PLJ 2010 SC (AJ&K) 98
[Appellate Jurisdiction]

Present: Muhammad Reaz Akhtar Chaudhary, C.J. and
Muhammad Azam Khan, J.

MUHAMMAD RIAZ KHAN, SUB-INSPECTOR SHO GARHI DOPATTA, MUZAFFARABAD--Appellant

versus

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE J&K, MUZAFFARABAD and 19 others--Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2005, decided on 18.2.2010.

(On appeal from the judgment of the Service Tribunal of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dated 25.6.2004 in Service Appeal No. 374/1999]

Preliminary objection--

----Proceeding--Objection cannot raised before Supreme Court--Civil servant was terminated from service and representation was turned down by authorities--Objection of--Civil servant was not an employee of police department--Appeal before service tribunal and in Supreme Court was not competent--Such point was not argued before service tribunal--Validity--A point which was not argued in the service tribunal and relates to inquiry into the facts cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in Supreme Court. [P. 103] A

AJ&K Service Tribunals Act, 1975--

----S. 4(6)--Proviso--Appeal to tribunal--Reckoned from date of filing appeal before departmental authority--Period of limitation of 30 days had been substituted to 90 days--Validity--Any person aggrieved from the order was bound to file an appeal before service tribunal within 120 days reckoned from the date of filing appeal before departmental authority.       [P. 105] C

Appeal Before Service Tribunal--

----Civil servant--Acquiesced to file appeal--Question of competency--Seniority list was challenged before departmental authority by way of appeal, the appeal was withdrawn, therefore, the civil servant had acquiesced by his conduct to file appeal before Service Tribunal--Appeal before Service Tribunal was not competent.       [P. 103] B

Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1975 (XXII of 1975)--

----S. 4(i)--Comparison of amended and un-amended provisions--Under proviso a of S. 4(i), a civil servant aggrieved by any final order cannot file direct appeal in service tribunal--Civil servant had to file an appeal, review or representation to departmental authority, provided in Civil Servants Act, 1976 and rules made thereunder--Validity--If an aggrieved person filed an appeal, review or representation before departmental authority and it was not decided within a period of 90 days then an aggrieved civil servant could prefer an appeal within 30 days and total period from the date of filing appeal before departmental authority would be 120 days for filing the appeal before service tribunal--After amendment of S. 4 of Service Tribunals Act, position had been changed--After deletion of proviso an aggrieved civil servant could file an appeal directly in the service tribunal within a period of 90 days from date of communication of such order--Held: If a civil servant was aggrieved from an original order then he could file appeal from that order within 90 days of communication of order of appellate authority--Period of limitation shall be reckoned from the date of communication.    [P. 106] D & E

1994 SCR 214, ref.

Police Rules, 1934--

----R. 12.2(3)--Seniority and probation--Seniority was to be reckoned from the date of confirmation--Validity--Seniority of an upper subordinate police officer in the same cadre would be determined from the date of first appointment and finally would be settled from date of his confirmation on the post held by him--Seniority of any upper subordinate police officer had to be settled from the date of his confirmation irrespective of the fact that prior to confirmation any upper subordinate police officer was serving in Reserve Police.          [P. 109] F

Standing Order of Police Department (I of 1975)--

----Para 3--Appeal on strength of Standing Order--Seniority of Reserve and Rangers Police shall be confined only to their respective wings--Validity--In case of transfer into regular force from Reserve or Rangers, their seniority with other employees of same cadre would be determined from the date of their transfer into regular force.        [Pp. 109 & 110] G

Police Act, 1861--

----S. 12--Police Rules, 1934--Rr. 12.2.(1)(2)&(3)--Powers of Inspector General Police to make rules--I.G. Police has powers to frame such orders and rules relating to organization, classification and distribution of police force and other matters relating to administration of the force subject to approval of the Govt.--Any Standing Order adversely affecting the terms and conditions of service of a police officer, guaranteed by rules, cannot be issued--I.G. Police from time to time with approval of Govt. can issue such orders or frame rules he deem expedient for rendering the police force efficient in discharge of duties, but he has no jurisdiction to issue such Standing Order which affects the terms and conditions of service of a police officer--I.G. Police has no power to amend the rules affecting thereby the terms and conditions of service of police officers--Method of promotion provided in original Rules was intact--Appeal was allowed.          [Pp. 110, 111 & 112] H, I, J, K & L

Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate for Appellant.

M/s. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi and Mr. Mujahid Hussain Naqvi, Advocates for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 26.11.2009.

Judgment

Muhammad Azam Khan, J.--This appeal by leave of the Court calls in question the order passed by the Service Tribunal of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on 25.6.2004 and communicated to the appellant on 16.8.2004, whereby Service Appeal No. 374/1999 filed by the appellant was dismissed.

2.  The appellant was appointed as ASI vide order dated 4.11.1991 on the basis of recommendations of selection authority. He joined on 07.11.1991 and subsequently, he was confirmed from the same date i.e 07.11.1991. Respondents No. 4 and 5 were promoted as ASIs from Head Constables on 01.01.1992 and were confirmed from the same date. Respondent No. 6 was promoted as ASI from Head Constable on 19.03.1992 and was confirmed from the same date. Respondent No. 7 was appointed and confirmed from 01.08.1993. Respondents No. 8 to 12 were appointed on 26.10.1993 and were confirmed from the same date. Respondent No. 14 was promoted as ASI on 31.08.1994 and was confirmed from the same date. Respondent No. 17 was promoted as ASI on 27.01.1995 and Respondents No. 18 to 20 were promoted on 01.07.1995 and were confirmed from the same dates, respectively. Respondent No. 2, Deputy Inspector General of Police Range, Muzaffarabad, issued a seniority list whereby the private respondents were declared senior to the appellant. He filed an appeal before the Inspector General of Police which was dismissed. Thereafter, he filed Service Appeal No. 374/1999 before the Service Tribunal of Azad Jammu and Kashmir which was also dismissed vide order dated 25.06.2004 and was communicated to the counsel for the appellant on 16.08.2004.

3.  Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate, while arguing on behalf of the appellant contended that it is an admitted fact between the parties that appellant was appointed and confirmed as ASI much earlier than private respondents and seniority is to be reckoned from the date of confirmation. While relying upon the Section 1 of Police Act 1861 and Rule 12.2(3) of Police Rules 1934 he contended that seniority of an upper subordinate is to be reckoned from the date of his confirmation. He maintained that the appellant was appointed as ASI on 07.11.1991 and he was confirmed vide order dated 30.04.1998 w.e.f the date of appointment i.e 07.11.1991 and the private respondents were appointed much later than the appellant and were also confirmed as such. He contended that seniority list has to be prepared in accordance with Rule 12.2(3) of Police Rules 1934 and it was prepared against the accepted rules governing the seniority. He vehemently argued that there is no concept of separate functional units in Police Service and seniority is to be determined under Rule 12.2(3). The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal being against the law while relying upon Standing Order No. 1 of 1975 issued by the Police department declaring that the said standing order was issued in 1975 and was never challenged by any person, therefore the seniority list was issued correctly in accordance with this standing order. He maintained that this enunciation of law is alien to the accepted norms of interpretation of statutes. He contended that Police Rules 1934 were framed by the Govt. by exercising the powers conferred on it and only the Govt. is competent to amend or alter the rules. The Inspector General of Police has no jurisdictional competence to amend the rules in the guise of standing order without approval of the Govt. He contended that no doubt that the Inspector General of Police has powers to issue a standing order but such powers are confined only to the extent of administration matters in conformity with the rules. No standing order in derogation of Rule 12.2(3) can be issued by the Inspector General of Police which affects the terms and conditions of service. He relied upon the cases titled Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Sardar Muhammad Rafique Khan [1993 PLC (CS) 286], Mehr Muhammad Nasir v. IGP Punjab and others [2002 PLC (CS) 1403] and Sardar Khurshid-ul-Hassan v. IGP and others [1991 PLC (CS) 208].

4.  Mr.M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, the learned counsel for the Respondents No. 7 and 12, raised preliminary objections that;--

(a)        the appellant was terminated from service in 1992 and his representation was dismissed as such he is not an employee of Police department, therefore, his appeal is not maintainable.

(b)        the appellant filed departmental appeal against the seniority list and withdrew the same on 15.05.1999, therefore, by conduct he is estopped to challenge the orders by way of appeal before the Service Tribunal. He relied upon the case titled Faizullah Vs. Govt. of the Punjab and others [2006 PLC (CS) 18].

(c)        the appeal of the appellant was time barred by one year, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. He maintained that the seniority list was issued on 22.10.1998 and appeal before the Service Tribunal was filed on 20.10.1999, therefore, the appeal merits dismissal. He contended that limitation starts from the date of order of the authority, therefore, the appeal was hopelessly time barred. He relied upon the cases referred as Shabir Ahmed Vs. AJK Govt. and another [1996 SCR 382] and Muhammad Fazal Khan Vs. Azad Govt. and others [1986 PLC (CS) 710].

(d)        the order dated 13.04.1998, whereby, the appellant was confirmed has been cancelled vide order dated 28.07.2000, therefore, the appellant is not confirmed Police Officer and is not entitled for promotion. He argued that this point was taken in the Service Tribunal but the Service Tribunal failed to consider the same.

On merits of appeal, Mr. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, admitted that according to Police Rules 1934 there is no concept of separate functional units as described in the Standing Order No. 1 of 1975, but the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Police Service (Composition and Cadre) Rules 1983, for recruitment and promotion of Superintendents of Police and Assistant Superintendents of Police when read with Rule 12.2 of Rules 1934 provide separate branches in Police service and each branch is a separate functional unit. He maintained that in the Rules of 1983 four functional units have been provided where Reserve Police is defined as a separate functional unit and the appellant was initially appointed in Reserve Police and the seniority is to be reckoned from the date of his induction in regular police i.e 01.01.1995, much later than the private respondents, therefore, seniority list was correctly issued. He relied upon the cases titled Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Israrul Haq and others [PLD 1981 SC 531]. He also referred Standing Order No. 23 of 1993 issued on 11.07.1995.

5.  Mr. Mujahid Hussain Naqvi, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 12 while relying upon the arguments of Mr. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, argued that appellant filed an appeal before the departmental authority against the seniority list which was withdrawn, therefore, he has acquiesced and is estopped by his conduct to challenge the seniority list in the Service Tribunal and in this Court. He contended that Inspector General of Police is competent to issue standing orders under the Police Act 1861. He referred the case titled The Province of West Pakistan Vs. Ch. Din Muhammad and others [PLD 1964 SC 21].

6.  While rebutting the arguments, advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan contended that arguments in respect of maintainability of appeal were not advanced in the Service Tribunal, therefore, the point which was not raised and argued in the appeal before the Service Tribunal cannot be raised in this Court. He contended that respondents have raised a number of new points which were not raised in the Service Tribunal, cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court. While relying 1983 Rules, he argued that Rules 12.2 (1) and 12.2(2) of Police Rules 1934 have been changed while Rule 12.2 (3) which deals with the cases of ASIs has not been changed. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan has also filed written arguments.

7.  Kh. Muhammad Nasim, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 14 is absent with prior permission of the Court. He has also filed written arguments.

8.  We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Before proceeding further the preliminary objections raised by Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, are being resolved first.

The first preliminary objection is that appellant was terminated from service and his representation was turned down by the departmental authorities, therefore, he is not an employee of Police department. His appeal before the Service Tribunal and in this Court is not competent.

A perusal of judgment of the Service Tribunal reveals that this point was not argued before the Service Tribunal. A point which was not argued in the Service Tribunal and relates to inquiry into the facts cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court. Even otherwise the department in para-5 of its written statement/comments filed before the Service Tribunal took specific stand that the service of the appellant was terminated but he was restored on the order of the Court on 02.04.1994. The preliminary objection has no substance and is hereby repelled.

The next objection is that the seniority list was challenged before the departmental authority by way of appeal, the appeal was withdrawn on 15.04.1994, therefore, the appellant has acquiesced by his conduct to file appeal before the Service Tribunal. His appeal before the Service Tribunal was not competent.

The case law referred to by Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi titled Faizullah v. The Govt. of the Punjab and others [2006 PLC (CS) 18] is correct that a person who himself abandons a claim and reconciles with the situation, cannot come to the Court by reopening the matter again, but a perusal of memorandum of appeal filed before the Service Tribunal reveals that the appellant took specific stand that after hearing, his appeal was dismissed without communicating him the order on appeal. The appellant filed an affidavit in support of the contents of appeal. His claim is proved from the affidavit which was not rebutted by the departmental authority, no counter affidavit was filed. This Court in a case titled Muhammad Sharif Khan v. Mirza Fazal Hussain and others [1993 SCR 88] has held as under:--

"......but there is another important factor which escaped the attention of the learned Judge. We find that Muhammad Sharif while filing his writ petition duly filed an affidavit in support of the contents of the petition, meaning thereby, that he claimed on oath that the disputed land was partly in his possession and also that the decree and the allotment chit mentioned above were in respect of the plot in dispute. The contents of this affidavit were not controverted by Fazal Hussain or other respondents before the High Court by filing a counter affidavit. Ordinarily this is considered sufficient in a writ petition prima facie proof and if not rebutted by cogent evidence it become conclusive proof. This aspect of the matter was over looked by the learned Judge in the High Court. Apart from that the reasons on which the conclusion was drawn, as mentioned above, are not sustainable."

After filing affidavit to the effect that he has not withdrawn the appeal there is no question of acquiescence or estopple. The objection is without any substance and is hereby repelled.

The next preliminary objection is that appeal before the Service Tribunal is one year time barred. The Inspector General of Police passed order on 27.05.1999 and appeal was filed before the Service Tribunal on 20.10.1999. From the record it appears that seniority list was issued on 22.10.1998. The appellant filed appeal before the Inspector General of Police within time which was decided on 27.05.1999. The order passed by the departmental authority was never communicated to the appellant. The appellant has taken the position that after hearing the arguments, the order was reserved which was announced in his absence on 27.05.1999. It was never communicated to him. As soon as he acquired the knowledge in respect of order passed on appeal, he immediately obtained the copy of order and filed appeal.

Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, while relying upon the case titled Shabir Ahmed v. AJK Govt. and another [1996 SCR 382] argued that the appellant filed appeal before the departmental authority on 04.03.1999. Under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act he has to file appeal in the Service Tribunal within a period of 120 days, a period of 90 days under proviso `a' of Section 4 and if appeal was not decided by the departmental authority within 90 days, a further period of 30 days was available to the appellant, meaning thereby, that the appeal before the Service Tribunal has to be filed on or before 4th July 1999. The appeal before the Service Tribunal was filed on 20.10.1999, therefore, it was hopelessly time barred. We have gone through the judgment of full bench of this Court in case titled Shabir Ahmed v. AJK Govt. and another [1996 SCR 382] and also perused the relevant law. The judgment in Shabir Ahmed's case was delivered on the basis of law holding the field at the relevant time but before filing the appeal before the departmental authority i.e 03.03.1999 the law had been changed on 01.02.1999 and proviso `a' of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act had been deleted and period of limitation of 30 days had been substituted to 90 days. It will be appropriate to reproduce Section 4 and provision `a' which is as under:--

"4. Appeal to Tribunals:--(1). Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate made by a departmental authority, in respect of the any of the terms and conditions of his service, may, with in [thirty] days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whatever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.

Provided that:

(a) where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is provided under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act 1976 or any rules against any such order, no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal or an application for review or representation to such departmental authority and a period of ninety days has elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application or representation was so preferred."

In the light of proviso `a' this Court in Shabir Ahmed's case held that any person aggrieved from the order is bound to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal within 120 days reckoned from the date of filing appeal before the departmental authority. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:--

"After giving deep consideration to the matter. We are of the view that there is hardly any justification for approving the view that a civil servant has two options either to file appeal within 120 days or to wait indefinitely till the disposal of his appeal, review, representation etc. and thereafter prefer an appeal to the Service Tribunal. We are of the opinion that he is bound to prefer an appeal to the Service Tribunal within in 120 days, reckoned from the date of filing of an appeal etc. to the departmental authority."

On 01.02.1999 Section 4 of Service Tribunals Act was amended which is reproduced as under:--

Amendment of Section 4 Act XXII of 1975:--In the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal Act, 1975 (Act XXII of 1975), in sub-section (1) of Section 4."

(a)        for the words "30 days" the words "ninety days" shall be substituted; and

(b)        the provisos (a) and (b) shall be omitted.

9.  A comparison of both the amended and un-amended provisions reveals that under proviso `a' of sub-section (1) of Section 4, a civil servant aggrieved by any final order cannot file direct appeal in the Service Tribunal. He has to file an appeal, review or representation to the departmental authority, provided in Civil Servants Act 1976 and rules made there under. In Shabir Ahmed's case it was categorically laid down by this Court that if an aggrieved person files an appeal, review or representation before the departmental authority and it is not decided within a period of 90 days then an aggrieved civil servant may prefer an appeal within 30 days and total period from the date of filing appeal before the departmental authority shall be 120 days for filing the appeal before the Service Tribunal. But after amendment of Section 4 position has been changed. After deletion of proviso an aggrieved civil servant may file an appeal directly in the Service Tribunal within a period of 90 days from the date of communication of such order. From the above it has become crystal clear that an aggrieved Civil Servant may prefer an appeal before the Service Tribunal within 90 days of communication of order whether the order is original or appellate. If a civil servant is aggrieved from an original order then he may file appeal from that order within 90 days of the communication of the order and if he is aggrieved from an appellate order of the authority then he may file appeal within 90 days from the communication of the order of appellate authority. The period of limitation shall be reckoned from the date of communication. This Court in a case titled Asif Majeed Khan Vs. Tahir Tayyub Abbasi and 3 others [1994 SCR 214] held as under:--

"After giving anxious thoughts we regret we are unable to agree that the appeal filed with Service Tribunal before the expiry of 90 days waiting period becomes matured if the appeal comes up for preliminary hearing after the expiry of 90 days. According to the scheme of Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act a civil servant who is aggrieved by an original or appellate final order made by a departmental authority, may prefer an appeal to the Service Tribunal within 30 days from communication of that order."

The same view was reiterated in another case titled Muhammad Naseer Jhangari and others Vs. Abdus Sami Khan another [1997 SCR 26] as under:--

"In the judgment of Rehmatullah Zia and Asif Majeed it has been laid down by the Court that appeal before the Service Tribunal can be filed within 30 days from the date of communication of the order and a further period of ninety days can be added if appeal, review etc. where maintainable has been filed."

10.  The departmental authority decided the appeal on 27.05.1999. The decision of appeal was not communicated to the appellant. He moved an application to the Superintendent of Police District Bagh, stating therein that, he has preferred an appeal to the Inspector General of Police. He was summoned and his appeal was heard. The order was not communicated to him. The Superintendent of Police made remarks on his application that no order on his appeal has been received in the office, however, he may apply to Central Police Office for the copy of the same. Thereafter, he applied to the Central Police Office and after obtaining copy of the order he filed appeal in the Service Tribunal of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on 20.10.1999. Thus it is proved that order was never communicated to him. After obtaining the knowledge that his appeal has been decided by Inspector General of Police he filed appeal promptly, therefore, the appeal was within time. Even otherwise the judgment of the Service Tribunal reveals that point of limitation was not argued before the Service Tribunal. The Service Tribunal treated the appeal within time. This argument is not available to the appellant in this Court.

The next objection is that appellant was confirmed by order dated 13.04.1998 and this order was withdrawn on 28.07.2000, therefore, the appellant is not a confirmed police officer and has no right to challenge the seniority list. It was also argued by Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, that this point was argued before the Service Tribunal but the Service Tribunal has not decided the same.

We have considered the contention of Mr.M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, that this point was not resolved by the Service Tribunal. If a point is taken in the objections/written statement but it is not pressed at the time of arguments it shall be presumed to be abandoned. If counsel takes a plea that he has taken the same then it is essential for the counsel to file an affidavit in support of his stand. No affidavit to this effect has been filed in this Court which proved that he has not argued this point in the Service Tribunal. The argument is repelled. This Court in a case titled Abdul Shakoor v. Mrs. Shamaim Khalid and 5 others [2003 SCR 351] has held that:--

".... It was contended that the point was raised in the pleadings and was also argued at the time of arguments but the learned Judge in the High Court failed to decide the same. The learned counsel for the opposite side opposed the aforesaid point on two grounds. Firstly, the aforesaid point was abandoned before the High Court and secondly the counsel for the petitioner who also happened to be a counsel before the High Court did not file any affidavit in support of his assertion. The learned counsel also pressed the point with further argument that even at this stage the counsel for the petitioner did not offer to file any affidavit that he had argued the aforesaid point before the High Court but the same was not resolved. It is correct that Mr.Alvi did not file the affidavit at this stage. It seems proper that he has abandoned the aforesaid point as no resolution is found in respect of the same in the exhaustive judgment passed by the High Court."

In another case titled Mushtaq Hussain Khan Vs Mst. Hafeeza Aziz and 3 others [2001 SCR 331] the observation of this Court is as under:--

"It is indeed correct that the petitioner in para No. 2 of his memo. of appeal has specifically taken the stand that issues have not been framed in accordance with the pleadings of the parties but the same was not argued before the Shariat Court at the time of arguments. The above mentioned fact does not find any mention in the judgment under appeal of the Shariat Court nor an affidavit to this effect has been placed on record by the petitioner or his learned counsel that the said point was raised and argued but the same was not resolved by the Shariat Court. Thus the point having not been argued before the Shariat Court would be deemed to have been waived."

11.  The Service Tribunal while deciding the appeal has held that it is admitted position that the appellant was inducted and confirmed in the Police service much prior to the private respondents. The Service Tribunal held that the appellant was inducted in the Reserve police and his induction in Regular Force is much later than the private respondents. While relying upon para-3 of Standing Order No. 1 of 1975 of the Police Department the Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that seniority of a police officer shall be reckoned from the date of transfer of Police Officer from Reserve Police to Regular Police. The question which needs resolution is what is relevant law for determining seniority of a Police Officer in such a case and what is status of standing order.

Chapter XII Rule 12.2 of Police Rules 1934 deals with the seniority and probation of the Police officers which is reproduced as under:--

Rule 12.2 Seniority and Probation:--(1)   

(2)       

(3)       

Seniority, in the case of upper subordinates, will be reckoned in the first instance from the date of first appointment, officers promoted from a lower rank being considered senior to persons appointed direct on the same date and the seniority of officers appointed direct on the same date being reckoned according to age. Seniority shall, however, be finally settled by dates of confirmation, the seniority infer se of the several officers confirmed on the same date being that allotted to them on first appointment; provided that any officer whose promotion or confirmation is delayed by reason of his being on deputation outside his range or district shall, on being promoted or confirmed regular the seniority which he originally held vis-a-vis any officer promoted or confirmed before him during his deputation.

Sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 12.2 deals with the seniority of Assistant Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police while sub-rule (3) deals with the seniority of upper subordinates police ranks. A perusal of Rules 12.2(3) reveals that seniority of an upper subordinate police officer in the same cadre shall be determined from the date of first appointment and finally shall be settled from the date of his confirmation on the post held by him. The seniority of any upper subordinate Police Officer has to be settled from the date of his confirmation irrespective of the fact that prior to confirmation any upper subordinate Police Officer was serving in the Reserve Police or the other. The record reveals that the appellant was directly appointed as ASI much prior to the private respondents and he was confirmed from the date of appointment i. e. 07.11.1991. Any other interpretation is not permissible under law.

12.  The Service Tribunal decided the appeal on the strength of Standing Order 1 of 1975. The Para 3 of the said standing order is reproduced as under:--

The standing order provides that seniority of Reserve and Rangers police shall  be  confined  only  to their respective wings. In case of transfer into regular force from Reserve or Rangers, their seniority with the other employees of same cadre shall be determined from the date of their transfer in to regular force. Rules making power vests with the Govt. The Police Rules 1934 were framed by the Govt. under Police Act 1861. Any policy decision, instruction, or standing order contrary to service rules affecting the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant issued by such authority which has no jurisdictional competence to frame the rules cannot have a force of rules. This Court in an unreported case titled Muhammad Ejaz Khan Vs. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan and others [Civil Appeal No.56/2009 decided on 18.08.2009], observed as under:--

"The Senior Member Board of Revenue issued order/policy on 02.06.1996 providing 3 written papers for promotion as Naih Tehsildar from Ministerial Staff. The rules provide competitive examination only for initial recruitment. The rules making powers vest in the Government. It is the right of the Government to frame the rules and amend the same whenever required. The Senior Member Board of Revenue was not competent to issue such policy which overrides the provisions of rules. It may be observed that the policy or notification cannot override the statutory rules framed by the Government under the statute. Instructions and policies cannot amend the statutory rules. It could only be done through amending the same and not by a policy. The policy can be made in the light of rules."

Under Section 12 of Police Act, 1861 the Inspector General of Police has powers to frame such orders and rules relating to organization, classification and distribution of Police force and other matters relating to administration of the force subject to approval of the Govt. It is appropriate to reproduce Section 12 of the Police Act, 1861 which is as under:--

12. Powers of Inspector General to make rules.--The Inspector General of Police may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the Government, frame such orders and rules as he shall deem expedient relative to the organization, classification and distribution of the Police-force, the places at which the members of the force shall reside and the particular services to be performed by them; their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them; the collecting and communicating by them of intelligence and information; and such orders and rules relative to the Police-force as the Inspector General shall, from time to time, deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect of duty, for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of its duties."

The Inspector General of Police is competent to make such orders from time to time as he deems expedient relating to organization, classification and distribution of Police force subject to approval of the Government. Any standing order adversely affecting the terms and conditions of service of a Police officer, guaranteed by the rules, cannot be issued. The Service Tribunal has relied upon the standing order on the ground that it was issued in 1975 and since then it is holding the ground for a long time, no one has challenged it, therefore, it is a valid law. This enunciation of law is alien to the interpretation of statutes. After plain reading of Section 12, we have no hesitation in holding that inspector General of Police from time to time with the approval of the Government may issue such orders or frame rules he deems expedient relating to organization, classification and distribution of Police force of rendering the Police force efficient in discharge of duties, but he has no jurisdiction to issue such standing order which affects the terms and conditions of service of a Police officer. This proposition came under consideration of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case titled Siddique Akbar and others v. Sanobar Khan and others [1998 SCMR 2013] where the Court observed that standing order issued by the Inspector General of Police without approval of the Government is devoid of legal status. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under:--

"We are therefore of the considered opinion that word `approval occurring in Section 12 of the Act implies the act of passing judgment, the use of discretion, and a determination as a deduction therefrom, to confirm, ratify sanction or to consent to some act or thing done by the Inspector General of Police. The word `approval' implies exercise of sound judgment, practical, sagacity, wise discretion and final direct affirmative action. Merely because the impugned Standing Order has held the ground for a number of years is not sufficient to assume the grant of approval of the issuance of the standing order by the Provincial Government."

The Standing Order No. 1 of 1975 issued without the approval of the Government has no legal force. The case titled Islamic Republic of Pakistan V Israrul Haq and others [PLD 1981 SC 531] and Standing Order No. 23 of 1993 referred to by Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi are not relevant in the present case. The rule of law laid down in the case titled The Province of West Pakistan Vs. Din Muhammad and others [PLD 1964 SC 21] is correct that administrative instructions issued by an authority competent to alter or amend the rules can be as effective as statutory rules, but in the present case the rules making powers vest in the Government. The Inspector General of Police is competent to issue standing order for the administration of Police force with the approval of the Government. He has no powers to amend the rules affecting thereby the terms and conditions of service of police officers.

13.  We have also gone through the Police Cadre Rules 1983 for recruitment and promotion of ASPs and SPs. Through these rules. Rules 12.2 (1) and 12.2(2) of Police Rules, 1934 have been changed while Rule 12.2(3) which deals with the cases of ASIs and upper subordinates has not been changed and the method of promotion provided in the original Rules is intact.

The result of above discussion is that we feel inclined to allow the appeal. Appeal is, therefore, accepted and it is ordered that appellant shall be entered in the seniority list from the date of his confirmation as ASI i.e. 07.11.1991 with no order as to costs.

(R.A.)  Appeal allowed.