PLJ 2000 SC 1894

[Appellate Jurisdiction]

Present: rana bhagwandas and javed iqbal, JJ.

Late Mst. MAJEEDAN (through her legal heirs) and another-Petitioners

versus

Late MUHAMMAD NASEEM (through his legal heirs) and another-Respondents

Civil Petition No. 566-K of 1999, decided on 28.7.2000.

(On appeal from the order of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, dated 10.9.1999 passed in Civil Revision Application No. 1/99)

(i) Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)—

—S. 9~Restoration of possession-Suit for--In order to become entitled to relief under Section 9, plaintiff must prove that he was in possession of
property; he has been dispossessed by defendant otherwise than in due course of law and dispossession took place within 6 months of suit-No question of title either of plaintiff or defendant can be raised or gone into in such cases-Such a relief can be granted even against true owner of property himself.    [Pp. 1896 & 1897] A

1989 CLC 318 (DB); 198-7 DLR 8; 1985 CLC 2309; 1983 CLC 50"7; 1982 CLC 654; PLD 1970 Lah. 560; 18 DLR (DB); PLD 1969 Kar. 784; AIR 1959 All 1 (DB); AIR 1956 Hyd. 170; AIR 1927 All. 669 (DB); AIR 1957 All. 394; PLD 1957 Kar. 892; PLD 1957 Kar. 887; PLD 1979 Kar. 227; 1987 CLC 1566 ref.

(ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)—

—-S. 115 read with Specific Relief Act, 1877, S. 9-Decree passed under Section 9 of Specific Relief Act-Revision petition against-Compete cy--Challenge to-Interference in revision would be justified, if case could be disposed of on an obvious misapprehension as to legal position or where there was some defect of jurisdiction-Except in exceptional circumstances, no such interference would be justified merely on ground that finding on question of fact was not based on adequate evidence or was erroneous, otherwise it would be against spirit of Section 9 of Specific Relief Act and in effect would convert revision petition into an appeal, hich law expressly disallows.     [Pp. 1898 & 1899] B & C

1983 PSC 158; PLD 1964 Pesh. 157; 16 DLR (WP) 164; PLD 1950 Pesh. 35; PLD 1952 Dacca 89; PLD 1951 Dacca 140; 1991 MLD 1046; AIR 1953 Assam 158; 72 Mad. L.W. 361; AIR 1942 Oudh 179; AIR 1957 Hyd. 4; AIR 1949 Nag. 422; AIR 1926 Mad. 290; AIR 1933 Mad. 609; AIR 1932 Oudh 39; AIR 1937 Oudh 183; AIR 1934 All. 541; 1989 CLC 219; 1989 CLC 219; AIR 1953 Assam 158; 17 Gal. W.N. 501 (DB) ref. Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, ASC/AOR for Petitioners. Syed Sarfaraz Ahmed, ASC and Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, AOR (absent) for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 27.7.2000.

order

Javed Iqbal, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge in the High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 10.9.1999 dismissing Revision Petition Bearing No. 1/99 in limine.

2.        Briefly stated the facts of the case are that respondents filed a suit on 8.5.1973 against the petitioners for recovery of possession of immovable property under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and possession of movable property or compensation in sum of Rs. 10,000/- in lieu thereof. The respondents filed amended plaint on 24.1.1980 with the averment that Respondent No.  1 was allotted a plot measuring 460 Sq. Yds in the Commercial   Area   of  Liaquatabad   Karachi   by   the   Deputy   Refugee Commissioner Karachi vide Order No. 17-3/D.C.-53/8190 dated 17.4.1953 and physical possession was delivered by the Refugee Welfare Officer Karachi. It is further averred that Respondent No. 2 who is brother-in- aw of the Respondent No. 1 was allowed by him to establish business in the said plot with the name and style of M/s. Khursheed Electric Company and M/s. Associated Traders. The petitioners dis-possessed the respondents from the said plot by use of force and on gun point. The respondents consequently filed a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act.  he petitioners contested the suit by filing written statement and strenuously denied the claim of respondents by raising various legal and factual objections including that the plot in question was allotted in their favour and Petitioner No. 1 is a lessee from K.M.C. who has not been impleaded as a party. It is further stated that the Refugee Welfare Officer allotted this plot to  etitioner No. 1 in 1955 and it was not allotted permanently in favour of respondents and subsequent allotment in favour of petitioners amounts to cancellation of allotment, if any made earlier in favour of the respondents.

3.    After framing of issues the parties led evidence to substantiate their respective claims and on conclusion of trial the suit was decreed by learned Senior Civil Judge (II) Karachi Central vide judgment/decree dated 17.12.1998. Being aggrieved the petitioners filed a Revision Petition which has been dismissed in limine by learned Single Judge vide impugned order.

4.   It is mainly contended by Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, ASC that the learned trial Court had exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and the suit was not maintainable being out side the purview of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act which aspect of the matter remained un-attended and resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. It is also contended that after the death of
Muhammad Naseem (Respondent No. 1) the suit could not be continued by his brothers and sisters. It is urged with vehemence that the learned trial Court has not appreciated the evidence which has come on record in its true perspective resulting in serious prejudice. It is argued that Muhammad Naseem used forged and fabricated document and thus played fraud upon
the Court by showing an entry of possession on the reverse of the allotment order and therefore, he was not entitled to get the possession as the plot in question was never allotted in his favour by the competent authority.

5.                  Syed  Sarfaraz  Ahmed ASC  appeared for  respondents and strenuously controverted the view point as canvassed by Mr. Khalil-ur- Rehman on behalf of petitioners by arguing that the petitioners have failed to substantiate their claim by adducing any worthy of credence oral or written evidence. It is further contended that the plot in question was got allotted on the basis of forged and fabricated allotment order which has been proved on the basis of documentary evidence as led by the respondents and correctly appreciated by the learned trial Court. He also pointed out that the question of fact cannot be agitated which has already been decided by the learned trial Court on the basis of cogent and concrete evidence. It is also contended that no illegality or irregularity whatsoever has been committed  ither by the trial Court or revisional Court calling for any interference by this Court. He has also drawn our attention to the  hequered history of the case and pointed out that after lapse of about three decades the controversy is yet to be determined finally.

6.         We  have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of petitioners and respondents in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have minutely perused the judgment passed by learned trial Court on 17.12.1998 and impugned order. The entire evidence has been thrashed out with the eminent assistance of learned counsels of the parties. We are not persuaded to agree with the main contention as agitated on behalf of the petitioners that suit was not maintainable under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act as twofold relief was sought by the respondents for the reason that at later stage the suit was got amended with permission of trial Court and only possession was prayed for. It is worth mentioning here that "A suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief  is however an entirely different kind of action. That section gives a special privilege to persons in possession who take action promptly. In case they are dispossessed, it entitles them to succeed simply by proving (1) that they were in possession, (2) that they have been dispossessed by the defendant, (3) that the dispossession is not in accordance with law, and (4) that the dispossession took place with six months of the suit. No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can be raised or gone into in that case". (1989 CLC 318 (DB) + 1987 Dhaka LR 8 + 1985 CLC 2309 + 1983 CLC 507 + 1981 CLC 654 + PLD 1970 Lah. 560 + 18 DLR (DB) + PLD 1969 Kar. 78 + AIR 1959 All. 1 (DB) + AIR 1956 Hyd. 170 + AIR 1927 All. 669 (DB). All that is necessary is that it must be proved that the plaintiff was in possession, that he was dispossessed and that the suit has been brought within 6 month from the date of the dispossession. It is immaterial if the plaintiff was in possession and that such possession was without title and therefore, the contention as agitated on behalf of the petitioners that possession was obtained on the basis of forged allotment order cannot be considered. It is well established legal position that "Title was not material in a suit falling under S. 9 and any person who had been dispossessed, otherwise than in due course of law, could, within pleading or proving title, seek to be reinducted into possession even though such a relief was sought against true owner of property himself. (Sobha v. Ram Phal, AIR 1957 All. 394; Azam Khan v. The State of Pakistan and another, PLD 1957 Kar. 892; Siddiq Ahmed v. Estate Officer and another, PLD 1957 Kar. 887; Riaz and another v. Razi Muhammad, PLD 1979 Kar. 227 and Supercon Ltd. v. Eastern Construction Ltd., 1987 CLC 1566 ref). Reference may here be made to the case reported as Ganesh and another v. Dasso and another (AIR 1927 All. 669), where while construing the scope of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act it was observed: "In suits under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, the Court does not try in question of title and, therefore, the defendant cannot resist the plaintiffs suit on the ground of his being the rightful owner. No matter how good the title of the dispossession, the person previously in possession is entitled to a decree for possession in suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, provided he brings the suit within six months of the date of his dispossession." Having observed as above the learned Court held: "This is not the case in suits for possession brought more than six months after the dispossession of the plaintiff. In such suits Courts have to try question of title and, therefore, it is open to a defendant notwithstanding the previous possession of the plaintiff to resist the claim for possession by setting up and proving a title in himself. In other words, title is no defence in a suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, but affords a conclusive defence in other suit". (Messrs A.R. Muhammad Siddique v. The Saifee High School Board (1983 CLC 507). In the case of Fazal Muhammad v. Muhammad Usman (PLD 1970 Lah. 560) while discussing a similar proposition the learned High Court of Lahore observed that in suits under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act the only question to be seen is whether the plaintiff was in possession when he was dispossessed and that the Court does not decide the question of title and all that it is concerned with is as to whether possession has been disturbed without any authority of law and in disregard of it.

7.         We have also dilated upon the question as to whether appeal or revision is competent in such like cases? The impugned order passed by learned Sinele Judge seems somewhat contradictory on this point. It is worth mentioning here at this juncture that Section 9 itself provides "That no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed". It is well settled by now that "A revision lies to the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in  espect of an order or decree made in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (1983 PSC 158 + PLD 1964 Pesh. 157 = 16 DLR (WP) 164 + PLD 1950 Pesh. 35 + PLD 1952 Dacca 89. But as in a suit under Section 9 an aggrieved party can institute a suit on the basis of title, interference in revision, has been generally declined even though Section 9 does not exclude the  emedy by way of revision altogether. (1991 MLD 1046 + PLD 1952 Dacca 89 + AIR 1953 Assam 158 + 72 Mad. LW 361. Every case has to be decided on its own facts (PLD 1952 Dacca 89 « PLR 1951 Dacca 140) and interference in revision is justified in cases of exceptional nature, (AIR 1942 Oudh 179 + AIR 1957 Hyd. 4. (Where the balance of convenience in a case is not in
favour of driving the plaintiff to a regular suit, the High Court would interfere in revision) + AIR 1949 Nag. 422 + AIR 1926 Mad. 290 + AIR 1933 Mad. 609 + AIR 1932 Oudh. 39 + AIR 1937 Oudh 183 + AIR 1934 All. 541) as when rights of the aggrieved party were so clear that it may not be equitable to force him to another suit or the case had been disposed of on an
obvious misapprehension as to the true legal position or where there was some defect of jurisdiction in the proceedings. (1989 CLC 219).

8.     We cannot endorse the view of Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman ASC that the evidence which has come on record has not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice because the scrutiny of entire evidence would lead clearly, indubitably and irresistibly to the inference that respondents have proved that they were in possession of
the plot in question and were dispossessed by the petitioners otherwise than in due course of law. It has been observed with grave concern that matter has been lingering on for one or the other reason for the last 27 years on hyper technical issues and the petitioners have succeeded in frustrating the object of various judicial pronouncements which aspect of the matter has
taken care of by learned trial Court by whom it was observed as follows:  "Thus in the light of 12 witnesses statement, confirmation of Muhammad Nasim allotment and possession by the allotting authority and his two officers of Liaquatabad and about 150
documents produced by him abundantly proved that Muhammad Nasim was real allottee and he was in possession of the suit premises till 3.4.1994, when he was dispossessed by Anwar Hussain, Defendant No. 2 and his associates on gun point FIR dated 3.4.1973 is also a solid proof of his dispossession on gun point. Judgment and decree dates 13.1.1983 and 22.1.1983 respectively in Appeal No. 232/80 of the Vllth Additional District Judge, Karachi, declaring allotment and lease as bogus and fraudulent of Defendant No. 1. Supreme Court of Pakistan's dismissal of defendants Review Petition No. 20-K of 1993 dated 23.6.1993. Cancellation of bogus and fraudulent lease deed of Mst. Majeedanby the K.M.C. of the suit plot on 26.1.1994 vide Letter No. AD/VP 1610/94. High Court of Sindh's dismissal order in Suit No. 689/93 dated 28.3.1996 of the defendants for declaration and injunction of the suit property. Dismissal of High Court's Appeal No. 43/96 dated 12.2.1998 of the defendants by Division Bench of the High Court regarding Declaration and Injunction of the suit property prove the facts noted above, that Muhammad Nasim was allottee of the suit property and he was in peaceful possession the same after construction of boundary walls, three rooms ad one shop on the suit premises till 3.4.1973, when he was dispossessed by the Defendant No. 2 alongwith notorious gundas ofLalukhet on gun point." In the light of foregoing discussion, we are, of the considered opinion that no illegality or infirmity whatsoever has been committed either by the trial or revisional Court calling for interference. It is worth mentioning that interference in a revision in a particular case is justified if the case may have been disposed of on an obvious misapprehension as to the legal position, or where there is some defect of jurisdiction. But where no exceptional circumstances are brought out and the they only contention raised is that the finding on a question of fact is not based on adequate evidence or is erroneous, interference would not be justified. It would be going against the spirit of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and in effect would be to convert a petition of revision into an appeal which the law expressly disallows. (1989 CLC 219 + AIR 1953 Assam 158 + 17 Cal. WN 501 (DB)]. The petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands and accordingly the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. The vacant possession of the plot in question be handed over to the respondents forthwith.