PLJ 2001 SC 139
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGEU; DEEDARHUSSAIN SHAH
and javed iqbal, JJ. Mqjor RASHID EEC-Appellant
versus
REHMAT
ULLAH KHAN and 4 others-Respondents Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1995, decided on
19.10.2000.
(On appeal from the judgment of the
Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 22.9.1993 passed in C.R. No. 172-D of 1982)
(i) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973-
—Art 185--Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), S. 115-Concurrent findings of Courts
below-Reversal by High Court-Validity-Wkere concurrent findings were based on conjectural
presumptions, erroneous assumptions and wrong proposition of law, same could be
reversed by High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction-Interference would be justifiable in
concurrent findings when the same were based on in sufficient evidence,
misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material evidence erroneous
assumption of facts, patent errors of law, consideration of inadmissible evidence,
excess or abuse of jurisdiction, as arbitrary exercise of power and where
un-reasonable view on evidence had been taken due to non-reading and misreading of
evidence. [P. 143] A
(ii) Specific Relief
Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--
—S. 42-Constitution
of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 186-Dismissal of respondents suit against
cancellation of allotment in their favour by two Courts below- -High Court on
consideration of material on record decreed respondents, suit--Validity--Plot
in question, was cancelled from the name of appellant and was allotted in favour of
respondent-Appellant had not invoked
jurisdiction of any civil Court to get his
title established or for redressal of bis
grievances but kept on waiting for the result of litigation by respondents, thereby ignoring the fact that he
could not derive any benefit, in as
much as, he was having no legal status after cancellation of plot in question, from his name--Non-delivering of
possession to respondent after
allotment, was of no consequence, in as much as, physical handing over of plot in question, was subject to completion of
certain formalities which could only be done by concerned functionaries
of District Allotment Committee-Lapse of the
Department in not handing over
possession of plot in question, after completion of
formalities could not be equated to
that of wilful default-High Court ,
thus, had rightly decreed respondents
suit and same could not be
interfered with in exercise of
appellant jurisdiction. [P. 144] B
PLD 1983 SC 53; 1981 SCMR 1233; PLD
198? SC 139; PLD 1985 SC 41; PLD 1989 SC 568; 1989 SCMR 34; PLD 1994 SC 162; 1994 SCMR
1836; 1999 SCMR 971; 2000 SCMR 533 ref.
Mr. Shakbaz
Khurshid, ASC & Mr. Tanvir Mmed, AOR (absent) for Appellant.
Ch. Muhammad Farooq,
St. ASC
and Ch. Akhtar Mi, AOR for Respondents Nos. 1 & 2.
Mr. Dil Muhammad Tarar, ASC for Respondents Nos. 3 to 5. Date of hearing:
19.10.2000.
judgment
Javed Iqbai, J.-This appeal
by leave of the Court is directed against judgment dated 22.9.1993 passed by
learned Single Bench of Lahore High Court, Lahore, whereby the revision petition
preferred on behalf of the respondents
has been accepted by setting aside the judgments/decrees dated 7.6.1979 and 23.1.1982 passed by learned Civil
Judge, Faisalabad, and learned
Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, respectively, whereby suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the
respondents has been decreed.
2. Leave granting order dated 3.13.1995 is
reproduced herein below to appreciate the
legal and factual aspect of the controversy to the effect that "the first and the second respondents were
allotted Plot No. 621/A but the allotment
was cancelled by the District Housing Officer's order dated 25.11.1967. The said respondents brought this
suit to have it declared that the cancellation
order was void and illegal. Then <vrd was that they had not violated the terms and conditions of allotment;
that they were to pay instalments
and raise construction on the plot only after the delivery of possession and as they were never placed in
possession of the plot, there was no
question of paying instalments or raising construction. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit and the said respondents'
appeal was dismissed by the
appellate Court's judgment dated 23.1.1982. On their revision, a learned Judge of the High Court held that the Courts below
had "acted with material irregularity
in reaching the conclusion that the petitioners had failed to observe
the terms and conditions of the contract or that the plot stood lawfully allotted in the name of Respondent No. 4
(Major Rashid Beg petitioner
herein). He, therefore, accepted the revision petition and set aside the judgment and the decree of the Courts below
and decreed the suit. We have heard
learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the plaintiffs. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein. We
have been referred to the finding of
the learned trial Judge and the finding of the learned Additional. District Judge, Faisalabad on the question of
delivery of possession. It is pointed
out that the finding was that it was the duty of the said respondents - to, and
here I quote from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge "have taken steps for de*! *°ry of
possession after the execution of agreement
Exh.. P-3", and that "there is nothing on the record to show that the appellants ever before the issuance of
show-cause notice applied to Respondent
No. 1 for delivery of possession". The contention is that in view of this
finding the learned Judge in the High Court was wrong to proceed on the footing
that possession of the plot was not delivered to the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Leave to appeal is granted to
consider this contention."
3. It is mainly
contended by Mr. Shahbaz Khurshid, learned ASC that the evidence which has come
on record has not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in
serious miscarriage of justice. It is urged with vehemence that in view of the well
settled law the concurrent findings of fact could not be reversed in view of
dictum laid down by this Court in PLD 1983 SC 53 and 1981 SCMR 1233. It is also
urged with vehemence that the plot in question was never cancelled from the name
of appellant and accordingly there was no lawful justification for its allotment in
favour of respondents.
It is further argued that a simple note in the demand and collection register
regarding cancellation of allotment by no stretch of imagination can be
equated with that of cogent documentary evidence which has been relied upon
by the learned High Court without any rhyme and reason which resulted in grave
prejudice. It is next contended that the impugned judgment being laconic is liable to
be set aside and the concurrent findings as derived by the learned trial and
Appellate Court may be kept intact.
4. Ch. Muhammad Farooq, learned Sr. ASC appeared on
behalf of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2
and vehemently controverted the view point as convassed on behalf of the
appellant by arguing that impugned judgment being free from any illegality or infirmity hardly calls for any interference
as no lawful justification is available for it. It is contended that the
scope of Section 115 CPC is not limited and concurrent
findings if based on misreading or
non-reading of evidence can be reversed. Reliance has been
placed on the following authorities
to substantiate the said contentions :--
Karamat Hussian v. Muhammad Toman (PLD 1987 SC 139)
Illahi Bakhsh v. Noor Muhammad (PLD 1985 SC 41)
Nasir Abbas v. Manzoor Haider Shah (PLD 1989 SC 568)
Sheikh Muhammad v. Mst. Hashmat Sultana (1989 SCMR 34)
Saheb Khan v. Muhammad Pannah (PLD 1994 SC 162)
Muhammad Bakhsh v. Province of Punjab (1994 SCMR 1836)
Zakirullah Khan v. Faizullah Khan (1999 SCMR 971)
Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Akram (2000 SCMR 533)
5.
It is, however, conceded frankly by Ch. Muhammad Farooq, learned Sr. ASC that the allotment order
was made in favour of appellant but it has
got no value as no agreement could be executed by the appellant which was a mandatory pre-requisite for such an
allotment. It is pointed out that
the respondents had executed the agreement after completion of all the mandatory
formalities. It is argued firmly that physical possession was never handed over to the respondents by the department
concerned and it was beyond the
competency of Respondents to take over the possession at their own and for the lapse or omission of the
department the respondents cannot be
held responsible.
6.
Mr. Dil Muhammad Tarar, learned ASC appeared on behalf of
learned
Advocate General and supported the impugned judgment by conceding that the
plot in question was allotted to respondents on 13.1.1964 and agreement was signed on 2.10.1964 but
possession was not handed over on "Form V".
7. We have carefully examined the respective
contentions as agitated on behalf of
the parties. We have thrashed out the entire record with the eminent assistance of learned counsels for
the parties. The judgments and decrees
passed by learned trial and Appellate Courts have been perused carefully. We have also gone througn
the impugned judgment. We are not persuaded to agree with Ch. Shahbaz
Khurshid, learned ASC on behalf of the
appellants that concurrent findings in any case cannot be reversed by the High
Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section
115 CPC for the reason that the scope of Section 115 CPC is not as narrow and limited as portraited by Ch. Shahbaz
Khurshid, learned ASC. We are of the
considered opinion that where the concurrent findings are based on conjectural presumptions, erroneous
assumptions and wrong proposition of law that can be reversed justifiable by
High Court while exercising
revisional jurisdiction as conferred upon it under Section 115 CPC and interference may be made in concurrent
findings when the same are based
on insufficient evidence, misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material
evidence, erroneous assumption of facts, patent errors of law, consideration of inadmissible evidence, excess or
abuse of jurisdiction, arbitrary exercise of power and where unreasonable view
on evidence has been taken due to non-reading
and misreading of evidence.
8. A careful scrutiny
of the record of the case and evidence would -- reveal that on 26.10.1963 the plot in
question was cancelled from the name of appellant and an entry to th* effect made
in the Demand and Collection Register against which an appeal was also filed by the
appellant which was not pursued and thereafter no further action was taken to
get the allotment revived. It is quite amazing that once again the appellant got up from
his slumber
when the suit of respondents was dismissed but "dismissal of suit" does not mean
re-allotment of plot in favour of appellant as in any case no declaration could have been given in his
favour irrespective of the fate of the ^ suit
filed by the respondents. It is an admitted feature of the case that the plot
in question was allotted in favour of respondents on 24.1.1964 after its cancellation on 26.10.1963. In this regard the
observations as made by the learned
High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction are unexceptionable which are reproduced herein below
for ready reference :--
"True, the disputed plot was
allotted in the name of Major Rashid Baig, Respondent No. 4 but subsequently it
was cancelled from his name on 26.10.1963. An entry to this effect was made in the Demand and
Collection Register maintained by the District Housing Officer, Faisalabad.
Subsequently, the plot was allotted to the petitioners but their allotment was
not challenged by Respondent No. 4 even after coming to know about the allotment of
the plot in the name of the petitioners. Respondent No. 4 had even filed an appeal against the cancellation of the
plot on 3.2.1972 before the Deputy
Commissioner and the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab but did
not pursue the same in view of the litigation pending in the Civil Court. The stand taken by the department that the agreement
alongwith the two copies was handed over to the petitioners; who were supposed to get it registered and return the same to the department is not acceptable. Had it
been so it must have been stated in
the show-cause notice. The department has accepted the execution of the agreement in favour of the petitioners and
has attempted to justify the action taken by it on the basis of the conditions of the contract.
9.
It is an admitted fact that the appellant had not invoked
the jurisdiction
of any Civil Court to get his title established or for the redressal of his grievances but kept on waiting for
the result of litigation initiated by the respondents but ignored that he could not
derive any benefit as he was having no legal status after the cancellation of
plot in question. We are not persuaded to agree
with Ch. Shahbaz Khurshid, learned ASC on behalf of the appellant that
since the possession was not handed over to the respondents as such appellant is on a
better footing as compared to that of respondents which aspect of the matter has
been appreciated properly by the forums below for the reason that admittedly
the physical possession was not handed over to the
respondents and the statement of Ajmal Khan makes it abundant clear that
physical possession was not handed over by the artment concerned and he stood firm
to tbe test of cross-examination and nothing beneficial could be elicited in spite
of various searching questions and exhaustive cross-examination. The version of official
witnesses remained unshattered
and being confidence inspiring cannot be brushed aside. The contention
as agitated on behalf of the appellant that since no construction whatsoever was made by the respondents as such
they are not entitled for the
allotment seems devoid of merits for the simple reason that without having physical possession the question of
construction does not arise and on this score
the entitlement of the
respondents cannot be challenged. Admittedly the further dues were required to be paid after having
received
the physical possession which was never handed over to the respondents and, therefore, such lapse cannot be equated to
that of a wilful default. All the conditions as enumerated in the agreement in
this regard would figure in after the
delivery of possession and thus cannot be pressed into service. As mentioned herein above physical handing over of
the plot is subject to completion of
certain formalities which can only be done by the concerned functionaries of the District Allotment Committee
and suo motu assumption of
the plot by the respondents was not possible as it was for the department concerned to hand over its proper possession.
10.
In the light of foregoing discussion we are not inclined
to accept this appeal which is accordingly
dismissed being devoid of merits.
(A.A.) Appeal dismissed.