatory one is conditioned by the fact that it should appear to the Court to be essential for the just decision of the case; and that, the rule against filling of the gaps would not operate against the exercise of this power if the case falls under the second part of Section 540 Cr.P.C. It relates to a proposition, converse to the so called rules regarding filling of the gaps; namely that it should not be exercised so as to prejudice one or the other party. Enough has been said already that if a situation falls under the second part of Section 540 clearly and squarely then the question of prejudice would not be entertainable. It is fallacious proposition that this power then should not be exercised. The mandate of law when itself does not admit of any such qualification, the Court cannot introduce it. Another, clarification needs to be made that although in this case the power to summon additional evidence regarding nikah when exercised would seem to be filling a gap left in the defence evidence; and, if ultimately the additional evidence admitted supports the defence, it would not be possible to say that the process has not gone in aid of justice. Same would apply to the prosecution side because the law as contained in Section 540, Cr.P.C. (second part) or for that matter in the relevant part of Section 165, Evidence Act, does not make any distinction between the prosecution and the defence." The objection of the learned Advocate General that when the application of the appellant was rejected by the trial Court on 30.3.1997 and the appellant having given statement on 31.3.1997 that he would not produce defence inspite of the fact that a day earlier in his statement U/S. 342 Cr.P.C. he had stated that he would produce defence debars him from any redress, finds a clear reply in the above judgment. On interpreting the second part of the Section it has been emphasized that irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or defence was negligent in producing the relevant evidence at the proper time and inspite of the objection that it would amount to filling up the facts in the case of one side or the other side, and also irrespective of the criticism of any side about the partiality of the Court in this exercise even then the Court is bound to perform its duty of examining the evidence which appears to be essential for just discussion of the case. In the above cited case the accused mainly relied for his innocence in the charge of abduction and Zina on a Nikah Narna but could not produce the same in Court. But inspite of that the case was remanded for re-trial to enable him to bring his stand on record as it appeared necessaiy for just decision of the case. The rule laid down in the above judgment was repeated in Shakir Muhammad and another vs. The State (PLD 1985 S.C. 357) when it wa>-observed: "In this background of events, we consider that the defence plea was not mala fide to imply summary rejection. If the trial Court had undertaken to decide the issue of validity of marriage then as indicated in Azam's case full inquiry should have been made into the conflicting claims with regard to the marriage invoking the powers of the Court under Section 540 Cr.P.C. or better still if the family case on the subject was pending its decision should have been awaited for a reasonable time. That course having not been adopted, a material defect remains in the trial. We are not satisfied on the quality of the evidence particularly when the other authentic evidence has not been taken note of on the question of nikah with regard to the findings recorded. It is therefore, a fit case in the light of decision given by this Court in Azam's case in which the decision merits interference. Hence, the appeal is allowed and the judgments of conviction recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the Federal Shariat Court are set aside and a re-trial is ordered in the term of decision of this Court in the case of Azam." It is thus manifest that calling of additional evidence is not always conditioned on the defence or prosecution making application for this purpose but it is the duty of the Court to do complete justice between the parties and the carelessness or ignorance of one party or the other or the delay that may result in the conclusion of the case should not be a hindrance in achieving that object. It is salutory principle of judicial proceedings in criminal cases to find out the truth and to arrive at a correct conclusion and to see that an innocent persons is not punished merely because of certain technical omission on his part or on the part of the Court. It is correct that eveiy criminal case has its own facts and, therefore, no hard and fast rule or criteria for general application can be laid down in this respect but if on the facts of a particular case it appears essential to the Court that additional evidence is necessary for just decision of the case then under second part of Section 540 Cr.P.C. it is obligatory on the Court to examine such a witness ignoring technical/formal objection in this respect as to do justice and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

11.  Now we take up the State appear against Muhammad Yaqoob. The learned Advocate General and the learned Asstt: Advocate General while arguing Appeal No. 49 of 1999 filed by the State to challenge the acquittal of Muhammad Yaqoob by the High Court argued that the learned Judges in the High Court have eiTed in discarding the evidence of recovery of Kalashnikov etc. at the behest of this accused as it matched with the empties picked up from the spot. It was also submitted that the confession of the accused before the Police was admissible in evidence under Section 26 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as the present case was decided on 4.4.1998 while the judgment of Mehram Ali case reported as PLD 1998 S.C. 1445, was delivered on 15.6.1998 and this Mehram Ali case has saved the cases which had concluded before decision of the case. These submissions were opposed by the learned counsel appearing for Muhammad Yaqoob.

12.    The reasons which prevailed with the High Court in the impugned judgment for acquittal of Muhammad Yaqoob are reproduced: "Muhammad Yaqoob appellant, upon arrest was not put to Identification Parade by the concerned police for the unknown reasons. The most important and basic evidence of the identification of this appellant having destroyed by the investigating agency has created an incurable dent in the prosecution case to establish charge against him. The eye-witnesses categorically stated that they identified both the accused at the spot but Muhammad Yaqoob appellant was not taken to the Identification Parade to be identified by the witnesses and consequently the participation of this appellant in the occurrence remains unproved. The identification of this accused in Court, by the witnesses without his identification in jail immediately after arrest was of no value in the facts of the present case. The appellant having not identified by the eye-witnesses in the Identification Parade with the role played by him in the occurrence, the prosecution has not been able to establish his guilt beyond doubt. The evidence of recovery of Kalashnikov at the instance of this appellant from the iron box lying in the room of his residential house and matching of some empties with the same itself is not enough evidence to sustain the conviction. The prosecution gave much importance to the confessional statement of the appellant before the D.S.P. while in custody in the policy station. This confessional statement having not made voluntarily did not acquire the status of extra-judicial confession. The D.S.P. displaying the recording of confessional statement through the vedio probably wanted to show that it was voluntarily made out he forget that the appellant was not mentally free. The appellant if was ready to make a confessional statement voluntarily instead of recording of same by the D.S.P. to remove any doubt the appellant should have been produced before a Magistrate. The confession made before a police official of the rank of D.S.P. was admissible under Section 26 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but the same still could be rejected by the Court, and necessary to be believed and given effect. Be that as it may, the apex Court in Mehram Ali's case (1998 S.C.M.R. 1156) has struck down the provisions of Section 26 of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 by virtue of which the confession before the D.S.P. was made admissible and, therefore, the confessional statement made by Muhammad Yaqoob appellant before the D.S.P. is not an evidence to be read as such and used against the accused. With the exclusion of the evidence of recoveiy, the confessional statement of the appellant and he having not identified through Identification Parade, the evidence of eye-witnesses in the given circumstances is of no help to the prosecution and the conviction and sentence of this appellant being not based on any evidence is not sustainable." The above para shows that the High Court was of the view that mere recoveiy at the pointation of Muhammad Yaqoob was not by itself sufficient to justify conviction in absence of other incriminating evidence. The confession by the accused was discarded as having been made before the Police Officer and as such violative of the rule laid down in Mehram Ali case mentioned above. The argument of the learned Advocate General that after the conviction in this case it became a past and closed transaction and that the dictum in Mehram Ali case would not apply to it as in the said case past and closed transactions have been saved/protected, is not correct. The present occurrence cannot be termed as past and closed transaction as the High Court decided it as an appeal by the convict and Murder Reference by the State and we are now dealing with it as an appeal by the State. In Mehram Ali case the conviction and sentence were challenged in Writ Petition which were collateral proceedings as in direct proceedings the petitioner had failed but in the present case we are deciding the appeal against acquittal against the judgment rendered by the High Court in appeal and Murder Reference, therefore, it is not possible to hold that this appeal relates to past and closed matter. The rule laid down in Mehram Ali case would, therefore, fully apply and on the strength of that judgment the confession before the Police being inadmissible cannot be made basis for conviction. We agree with the High Court that in absence of any other incriminating evidence mere recovery on the pointation of Muhammad Yaqoob respondent would not be sufficient to hold him guilty. The learned Advocate General was unable to show that the reasons given in the impugned judgment for acquittal of the respondent were arbitrary or perverse. This Court is always reluctant to interfere in acquittal order which does not suffer from mis-reading/non-reading of evidence and which cannot be termed so perverse as to have caused miscarriage of justice. The above are the reasons for short order announced on 18..8.2000, which reads as under: "In the light of the factual and legal position to be explained in the detailed order, we accept Criminal Appeal No. 173 of 2000, filed by Muhammad Asif and set aside the impugned judgment of the trial Court and the High Court in respect of the said appellant and remand the case to the learned trial Judge with the direction to summon the witnesses mentioned in the application dated 28.3.1998 under Section 540 Cr.P.C. submitted by the appellant in the trial Court alongwith the relevant record/documents and examine them as Court Witnesses. Both the prosecution and defence be allowed to cross-examine these witnesses in accordance with law. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge should decide the case afresh on the basis of evidence already on record and the one to be brought on record in pursuance of this judgment without being influenced by anything stated/observed in the judgment of the trial Court, the High Court or this Court. The learned trial Court should resume hearing in this case on 2.10.2000 and should finally decide it within three months and report of compliance should be sent to the Registrar of this Court. The learned Advocate General, Punjab and the Jail Authorities should ensure the attendance of the appellant before the trial Court on 2.10.2000. The appellant Muhammad Asif should be kept in judicial lock up as under-trial prisoner during the trial." Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1999 filed by the State against the acquittal of Muhammad Yaqoob is dismissed for the reasons to be recorded in the detailed order".

(S.A.K.M.)                                                                  Orders accordingly.