PLJ 2010 AJ&K 40

Present: Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, J.

Sardar KARAM DAD KHAN, ADVOCATE, SUPREME COURT AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR MUZAFFARABAD and 5 others--Petitioners

versus

CHAIRMAN AJ&K COUNCIL/PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN, through Secretary AJ&K Council Secretariat, Islamabad
and 9 others--Respondents

W.P. No. 362 of 2010, decided on 7.5.2010.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----S. 10--Power to order further scrutiory--Jurisdiction--Objection of--No Court shall proceed with trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claimed litigation under same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in Pakistan having jurisdiction to grant relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of Pakistan established or continued by Central Government and having like jurisdiction or before Supreme Court--Objection has no substance, hence, is hereby repelled.            [P. 48] A

Jurisdiction of Supreme Court--

----Pendency of the petition in original jurisdiction--Supreme Court is not debarred from hearing and deciding the controversy brought before it whereby action or inaction of the Constitutional functionaries working within the territorial jurisdiction of Supreme Court is challenged.            [Pp. 48 & 49] B

AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974--

----S. 44--Constitutional petition--Appointment of private respondent as judge--Notification by AJ&K Government--Appointment and issuance of notification can be scrutinized by the Courts--Jurisdiction--In absence of prohibitory order--Supreme Court cannot stay its hands from enforcing fundamental rights of the petitioners, who have been struggling 2006--Both the Courts have concurrent jurisdiction on the ground that cause of action arose in their jurisdiction--Either of the Court can stay its hands only on rule of propriety not otherwise.                [P. 49] C & D

AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974--

----S. 42(e)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 209--Removal of the Judges of Superior Courts on ground of incapability of performing the duties of their offices by reason of physical mental incapacity or guilty of misconduct--Modern democratic system of the Government, unlike other public functionaries, Judges of superior Courts are not immune from the process of accountability--In order to save the judges from being dragged into the ordinary Courts or tribunals, and in order to strengthen the concept of independence of judiciary, a highest constitutional body is provided for removal of the judges, composed of their own Judges. [P. 54] E

AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974--

----S. 42(g)--Proceedings of Supreme Judicial Council--Challenge to--Revisional jurisdiction--S.J.C. is highest Constitutional body consisting upon the Judges--Findgs of such body regarding guilty of misconduct has been declared final by Constitution itself and executive is not vested with any authority to sit over it as appellate authority to exercise review or revisional jurisdiction because the report and proceedings of Supreme Judicial Council are immune from challenge u/S. 42-G of the Act, 1974.                [P. 55] F

AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974--

----S. 36(2)--Reasonable time--To issue on executive order on basis of the report without unreasonable delay--No timeframe is provided in Constitution for issuance of notification--Advice by Chairman and President cannot be procrastinated and has to  be complied within reasonable time--Validity--Bill passed by legislative assembly or joint sitting has to be consented by President within seven days u/S. 36(2) of Act and if it is not done within that period, it shall be deemed to have been assented as the will of Parliament is final.              [P. 55] G

Supremacy of Parliament and Independence of Judiciary--

----Judgments of Supreme Court or any other tribunal--Principle of finality of judgments--Where the Constitution or law means to leave a room for executive, notwithstanding the finality of a judgment--Limited power of the President under Constitution of India, Pakistan and AJK relating to clemency/remission of the sentence, where inspite of judgment of a Court having become final, President can alter it for the purpose of remission of sentence--Principle of finality of judgments even then remains undisturbed.                [P. 55] H

AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974--

----S. 42-E(6-b)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 209(6-B)--Bound to advice the President to remove the judge--Difference between the report made by S.J.C. constituted Constitution of Pakistan and Act, 1974--Validity--Chairman is bound to advice the President to remove the judge from his office and President is also bound to pass the order in light of recommendations of Supreme Judicial Council.     [P. 56] I

Report of Supreme Judicial Council--

----Not challengeable--Affect of report cannot be nullified by non-issuance of the formal order which is a mere formality.            [P. 56] J

So-Called Order--

----Writ can be issued in appropriate cases for implementation of the same--After acceptance of review petition by competent authority, it is duty of the authority to implement such order irrespective of issuance of so-called formal order.       [P. 56] K

Misconduct of Private Respondent--

----Recommendation of Supreme Judicial Council--Proved of--Private respondent has ceased to be the Judge Chief Justice of Supreme Court of AJK and the office of the Chief Justice is vacant--Proceeding in instant petition will not serve any purpose.              [P. 57] L

PLD 1998 SC 161; PLD 2008 SC 735 and 2002 SCR 62 ref.

Sardar K. D. Khan, Advocate, in person, and for the remaining Petitioners.

Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate, for AJK Government.

Raja Tariq Mehmood, Assistant Draftsman/Deputy Secretary AJK Council Secretariat, for AJK Council.

Sardar Mushtaq Hussain Khan, Kh. Muhammad Nasim and Kh. Maqbool Waar, Advocates, for the Respondent No.9.

Date of hearing: 7.5.2010.

Judgment

The petitioners, herein, are practicing Advocates of the bar, have filed this petition under Section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, and have claimed following relief:-

"It is, therefore, very humbly prayed that in light of the pleadings appropriate writ may be issued in following manners.

a.             That the notification No. LD/AD 2/1/2002 dated 21.10.2006 whereby respondent No. 9 has been appointed as Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir may kindly be declared illegal, against the constitutional Conventions and against the seniority and same may kindly be set aside, the post of the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir may kindly be declared vacant.

b.             That Hon'ble respondent No. 9 may kindly be asked that under what authority of law he is holding the office of Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, against the Constitutional provisions, Constitutional conventions. Moreover the respondents No. 1 to 8 may kindly be asked that under what authority of law they have issued notification LD/AD 2/1/2002 dated 21.10.2006.

c.             That respondents No. 1 to 5 may kindly be directed to send advice for appointment of senior most Judge of Supreme Court as Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and respondents No. 5 to 8 may kindly be directed to issue the appointment order of most senior Judge of Supreme court as Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir according to the Constitutional conventions and dictum of Supreme Court of Pakistan as laid down in the cases titled "Asid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 1998 SC 161], Raees-ul-Mujahideen Habib Wahab-ul-Kheri v. Federation of Pakistan [PLJ 1996 SC 882]

d.             Any other relief which is admissible under law may kindly be granted."

The brief facts forming the background of the instant petition, as claimed, are that respondent No. 1 has to administer the State territory under the auspicious of United Nations Resolutions, and for that purpose Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 (hereinafter to be referred as Act,1974) has been enacted whereby parliamentary system of the Government, trichotomy of powers has been introduced. According to the scheme of the Constitution, the executive, parliament and judiciary have to act within their allotted spheres. It is claimed that under the modern democratic system, an independent judiciary is necessary for protection of the rights of the citizens. In Azad Jammu and Kashmir superior Courts either Supreme Court and High Court have been established with their respective jurisdiction under Sections 42 and 43 of the Act, 1974. The President has to make appointments of the Chief Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court on the advice of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. It is claimed that in past senior most Judge of the Supreme Court of AJK has been adviced to be appointed as Chief Justice of Supreme Court  but in derogation to this practice and constitutional convention, respondent No. 6 has appointed private respondent as Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir vide Notification dated 21 Oct 2006 while superceding Mr. Justice Manzoor Hussain Gillani, the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court. The appointment of private respondent, herein, has been challenged on the ground that even for appointment as Acting Chief Justice, Constitution requires that the senior most of the other Judges, is to be appointed whereas while appointing the permanent Chief Justice this principle has been brushed aside and the requirement of the Constitution that only the senior most Judge has to be appointed as Chief Justice of AJK in order to ensure free, fair, impartial and public confidence inspiring justice stood violated. The petitioners have also challenged the appointment of private respondent for having been made in violation of rule of law laid down in Malik Asid Ali's case [PLD 1998 SC 161]. It is also claimed by them that Government of Jammu and Kashmir as well as President was not bound to act upon an unconstitutional advice of the respondent No. 1, hence, their act i.e. acting upon illegal advice was violative of the Constitution and Rules of Business of the Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Record of the case was earlier summoned by the Supreme Court and in view of order of the then Acting Chief Justice of this Court on Mar 28, 2007, the same was sent to the apex Court. However, this petition remained pending there till Apr 16, 2010. On 16.4.2010, the file has been received back from the apex Court upon which notices were issued to the respondents. Private respondent was also served who sought some time and the case was adjourned to 20.4.2010. On this date some documents were placed before the Court by the petitioners and the next date was fixed as 21.4.2010. On 21.4.2010, Kh. Muhammad Nasim, Advocate, requested for filing power of attorney on behalf of respondent No. 9 and made a request for an amendment which was allowed. The next date was fixed as 27.4.2010. On 27.4.2010, Kh. Muhammad Nasim and Kh. Maqbool Waar, Advocates, tendered their power of attorney on behalf of private respondent and seek further time. Their request was again allowed and the case was fixed for 30.4.2010. On this date again Kh. Maqbool Waar, Advocate, sought an adjournment which was allowed in the interest of justice and the case was fixed for 3.5.2010. On 3.5.2010 an application was filed by Kh. Muhammad Nasim, Advocate, that the petitioners, at their own, have made some deletion/amendment in the petition, therefore, they may be allowed further time after clarifying that on which petition they have to file parawise comments. This application was rejected because sufficient time has already been allowed to them and objection, if any, could be taken in the comments. So far as question of amendment is concerned, this Court directed the petitioners to delete some paras of the petition, which in estimation of the Court, were against the rule of pleadings and were contemptuous. On this verbal order, the petitioners have filed amended petition after deleting scandalous material.

The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council (hereinafter to be referred as Council) has filed comments through its representative wherein it is pleaded that a petition on similar grounds is subjudice before the apex Court of Pakistan, therefore, the matter being directly and substantially in issue before the apex Court of Pakistan, this petition merits dismissal. It is also pleaded by them that Supreme Judicial Council has finalized its proceedings in a reference filed against private respondent, herein, therefore, this Court lacks the jurisdiction in the case in hand.

The Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has also filed comments. The essence of the comments is that case of the private respondent, herein, has not been processed in the light of Rules of Business by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government who has pivotal role and duty to provide fair, free and impartial judiciary for administration of justice. It is also submitted that advice of the Council, in the circumstances of this case, was not mandatory. It is also pleaded that provisions of the Act, 1974 either Sections 42(4) & 42(8) have to be interpreted in the light of Article 177 and 193 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and rule of law laid down in Al-Jehad Trust's case [PLD 1996 SC 324]. It is prayed that appropriate order may be passed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 42(4) and 42(8) of the Act, 1974 read with the Rules of Business of the Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Sardar K. D. Khan, Advocate, contended that appointment of senior most Judge of the Supreme Court as Chief Justice Azad Jammu and Kashmir is not only in line with the scheme of the Act, 1974 rather is supported by well established Constitutional Convention, acted upon and accepted by the functionary exercising the powers to appoint Chief Justice in Pakistan & Azad Jammu and Kashmir from time to time. According to him in absence of an express provision in the Act, 1974, Constitutional Convention has the force of Constitution itself and is liable to be implemented in letter and spirit. He submitted that Section 42(4) of the Act, 1974, clearly postulates that Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Council and each of the other Judges of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Council after consultation with the said Chief Justice. He also referring to and relying upon Section 42(8) of the Act, 1974 contended that at any time when office of the Chief Justice is vacant or Chief Justice is absent or unable to perform the functions of his office due to any other cause, the President shall appoint the most senior of the other Judges of the Supreme Court as Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. He also submitted that words "most senior of the other Judges" used in subsection (8) of Section 42 of the Act, 1974 are suggestive of the fact that even for the purpose of appointment as Acting Chief Justice, seniority cannot be ignored. He also submitted that deviation from the principle of seniority has been thrashed out in Malik Asid Ali's case [PLD 1998 SC 161]. He submitted that neither the Government nor the President or Council could violate the principle laid down in the cited case while making the appointment of Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir at the relevant time. The learned Advocate submitted that no valid, concrete, cogent or administrative reasons have been given in the summary for suppression of Mr. Justice Manzoor Hussain Gillani, the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. In support of his submissions the learned Advocate placed reliance on the following cases:-

i)              Malik Asid Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others [PLD 1998 SC 161].

ii)             Al-Jehad Trust's case [PLD 1996 SC 324]

He further submitted that a Judge can be ignored from further elevation only on the ground that he is incapable of properly performing the duties of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity or he has been guilty of misconduct, otherwise, neither a Judge can be removed from the office nor in light of the scheme of the Act, 1974 can be superceded. The learned Advocate contended that notification of appointment of the private respondent, herein, still exists, therefore, relief prayed for can competently be granted.

Raja Tariq Mehmood, Assistant Draftsman/Deputy Secretary AJK Council Secretariat, appearing on behalf of Council has confined himself only to two grounds. Firstly, he submitted that as the matter is already subjudice before the apex Court of Pakistan on the common grounds, hence, this Court despite having concurrent jurisdiction should abstain from entertaining and deciding the controversy agitated in this petition. Secondly, the Supreme Judicial Council has completed its recommendations/ report which has been sent to the competent authority for notification, therefore, further proceedings in this petition would be academic.

Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel representing the AJK Government contended that only lawful advice is binding on the President as well as Government of AJK. The advice tendered in the present case, according to him, was violative of the rule of seniority recognized in Malik Asid Ali's case, supra, hence, the President and the Government were not bound to implement the same. He further argued that advice cannot be thrust upon rather has to be sought and for that purpose, process should have been initiated under the Rules of Business and the viewpoint of the Government and opinion of the President, should be placed before the Chairman in juxtaposition for a lawful and proper advice. Only on a duly processed file and collected material the Chairman can make-up his mind for the purpose of advice. He submitted that an advice cannot be given in vacuum without consideration of the material facts. He referred to and relied upon Article 177 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and made a comparison with Section 43(2) of the Act, 1974 and prayed for proper orders.

The Advocates who have filed power of attorney on behalf of the private respondent remained present in the Court but have abstained from arguing the case except making application mentioned in the earlier part of the order.

I have heard the learned Advocates representing the parties and gone through the record of the case with my utmost care.

Before proceeding further the objections raised on behalf of the Council by Raja Tariq Mehmood, Assistant Draftsman/ Deputy Secretary AJK Council, must be attended first. For proper appreciation of the matter, both the objections are reproduced as under:-

1.             That the writ petition is incompetent as the principle of Res subjudice is applicable. The validity of the advice of the Chairman, AJ&K Council (Prime Minister of Pakistan) dated 20.10.2006 for the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Reaz Akhtar Choudhry as Chief Justice of AJ&K is directly and substantially in issue before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Constitutional petitions No. 14 & 31 i.e. (1) Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani Vs. Govt. of Pakistan and others (2) Mr. Tabassam Sadiq and others Vs. Govt. of Pakistan) filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Law bars concurrent jurisdiction for simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating in respect of the same cause of action, the same subject mater and for the same relief. Upon direction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the AJ&K Council Secretariat has filed a concise Statement with the submission that the Supreme Court of Pakistan have jurisdiction in the aforesaid Constitutional petitions. The Federation of Pakistan has also taken the similar stance before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has summoned and inspected the record relating to the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Reaz Akhtar Choudhry as Chief Justice of AJ&K. Resultantly the Writ petition merits no consideration till the final disposal of the Constitutional petitions No. 14 & 31 (i.e. (1) Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani Vs. Govt. of Pakistan and others(2) Mr. Tabassam Sadiq and others Vs. Govt. of Pakistan)

2.             That Section 42-E of the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974 provides mode of removal of Judges of Superior Judiciary explicitly and unambiguously. Reportedly, the Supreme Judicial Council has finalised its proceedings in a reference filed against Mr. Muhammad Reaz Akhtar Choudhry as Chief Justice of AJ&K. therefore, the AJ&K High Court lacks jurisdiction in the matter."

The first objection has been raised by the Council in its comments on the strength of Section 10 of C.P.C. which postulates that no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claimed, litigating under the same title, where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in [Pakistan] having jurisdiction to grant relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of [Pakistan] established or continued by the [central Government] and having like jurisdiction or before [the Supreme Court]. I am of the view that the first objection reproduced hereinabove has no substance, hence, is hereby repelled. Admittedly the petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioners as well as proforma respondent before the apex Court of Pakistan which is still awaiting disposal but it is in my judicial notice that functionaries who were directly responsible and concern with the appointment of Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir have been deleted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Now the petition before the apex Court is pending only to the extent of functionaries working in Islamabad and answerable before the apex Court of Pakistan for their action or inaction. Even then I would have deferred the case on the basis of rule of propriety but I have noticed the summary prepared by the Federal Law Department, wherein it has been opined that proper course for proforma respondent, herein, is to contest the petition pending before this Court. Notwithstanding the pendency of the petition in original jurisdiction before the apex Court of Pakistan, in my estimation, this Court is not debarred from hearing and deciding the controversy  brought   before   it   whereby   action   or   inaction   of   the constitutional functionaries working within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is challenged. The appointment of private respondent, herein, has been approved by the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and is notified by the AJK Government who have already been deleted in the petition pending before the apex Court of Pakistan, therefore, impact of appointment and issuance of notification can be scrutinized by the Courts created under Act, 1974. The jurisdiction is even otherwise concurrent and in absence of a prohibitory order, this Court cannot stay its hands from enforcing fundamental rights of the petitioners, herein, who have been struggling since 2006. The view taken above lends support from Let. Gen.(R) Salahuddin Tirmizi's case [PLD 2008 SC 735] wherein the order passed by the Election Commission of Pakistan was challenged in Peshawar High Court as well as Islamabad High Court, simultaneously. The question of jurisdiction was resolved affirmatively and it was held that in the circumstances of the case, both the Courts have concurrent jurisdiction on the ground that cause of action partly arose in their respective jurisdiction. Either of the Courts can stay its hands only on the rule of propriety not otherwise. Relevant observation is recorded in para No. 27 of the report which is as under:-

"In the light of the nature of proposition, we deem it proper to decide the question of jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court at the first instance. The principle is that question of jurisdiction which is always a fundamental question must be decided at the initial stage of proceedings as it is the right of Court to proceed with the litigation and this right must be determined at the first instance. The power of Court to adjudicate upon the matter is linked with the territorial jurisdiction otherwise the judgment is treated to have been rendered illegally, without lawful authority due to lack of jurisdiction. The Court possesses jurisdiction which is directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by the law and the constitution but jurisdiction of the court vested under the constitution cannot be abridged or enlarged through an ordinary legislation. The jurisdiction conferred on High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution may be territorial as well as inherent which cannot be construed in a manner to curtail the concept of jurisdiction only to the territorial boundaries. This is settled principle that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver if the Court otherwise lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate and render judgment in a matter and at the same time it is also settled law that if the objection relating to the jurisdiction which was required to be taken at initial stage, was not raised at appropriate stage, there may be waiver or estoppel to the question of jurisdiction of the Court at a later stage. This Court in Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Charsadda V. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad, (1997 SCMR 1874) in which, order was passed by Collector of Customs an Central Excise Peshawar, was under challenge, overruled the objection that Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court was not competent to entertain constitutional petition and exercise the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. It was observed that not only the order passed by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Peshawar was under challenge but the relief was also claimed against Central Board of Revenue which functions at Islamabad, therefore, High Court at Peshawar and Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court had concurrent jurisdiction. There is no departure to the principle that in the federal System, Federating Units are independent in their affairs and similarly the Public functionaries and authorities as well as Courts or Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction conferred on them and powers vested in them by law and can exercise such powers and jurisdiction within their respective territory. Islamabad Capital territory is not a Province but has independent status in the Constitution and in Article 175 of the Constitution, the words "Islamabad Capital Territory" have been inserted by virtue of a recent amendment made in the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court has been established with status equal to that of the High Courts of Provinces under (Establishment) Order, 2008 (P.O NO.5 of 2008) wherein its territorial limits have been described as Islamabad Capital Territory, therefore, this Court has Territorial as well as inherent jurisdiction in all matters within the area of capital territory (Islamabad District) and the authorities functioning at Islamabad in connection with the affairs of Federation are subject to the jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court. The principal seat of Election Commission of Pakistan is at Islamabad with its Branches at Provincial Headquarters and the function of Election Commission of Pakistan is to manage and regulate the elections of parliament (National Assembly and Senate), prepare electoral rolls for such elections with all other duties relating to election, therefore, in the light of principle laid down in Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Charsadda v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad 1997 SCMR 1874, the order passed by Election Commission of Pakistan in respect of constituency situated in a Province can conveniently be challenged before the Islamabad High Court. The expression "discharges function within the territorial jurisdiction" would sufficiently indicate that an order passed by an authority which exercises jurisdiction within the boundaries of Capital Territory, is subject to the jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court. In the present case, Election Commission of Pakistan while discharging functions in connection with the affairs of Federation within the territorial jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court passed an order in respect of NA-20 Mansehra-I, a constituency of Province of N.W.F.P., therefore, the objection relating to the jurisdiction and maintainability of writ petition before the Islamabad High Court, would be of no significance. It may be pointed out that in the light of principle laid down by this Court regarding the exercise of jurisdiction in such situation, the order passed by the Election Commission of Pakistan which functions at Islamabad in respect of the constituency of Province of N.-W.F.P., would be challengeable both before the Islamabad High Court and Peshawar High Court. This concurrent jurisdiction is, however, subject to the rule of propriety according to which a High Court having jurisdiction in a matter if has exercised such jurisdiction, the other High Court which has also jurisdiction in the matter may restrain from exercising its jurisdiction. In view thereof, in the present case, the propriety demanded that subsequent order passed by Election Commission of Pakistan should have been challenged before the Islamabad High Court and the jurisdiction of Peshawar High Court should have not been invoked and said High Court also should not, without determining the question of propriety exercise the jurisdiction. Be that as it may, initially the respondent invoked the jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court against the order of Election Commission of Pakistan and subsequently, the order passed by Election Commission of Pakistan in post remand proceedings was challenged by the petitioner before the Peshawar High Court and question of jurisdiction was neither raised before Islamabad High Court nor before Peshawar High Court and since both the courts have concurrent jurisdiction, therefore, the orders of Islamabad High court as well as Peshawar High court have been passed in exercise of lawful authority and objection in this behalf may have no significance."

Same view has been reiterated in Sandalbar Enterprise's case [PLD 1997 SC 334].

The second objection raised on behalf of the learned representative of the Council has a substance and must prevail. For proper appreciation of the same it will be useful to reproduce the relevant provisions regarding constitution of Supreme Judicial Council in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Act, 1974 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Both the provisions are reproduced as follow:-

(A)          Constitution of Pakistan

"209. Supreme Judicial Council. (1) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan, in this Chapter referred to as the Council.

(2) The Council shall consist of--

(a)           the Chief Justice of Pakistan;

(b)           the two next most senior Judges of the Supreme Court; and

(c)           the two most senior Chief Justices of High Courts.

                Explanation. For the purpose of this clause, the inter se seniority of the Chief Justices of the High Courts shall be determined with reference to their dates of appointment as Chief Justice [otherwise than as acting Chief Justice], and in case the dates of such appointments are the same, with reference to their dates of appointment as Judges of any of the High Courts.

(3) If at any time the Council is inquiring into the capacity or conduct of a Judge who is a member of the Council, or a member of the Council is absent or is unable to act due to illness or any other cause, then-

(a)           if such member is a Judge of the Supreme Court, the Judge of the Supreme court who is next in seniority below the Judges referred to in paragraph (b) of clause (2), and

(b)           if such member is the Chief Justice of a High Court, the Chief Justice of another High Court who is next in seniority amongst the Chief Justices of remaining High Courts,

shall act as a member of the Council in his place.

(4) If, upon any matter inquired into by the Council, there is a difference of opinion amongst its members, the opinion of the majority shall prevail, and the report of the Council to the President shall be expressed in terms of the view of the majority.

(5) If, on information received from the Council or from any other source, the President is of the opinion that a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court.

(a)           may be incapable of properly performing the duties of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity; or

(b)           may have been guilty of misconduct,

the President shall direct the Council to inquire into the matter.

(6) If, after inquiring into the matter, the Council reports to the President that it is of the opinion--

(a)           that the Judge is incapable of performing the duties of his office or has been guilty of misconduct, and

(b)           that he should be removed from office,

the President may remove the Judge from office.

(7) A Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court shall not be removed from the office except as provided by this Article.

(8) The Council shall issue a code of conduct to be observed by Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts."

(B)           AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974.

42-E. Supreme Judicial Council.--(1) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

(2) The Supreme Judicial Council shall consist of:-

(a)           The Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir who shall be its Chairman.

(b)           The Senior Judge of the Supreme Court; and

(c)           The Chief Justice of the High Court.

(3) A Judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court shall not be removed from office except as provided by this Section.

(4) If, on information received from the Supreme Judicial Council or from any other source, the Chairman of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council or the President is of the opinion that a Judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court,--

(a)           may be incapable of properly performing the duties of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity; or

(b)           may have been guilty of misconduct, the Chairman or the President, as the case may be, shall direct the Supreme Judicial Council to inquire into the matter.

(5) if, upon any matter inquired into by the Supreme Judicial Council, there is a difference of opinion amongst its members, the opinion of the majority shall prevail, and the report of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be expressed in terms of the view of the majority.

(6) If, after inquiring into the matter, the Supreme Judicial Council reports to the Chairman of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council that it is of the opinion,--

(a)           that the Judge is incapable of performing the duties of the office or has been guilty of misconduct, and

(b)           that he should be removed from office, the Chairman shall advice the President to remove the Judge from his office and the President shall pass orders accordingly.

(7) The Supreme Judicial Council shall issue a Code of Conduct to be observed by Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court.

(8) If at any time the Supreme Judicial Council is inquiring into the conduct of a Judge who is a member of the Supreme Judicial Council, or a member of the Supreme Judicial Council is absent or unable to act due to illness or any other case, then:

(a)           if such member is the Chief Justice or the Judge of the Supreme Court, the Judge of the Supreme Court who is next in seniority;

(b)           if such member is the Chief Justice of the High Court, the senior most of the other Judges of the High Court, shall act as a member of the Supreme Judicial Council in his place.

(9) if, upon any matter inquired into by the Supreme Judicial Council, there is difference of opinion amongst its members, the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be expressed in terms of the view of the majority."

(Underlining is mine)

A comparison of the above reveals that for removal of the Judges of superior Courts on the ground of incapability of performing the duties of their offices by reason of physical mental incapacity or guilty of misconduct, the procedure of inquiry and report is provided under Article 209 and Section 42-E, respectively. In the modern democratic system of the Government, unlike other public functionaries, Judges of the superior Courts are not immune from the process of accountability. However, in order to save the Judges from being dragged into the ordinary Courts or tribunals, and in order to strengthen the concept of "independence of judiciary", a highest constitutional body is provided for removal of the Judges, composed of their own brother Judges, on the grounds listed in Article 209 and Section 42-E of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Act, 1974 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir,   respectively.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  is  the  highest constitutional body consisting upon brother Judges who have taken oath under the Constitution to decide whatever controversy is brought before them, without fear, favour and with impartiality. The report/finding of such body regarding guilty/misconduct has been declared final by the Constitution itself and the executive is not vested with any authority to sit over it as appellate authority to exercise review or revisional jurisdiction because the report and proceedings of Supreme Judicial Council are immune from challenge under Section 42-G of the Act, 1974. The report of Supreme Judicial Council is not subject to ratification, approval, confirmation or consent of the Chairman of the Council, but is practically a direction to be carried into effect through the notification. The Chairman has to direct to issue an executive order on the basis of the report without unreasonable delay. Though no timeframe is provided in the Constitution for issuance of Notification, but it is implied that it has to be instantly notified as it does not require any further action given the nature of its finality and un-challengable-ness before any authority. Advice by the Chairman and President cannot be procrastinated and has to be complied within reasonable time. The Constitution itself visualizes the scheme, e.g. a bill passed by the Legislative Assembly or Joint Sitting has to be consented by the President within seven days under subsection (2) of Section 36 of the Constitution, and if it is not done within that period, it shall be deemed to have been assented as the will of the Parliament is final. On that analogy it can be concluded that report should have been implemented within reasonable time i.e. seven days from the date of receipt of report as the report of Supreme Judicial Council is equally final. The purpose in both the cases is to uphold the supremacy of the Parliament and independence of Judiciary, as the case may be, like judgments of the Supreme Court or any other tribunal, which attain finality. Similarly the report of the Supreme Judicial Council is also final and conclusive where the Constitution or law means to leave a room for executive, notwithstanding the finality of a judgment, it is expressly stated such as the limited powers of the President under the Constitution of India, Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, relating to the clemency/remission of the sentences etc, where inspite of judgment of a Court having become final, the President (the executive authority) can alter it for the purpose of remission of the sentence. The principle of finality of judgments even then remains undisturbed.

It may be observed that there is a marked difference between the report/recommendations made by the Supreme Judicial Council constituted under Article 209 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Supreme Judicial Council constituted and established under Section 42-E of the Act, 1974. In the former the President has the discretion to accept or refuse the report because in sub clause 6(b) of Article 209, reproduced hereinabove, the word "may" is used. Inspite of it, the report/ recommendation of Supreme Judicial Council is instantly acted upon. See the cases of Justice Akhlaque Hussain [PLD 1960 SC 260] and Justice Shaukat Ali [PLD 1971 SC 585], respectively. But in subsection 6(b) of Section 42-E of the Act, 1974, the Chairman is bound to advice the President to remove the Judge from his office and the President is also bound to pass the order accordingly in the light of the recommendations/report of the Supreme Judicial Council, as the word "shall" is used for both. The Chairman is left with no authority, except to perform the executive duty of his office as ordained by the Constitution.

As stated above, the report of the Supreme Judicial Council is conclusive and final in all respects because same is not challengeable at any forum, therefore, affect of the report cannot be nullified by non-issuance of the formal order which is a mere formality. In Sardar Sabir Hussain Khan Abbasi's case [2002 SCR 62], the apex Court of AJK observed that if direction is issued by the Prime Minister on an appeal or review etc., writ can be issued in appropriate cases for implementation of the same. The observation of the High Court that as the formal order was not issued in pursuance of the order, the writ cannot be issued, is not sustainable. It was held that after acceptance of the review petition by the competent authority, it is duty of the concerned authority to implement such order irrespective of the issuance of so-called formal order.

The contention of Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned Advocate representing the AJK Government that only lawful advice is binding on the AJK Government and the same should be implemented, has a force. A full bench of this Court has already set at rest the controversy in Mr. Justice (R) Muhammad Saddique Farooqi's case [Writ Petition No. 24/2001, decided on 2.8.2001]. In para No. 15 of the judgment, the learned Judges observed as under:-

15. "Now we will like to deal with the next point which relates to the advice of the Council as to whether it is binding on the President or not. From the reading of the Constitutional Act, it becomes quite clear that in this Act affairs of this liberated part of the Jammu and Kashmir State are to be run through a parliamentary form of Government. Under the provisions of the Constitutional Act, the Executive Authority of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government is to be exercised in the name of President by the Government which is headed by the Prime Minister as its Chief Executive and his Ministers who have to act through him. The scheme of the Constitutional Act shows that the President has to perform his functions either on the advice of the Government or on the advice of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council which is given exclusive legislative powers over the subjects mentioned in the Third Schedule. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council is also vested with executive authority over these subjects. In parliamentary form of the Government, the people who are responsible to run the affairs of the State are answerable before the people through their representatives who sit in the legislative bodies. President in a parliamentary form of Government is not answerable before any person. For this purpose, it is laid down under section 7 of the Constitutional Act that President shall perform the functions of his office in accordance with the advice tendered to him by the Prime Minister and such advice shall be binding on him. Under the provisions of Constitution, the matters, which relate to the Council and which are to be performed by the President on the advice of the Council shall be performed by him in accordance with the advice tendered to him by the Council."

Again in para No. 17 of the judgment it was concluded as under:-

"17. We are quite clear that no advice can be tendered against the express provisions of the Constitution and if an advice is tendered in accordance with law and the provisions of the constitution by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council or Government, the same shall be binding on the President, any contravention thereof is liable to be struck by the Courts."

In view of above, I am of the view that after recommendation/ report of the Supreme Judicial Council dated 12.4.2010, in which misconduct of the private respondent, herein, is proved, the private respondent, herein, has ceased to be the Judge/Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the office of the Chief Justice is vacant, hence, further proceedings in this petition will not serve any purpose.

As the office of the Chief Justice has become vacant, therefore, the Government is directed to immediately initiate proposal for appointment of permanent Chief Justice of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, by seeking the advice of the Chairman of AJK Council to the President of AJK for approval and Notification, so that office of the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir is filled without any further delay.

This petition stands disposed off accordingly with the above stated constitutional position.

A copy of this order shall be sent to Secretary AJK Council Secretariat, Islamabad and Chief Secretary of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, Muzaffarabad for compliance.

(R.A.)     Petition disposed off.