PLJ 2010 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 34

Present: Iftikhar Hussain Butt, J.

GHULAM MUSTAFA and another--Appellants

versus

STATE & others--Respondents

Crl. Appeal Nos. 85 & 99 of 2005, decided on 12.8.2008.

Dying declaration--

----Evidentiary value--It is not requirement of law that dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate or it must be certified by a doctor rather it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case while considering the evidentiary value or weight to such statement. In a proper case a person can be convicted on the basis of a dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to look for corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that dying declaration is a truthful version and not fabricated in any other manner--Prosecution case mainly rests on the ocular evidence, and the evidenciary value of the dying declaration need not be put hard test for relying upon the same as would be the case where the dying declaration is the sole evidence of the conviction cannot be recorded with acting upon the dying declaration--No specific forum has been provided for recording dying declaration and it can be made before a private person--It is also not legal requirement that is must be read over or it must be signed by its maker--The only legal requirement is that it must be independent and free from influence of others--In this manner, a very close scrutiny is needed because such declaration is made in absence of the accused without providing him an opportunity of cross-examination--The sanctity attached with the dying declaration by statute must be respected that a dying person is not expected to tell lie and its veracity cannot be brushed away on the ground that prior to recording such statement a certificate was not obtained by a doctor when the dying declaration is relied upon then it does not require any independent corroboration and conformatory evidence is required only when some discrepancies or infirmities appear in such declaration.            [Pp. 43, 44 & 45] A, B, C, D & E

AIR 1983 SC 164, AIR 1972 SC 1776, AIR 1958 SC Bomaby 22 & 1992 SCR 294, rel.

Criminal Jurisprudence--

----Principle--Criminal jurisprudence that in case where the evidence of eye-witnesses is reliable and trustworthy any variation appearing in the medical evidence would not effect the ocular version of the eye-witnesses which has to be relied upon.     [P. 46] F

2005 SCR 66 ref.

Dereliction--

----It is by now an enriched principle of law that the misfeasance or dereliction of duty by the I.O. will not, now go the advantage of accused against the prosecution as the approach of the Courts to a case carrying capital charge has to be dynamic and these technical infirmities cannot stand in its way to do Justice if its conscience is satisfied that the event as narrated by the witnesses did take place and there is no earthly reason for him to lie--The infirmities while preparing inquest report and injury forms and even their non-production is not fatal to the prosecution case because these are hardly material if the case is otherwise established by the prosecution.        [P. 48] G & H

PLJ 2001 Cr.C. (Lahore) 700 & 2001 SCR 240, rel.

Ocular Evidence--

----Principle--When ocular evidence is reliable and satisfactory, the conviction in law can be recorded on such evidence done without any further corroboration because corroboration is required only to satisfy the conscious of the Court that witnesses have spoken the truth and their deposition is worthy of credence. [P. 49] I

2000 SCR 123 rel.

Mr. Abdul Majeed Mallik, Advocate for (Ghulam Mustafa), Convict-Appellant.

Ch. Lal Hussain, Advocate for Complainant.

Mr. Muzaffar Ali Zaffar, Addl. A.G. for State.

Date of hearing: 12.8.2005.

Judgment

As the above titled appeals relate to the same incident and judgment; therefore, these have been consolidated and will be disposed off by this single judgment.

Brief facts of the case are that on 5.4.2001, Mehdi Khan Head Constable Police (P.W. 13) recorded the statement/dying declaration of Abdur Rasheed, complainant, in Tehsil Headquarter Hospital Dudyal. The deceased-complainant alleged that he installed a crush machine in village Gunchoor after acquiring the land on lease from the Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir whereby Ghulam Mustafa, accused, also wanted to install his crush machine on the said land but the complainant obtained temporary injunction from the civil Court. On 5.4.2001, the labourers of Ghulam Mustafa, accused, started installation of the crush machine on the said land. The complainant forbade the labourers in the light of temporary injunction. In this regard, Ghulam Mustafa, accused, was informed by some mason or by someone else. The complainant alongwith Ch. Muhammad Khan was proceeding towards his house riding on the motorcycle. When the complainant went ahead of the crush machine at 10:00 a.m, the accused waylaid. As soon as, the complainant reached nearby, Ghulam Mustafa, accused, who was armed with a 12-bore gun, at once came on the road and warned the complainant that he will not let him go alive. He fired a straight shot upon the complainant which hit him on right side of his abdomen and he fell down. The accused fled away from the place of occurrence while waving the gun. The incident was witnessed by Muhammad Khan, Munshi Abdur-Rauf and Nasir Ali.

The motive behind the occurrence has been stated to be a land dispute between the parties.

On this report, a case was registered against the accused under Sections 324 & 337-F(1), APC by Muhammad Rasheed Constable Police No. 200 (Incharge Police Station Dudyal) (P.W.9). On the same day, Abdul Rasheed succumbed to the injuries; therefore, the case was altered to one under Section 302, APC. On 5.4.2001, Zulqarnain Khan (P.W. 15) prepared inquest report Exh.PN and the injury form Exh.PK of the deceased. On the same day, he took into possession the bloodstained clay vide recovery memo Exh. PA, Motorcycle No. 4737 AJK-D vide recovery memo Exh. PB and a 12-bore gun alongwith used cartridge at the pointation of Ghulam Mustafa accused vide recovery memo Exh. PD in the presence of Allah Ditta (P.W.5) and Muhammad Farid (P.W.6).

After autopsy, the bloodstained clothing of the deceased were taken into possession by said Zulqarnain Khan vide recovery memo Exh. PC in presence of the aforesaid witnesses.

On 10.4.2001, Ghulam Rasool Patwari (P.W.7) prepared the site-plan Exh.PF in the presence of eye-witnesses and the police. He took into possession the copies of temporary injunction Exh.PJ, the suit Exh.PKK, the judgment Exh.PL and the decree Exh.PM.

On 11.4.2001, he also took into possession the pellets of 12-bore gun recovered from the body of deceased during the postmortem vide recovery memo Exh.PE attested by the aforementioned P.Ws.5 & 6.

It was reported by Chemical Examiner vide its report Exh.PP that the earth, Shalwar, Qameez, Azarband and Bunyan of Abdur Rasheed deceased were stained with blood.

It was also reported by Director Forensic Science Laboratory Punjab vide its report Exh.PQ that crime empty was found to be fired by 12-bore gun allegedly recovered from Ghulam Mustafa accused.

The postmortem of Abdur Rasheed deceased was conducted on 5.4.2001 by Dr. Saeed Civil Medical Officer Tehsil Headquarter Hospital Dudyal vide postmortem report Exh.PO. He noticed the following injuries on the body of the deceased caused by firearm. The injuries are detailed as follows:--

"Multiple pellets entry wound in the right hypochondrium. Two pellets entry wound in the right lower thorax anteriorly in the midline. One pellet entry wound skin deep on the right middle thigh anteriorly in the midline.

Opinion:--

According to the opinion of doctor, the death occurred due to heavy intra-abdominal haemorrhage caused by firearm."

The accused was arrested on the day of occurrence and after necessary investigation challan was filed against the convict-appellant Ghulam Mustafa under Section 302, APC. The charge was framed against the accused but he denied the guilt and claimed the trial.

In support of its case, the prosecution produced Muhammad Khan (P.W.2), Abdur Rauf (P.W.3), Nasir Ali (P.W.4), Allah Ditta (P.W.5), Muhammad Farid (P.W.6), Ghulam Rasool Patwari (P.W.7), Muhammad Rasheed Constable Police (P.W.9), Muhammad Aslam Constable Police (P.W.10), Mehdi Khan Head Constable Police (P.W.13), Raja Rab Nawaz DSP (P.W.14), Zulqarnain Khan Inspector Police (P.W. 15), Shabbir Khan Constable Police, Zaheer Ahmad and Sajid Shabbir clerk of District Headquarter Office Mirpur.

After recording the evidence, the salient feature and circumstances appearing against the accused in prosecution evidence were put to him for his explanation, as required by Section 342, Cr.P.C. but he refuted the prosecution evidence and pleaded to be innocent. The trial Court also conducted the purgation of the prosecution witnesses, who were found `Adil' according to the report of `Muzakki'.

After completion of the trial, Additional District Criminal Court Dudyal, Camp Mirpur, convicted and sentenced Ghulam Mustafa to life imprisonment under Section 302(B), APC and also ordered him to pay amount of compensation Rs. 1,000,00/- (one lac) to the heirs of the deceased under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C in default thereof to undergo four months simple imprisonment. However, the accused was given benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C vide its judgment dated 7.7.2005. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, Ghulam Mustafa convict-appellant lodged an appeal for his acquittal, whereas Mst. Nasreen Begum widow of complainant preferred an appeal for awarding the death sentence to Ghulam Mustafa, accused. The aforesaid two appeals are subject matter of this judgment.

In support of the appeal, Mr. Abdul Majeed Mallik, Advocate, the learned Counsel for the convict-appellant argued with vehemence that a false case has been registered against the accused on account of enmity. The learned Counsel further contended that a fake dying declaration was prepared to implicate the accused with the commission of alleged offence which cannot be taken into consideration because neither it discloses the time of writing nor it was attested by any doctor or by any member of the hospital staff. Therefore, the dying declaration is an afterthought story which has been fabricated by the prosecution. The learned Counsel pointed out that the eye-witnesses Abdur Rauf and Nasir Ali being workers of the deceased are interested witnesses; therefore, their testimony cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, they are chance witnesses. Thus, their testimony requires close scrutiny. The learned Counsel also assailed the deposition of Muhammad Khan (P.W.2) on the ground that according to the prosecution he was sitting on the motorcycle behind the deceased but he did not sustain any injury; therefore, his presence at the time of occurrence is also doubtful and suspicious. The learned Counsel emphasized that the ocular version of the prosecution has not been corroborated by the medical evidence because according to the site-plan, the shot was fired from a distance of 21 feet and in this manner, the pellets spread widely on the body of the victim and damage caused by such pellets diminishes because from such distance the shot is only capable of penetrating the clothes and skin of the victim whereas the nature of injury mentioned in the postmortem report shows that the shot was fired from a very close range. According to the learned counsel, the time and place of occurrence have been substituted and in fact the occurrence took place in early hours of the morning at crush machine owned by the accused whereat the deceased went to forbid the Pathans workers of the accused not to install the machine and during the quarrel someone else fired shot upon the deceased and fled away. The learned Counsel laid great stress upon the point that the witnesses of recovery are closely related to the deceased; therefore, their evidence is not worthy of any credence. The learned Counsel pointed out the discrepancies appearing in the inquest report, site-plan and the report of postmortem and submitted that the prosecution story is full of material contradictions; thus, the prosecution version cannot be relied upon. The learned Counsel maintained that according to the civil suit Exh.PKK filed by the deceased, it transpires that the accused wanted to install a crush machine upon the land adjacent to the land of deceased whereas the perusal of dying declaration shows that the deceased had obtained the land from the government on lease, which also proves that the dying declaration has been fabricated. The learned Counsel pressed into service the submission that Dr. Saeed (P.W.8) did not appear before the Court and Sajid Shabbir a clerk verified his signatures; therefore, the medical evidence loses its veracity. The learned Counsel submitted that motive alleged by the prosecution has been refuted by the oral and documentary evidence of prosecution but the trial Court miserably failed to appreciate and appraise the prosecution evidence in its true perspective and recorded the impugned judgment in a hasty manner. The learned Counsel finally submitted that accused is 76 years old, who has been confined in lockup for the last 7 years; therefore, he may be acquitted of the charge. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel cited the following authorities:--

1. PLD 1970 SC 406.

2. 1984 SCMR 1092.

3. PLD 1984 Lahore 132.

4. 1994 SCMR 212.

5. 2004 PCr.LJ 813.

6. PLD 2006 SC 255.

Ch. Lal Hussain, Advocate, the learned Counsel for the complainant controverted the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant and submitted that it is a day light occurrence, F.I.R has been lodged promptly, the names of the accused and prosecution witnesses have been clearly mentioned, the motive has been established and the prosecution story has been fully supported by the dying declaration alongwith three eye-witnesses. The learned Counsel further contended that obtaining a certificate from doctor about the condition of deceased was not a mandatory legal requirement. The learned Counsel pointed out that sanctity is attached to dying declaration by the statue which has to be respected and relied upon and even dying declaration can be made before a private person. According to the learned counsel, the dying declaration can be made sole basis for conviction without any corroboration. The learned Counsel maintained that the eye-witnesses are neither related to the deceased nor nurse any grudge against the accused-person; therefore, the question of substitution of the place of occurrence or the accused does not arise. The learned Counsel vigorously argued that Muhammad Khan (P.W.2) was riding on the motorcycle behind the deceased and for the reasons he did not sustain any injury; therefore, his evidence cannot be ruled out of consideration on the score that he was not injured. Similarly, Abdur Rauf and Nasir Ali, who were working at crush machine of the deceased, witnessed the occurrence nearby; therefore, the trial Court has rightly believed their evidence. The learned Counsel emphasized that the report of postmortem fully corroborates the ocular version; therefore, non-mentioning of the clothes of the deceased in the postmortem report or the inquest report does not affect the prosecution's case adversely. The learned Counsel laid great stress upon the point that no adverse presumption can be taken against the prosecution on account of some discrepancies appearing in the site-plan because it is not a substantive piece of evidence. The learned Counsel pressed into service the submission that non-mentioning of departure of Mehdi Khan (P.W. 13) in police diary or the refusal of Muhammad Rasheed (P.W.9) about hearing of telephone call or non-availability of the documents of ownership of motorcycle or non-examination of the place of installation of crush machine are procedural defects and irregularities committed during the course of investigation which cannot demolish the prosecution case. The learned Counsel maintained that old age by itself is not a circumstance to reduce the sentence because the accused is neither mentally senile nor physically infirm rather the accused was strong enough to shoot at the deceased with precision, who deserves the normal penalty of death for a deliberate commission of murder; therefore, the accused may be awarded the sentence of Qisas. The learned Counsel referred to me the following case law in support of his arguments:--

1. PLD 1983 SC 27.

2. PLJ 2001 SC 722.

3. PLJ 2001 Cri.Cases 1072 DB.

4. 2001 PCr.LJ 1559.

5. PLD 2001 SC 107.

6. 2001 SCR 402.

7. 2002 PCr.LJ 1965.

8. 2002 PCr.L J 787.

9. PLJ 2005 SC 1099.

10. PLJ 2005 SC 1747.

11. PLJ 2005 Sh.C AJK 1.

12. 2005 SCR 166.

13. PLD 2006 Lahore 117.

14. PLD 2006 Peshawar 5.

Mr. Muzaffar Ali Zaffar, the learned Addl. A.G. appearing on behalf of the State, has fully owned and supported the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the complainant.

The respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties were examined with care alongwith record and the case law cited. The prosecution case mainly rests upon the evidence of dying declaration and ocular version of the prosecution; therefore, it will be appropriate to firstly deal with the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. In the instant case, on receiving information that Abdur Rasheed, injured was brought to the hospital, Mehdi Khan Head Constable Police (P.W. 13) went to the hospital and recorded his dying declaration Exh.PJ, whereby he deposed that the accused wanted to install a crush machine on the land which has been obtained by him on lease from the government and he has also obtained a temporary injunction against the accused from the relevant Court. On 5.4.2001, the accused was installing crush machine but he forbade the labourers not to do so because a temporary injunction has been issued. The accused was informed by some mason or somebody else about his intervention; therefore, when he was proceeding towards his house alongwith Muhammad Khan (P.W.2) riding on a motorcycle. At 10:00 a.m., he found the accused waylaid a bit ahead of the crush machine. As soon as, he reached nearby, the accused appeared on the road at once, who was armed with .12-bore gun. The accused after raising a lalkara fired a straight shot upon him with .12-bore gun which hit him on right side of his abdomen. The complainant fell down and the accused fled away while waving his gun. The occurrence was witnessed by Muhammad Khan, Munshi Abdur Rauf and Nasir Ali. The complainant also deposed the motive of the occurrence, the land dispute since long between the complainant and the accused.

Mehdi Khan Head Constable Police (P.W. 13) fully supported the aforementioned statement before the trial Court and despite of lengthy cross-examination his testimony could not be shaken. He explained that he did not obtain ID Card of the deceased because he personally knew him. He further stated that he did not obtain any certificate from doctor because the deceased got recorded his statement in a befitting manner. The learned Counsel for the defence laid great stress upon the point that dying declaration was fabricated because neither the time of its recording was mentioned nor it was certified by any doctor or staff member of the hospital. It was further contended that the ID Card of the deceased was not produced and his signature was also not got identified by any witness. In support of the contentions, the learned Counsel referred to me the case reported as Mst. Zahida Bibi V. The State (PLD 2006 SC 255), whereby it has been opined that dying declaration in absence of doctor and without associating any member of the hospital staff would be a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C and not a dying declaration of the deceased which is a weak kind of evidence because of the absence of cross-examination; therefore, it is dangerous to accept such statement without careful scrutiny of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances. The learned Counsel also cited a case titled Muhammad Latif & another V. Muhammad Hussain & 9 others (PLD 1970 SC 406), whereby it was held that the reliance cannot be placed on the dying declaration which is recorded in the hospital in presence of all the eye-witnesses because the possibility that deceased was tutored by these persons cannot be ruled out. The learned Counsel further cited a case titled Nazim Khan & 2 others V. The State (1994 SCMR 1092), whereby it was observed that dying declaration recorded at Police Station in presence of relatives of the deceased is not worthy of any credence. The learned Counsel further referred to me a case reported as Muhammad Anwar V. The State (PLD 1984 Lahore 132) whereby it was held that a police officer recording dying declaration knowing details of incident before time, no certificate obtained from doctor to the effect that deponent remained conscious throughout and the police officer not associating any person from hospital staff, dying declaration though recorded in presence of doctor but no reason was assigned as to the absence of signature of doctor on the declaration, the genuineness of such dying declaration is doubtful in circumstances of the case. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant cited a case reported as Farman-Ullah V. Qadeem Khan & another (PLJ 2001 SC 722) whereby it was opined by the Apex Court that no specific forum has been provided by law before whom such dying declaration is required to be made and it can be made even before a private person. It was further held that there is no legal requirement that the declaration must be read over or it must be signed by its maker. The only condition is that it should be influenced free and the person by whom it was recorded should be examined as a witness and when it is proved that it was made by the deceased it becomes substantive evidence; therefore, corroboration of dying declaration is not a rule of law but requirement of prudence and when the dying declaration is proved by cogent evidence it can be made basis for conviction. The learned Counsel for the complainant also referred to me a case titled Niaz Ahmad V. The State [PLJ 2001 Cri.Cases (Lahore) 1072) (DB)], whereby it was held that even a statement made under Section 161, Cr.P.C of an injured person or the F.I.R recorded by him is admissible in evidence as dying declaration if injured dies later. It was also observed that conviction can be based upon a dying declaration without any other corroboratory piece of evidence. However, the Courts look for corroboration as a rule of prudence depending upon facts and circumstances of each and every criminal case, where Courts would find for corroboration from other pieces of evidence.

It transpires from the perusal of above cited cases that it is not requirement of law that dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate or it must be certified by a doctor rather it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case while considering the evidentiary value or weight to such statement. In a proper case a person can be convicted on the basis of a dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to look for corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that dying declaration is a truthful version and not fabricated in any other manner. I am fortified in my view from the following cases:--

In Ramawati Devi V. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164), it was observed that there is no requirement of law that dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate. What evidentiary value or weight has to be attached to such statement, must necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In a proper case, it may be permissible to convict a person only on the basis of a dying declaration in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case.

In Lallubhai Devchand Shah & others V. The State of Gujarat (AIR 1972 SC 1776), it was held that if the Court is satisfied on a close scrutiny of a dying declaration that it is truthful, it is opened to the Court to convict the accused on its basis without any independent corroboration.

In Khushal Rao V. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC Bombay 22), it was opined that before relying upon a dying declaration it has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing its veracity by cross-examination. But once, the Court reaches the conclusion that the dying declaration is truthful version then question of further corroboration does not arise. If, on the other hand, the Court comes to the conclusion that dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, it is not reliable by itself, and that its suffer from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of conviction thus, a necessity for corroboration arises not from inherent weakness of dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from infirmities.

It has been held in Abrar Hussain Shah V. The State (1992 SCR 294), that the evidentiary value of dying declaration depends on the circumstances of each case, i.e. the words used by the deceased, the impartial character of the witness who proves the dying declaration and also the mental calibre of the concerned witness so as to exclude the possibility of misunderstanding the words used by the declarant. The mere fact that the dying declaration was not a detailed one is not sufficient reason to discard the same, especially so when the witness proving the same is upright trustworthy and has no motive to implicate the accused falsely. It may be observed that the prosecution case mainly rests on the ocular evidence, and the evidentiary value of the dying declaration need not be put hard test for relying upon the same as would be the case where the dying declaration is the sole evidence of the conviction cannot be recorded with acting upon the dying declaration. As we are of the view that the testimony of the eye-witnesses needs no corroboration, we need not dilate upon the question of dying declaration any more. Suffice it to say, if at all any corroboration was necessary in this case that is furnished by dying declaration because we find no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Dr. Muhammad Arif, P.W.

The evidentiary value of dying declaration was dealt with in a case titled Waris Hussain Shah V. Abid Hussain Shah & 3 others (2001 PCr.LJ SC AJ&K 268) as under:--

"The dying declaration, as stated earlier, is only a corroboratory piece of evidence which supports the ocular testimony given by the eye-witnesses. No hard and fast rule can be laid down about the standard of the dying declaration. Its veracity, authenticity and reliability vary from case to case. In some cases the dying declaration alone may be considered sufficient evidence against the accused, while in some, it cannot at all be relied upon unless it is proved to be reliable or to be supportive of the other evidence on record. In the case in hand the dying declaration is in line with the ocular account of the eye-witnesses. No animosity smacks from the dying declaration, hence its authenticity and reliability cannot be said to be doubtful for the reason that it is made in the presence of the eye-witnesses, which of course, is also not true."

The above stated catena of decisions lays down the principle that no specific forum has been provided for recording of dying declaration and it can be made before a private person. It is also not legal requirement that it must be read over or it must be signed by its maker. The only legal requirement is that it must be independent and free from influence of others. In this manner, a very close scrutiny is needed because such declaration is made in absence of the accused without providing him an opportunity    of    cross-examination.  If  it  is  found  that  deceased  had opportunity to identify the accused at the time of making the declaration, his memory was not impaired, his statement was consistent throughout, it was made at the earliest opportunity and it was proved by whom it was recorded then the sanctity attached with the dying declaration by statute must be respected that a dying person is not expected to tell lie and its veracity cannot be brushed away on the ground that prior to recording such statement a certificate was not obtained by a doctor.

The dying declaration recorded by Mehdi Khan ASI Police (P.W. 13) when examined in the light of the criterion as mentioned hereinabove, I am of the opinion that it has been proved beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt and being a substantive piece of evidence it was rightly relied upon by the Court below. It is an admitted fact of the case that the occurrence occurred in broad-day light and only a single accused was nominated by assigning a specific role leaving no question of mistaken identity. Therefore, I do not find any reason to disbelieve the aforesaid P.W. who is a government servant having no grudge or rancour against the convict-appellant.

In such state of affairs, I cannot subscribe to the view of learned counsel for the defence that dying declaration is not reliable because it was averred by the deceased in his civil suit that the accused wanted to install a crush machine adjacent to his land, whereas according to the dying declaration, it was deposed by him that he had installed a crush machine in the land obtained from government on lease, which proves the fact that dying declaration was not testified by the deceased.

As stated above, when the dying declaration is relied upon then it does not require any independent corroboration and confirmatory evidence is required only when some discrepancies or infirmities appear in such declaration. It will be pertinent to note here that the prosecution has also produced three independent and trustworthy eye-witnesses who have no motive to implicate the accused falsely.

Muhammad Khan (P.W.2) is neither related to the deceased nor has any enmity or ill well against the convict-appellant. It has also been proved on the record that at the time of occurrence he was riding on the back seat of motorcycle which was driven by the deceased. Therefore, he is a natural and important witness of the occurrence and his statement cannot be ignored on the basis that he did not sustain any injury during the occurrence.

Similarly, Abdur Rauf (P.W.3) and Nasir Ali (P.W.4) have been working with the deceased but their evidence before the trial Court was recorded after a year and three years of the occurrence respectively. In such state of affairs, it cannot be believed that they have not spoken the truth, unduly favoured their deceased boss and falsely implicated an innocent person substituting the real culprit. Both the above mentioned eye-witnesses were present nearby the place of occurrence; therefore, they are also natural and trustworthy witnesses and cannot be described as chance witnesses. Abdur Rauf (P.W.3) basically belongs to Kotli whereas Nasir Ali (P.W.4) belongs to Vehari, Pakistan. In this view of the matter, if for the sake of argument, some minor discrepancies or infirmities appear in the dying declaration, it can safely be treated as a strong corroboratory piece of evidence.

The next question which heeds determination is as to whether the medical evidence contradicts the ocular version. The learned Counsel for the defence has strenuously contended that occurrence took place somewhere else by some other persons and the victim was targeted from a very close range. According to the learned counsel, if the deceased was fired upon from a distance of 21 feet, the pellets spread widely but none of the pellets hit the arms of the deceased who was driving a motorcycle at the time of occurrence and all the pellets hit his abdomen. Suffice to note that the postmortem report supports the ocular version which shows that the shot fired by the accused hit the deceased at his area of abdomen and thigh; therefore, it was not necessary that the pellets should have hit the arms of the deceased while he was driving a motorcycle. It is also worth mentioning that if the shot would have been fired from a close range, it would have caused blackening scorching or tattooing of the surrounding skin which is not found in the instant case. It is also to be noted that it is not easy to give a definite opinion about the distance from which the firearm was discharged and because of the reason the doctor has opined in the postmortem report that shot was fired from distance of a few yards. On this account, the medical evidence fully supports the ocular version. Even otherwise, it is settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in case where the evidence of eye-witnesses is reliable and trustworthy any variation appearing in the medical evidence would not affect the ocular version of the eye-witnesses which has to be relied upon. (2005 SCR 166).

As far as the question of non-appearance of Doctor Saeed (P.W.8) is concerned, the secondary evidence of Sajid Shabbir, clerk DHO Office, has been recorded after following the required procedure i.e. after recording the statement of Shabbir Khan Constable police No. 466 P.W. that Dr. Saeed has gone to Saudi-Arabia. Sajid Shabbir P.W. has clearly deposed about the identification of the signature of Dr. Saeed on the postmortem report Exh.PO.

Pursuant to the above discussion, all the eye-witnesses are unanimous on the point that Abdur Rasheed was killed by the fire of Ghulam Mustafa, accused, with the .12-bore gun which hit him upon his abdomen who fell down and later on succumbed to the injury, whereas according to the defence, the occurrence took place in early hours of the morning at crush machine of the accused whereby the deceased went to forbid the labourers of the accused and some of the labourers fired a shot upon him and fled away. The above stated version has not been specifically taken by the defence either at the time of framing of charge sheet or at the time of seeking explanation of the prosecution evidence from him, as required by Section 342, Cr.P.C, but it only emerges from the style of cross-examination and suggestions put to the prosecution witnesses. When both the versions of the prosecution and the defence are taken into juxtaposition and appreciated in its true perspective, the version of the prosecution seems to be more probable, plausible and trustworthy, which was taken from the day first, whereas the defence has not produced any evidence or record in support of its version. Therefore, the version of the defence is neither plausible nor reasonable. At the same time, I am also cognizant of the fact that in absence of raising a counter version by the defence, the prosecution cannot be absolved from its duty to prove its case beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt. The minute scrutiny of the ocular version, who stood the test of cross-examination alongwith the evidence of dying declaration, the time and place of occurrence and death of Abdur Rasheed at the hands of accused by firing a shot have been fully established. The recoveries of bloodstained clay and motorcycle coupled with the above stated sufficient evidence, the place of occurrence has been proved to be same as alleged by the prosecution in F.I.R. The dying declaration was also promptly recorded which made basis of F.I.R. Both accused and eye-witnesses are nominated and a clear role has also been ascribed to the accused. There is no dispute of identification of the accused. It was never possible for the eye-witnesses to involve an innocent person in a heinous case of murder instead of a real culprit. The motive setup by the prosecution, a land dispute between the deceased and the accused has also been abundantly established and to prove the motive, the copies of the suit Exh.PKK, stay order Exh.PJ, decision Exh.PL and decree Exh.PM have been produced by the prosecution. As stated in earlier part of the judgment, the dying declaration has been proved to be authenticate and reliable which provides ample support to the ocular version. The postmortem report by Dr. Saeed, the site-plan prepared by Ghulam Rasool Patwari (P.W.7), the recovery of rifle alongwith a used cartridge extracted from the body of the deceased, the bloodstained clothing of the deceased, the reports of Chemical Examiner and Forensic Science Laboratory Punjab also furnish sufficient confirmatory and corroboratory evidence. In this manner, the version of the prosecution is clear, cogent and trustworthy.

As far as an objection raised by the learned counsel for the defence about non-mentioning of the clothing of the deceased in inquest report or in the report of postmortem, the non-mentioning of departure of Mehdi Khan from Police Station in daily diary, the refusal of hearing a telephone call by Muhammad Rasheed (P.W.9), the non-production of registration papers of motorcycle or non-examination of the crush machine do not demolish the prosecution case because these are simply treated irregularities and procedural defects committed during the course of investigation. (2002 P Cr.LJ 1785).

It is by now an enriched principle of law that the misfeasance or dereliction of duty by the I.O. will not, now go the advantage of the accused against the prosecution as the approach of the Courts to a case carrying capital charge has to be dynamic and these technical infirmities cannot stand in its way to do justice if its conscience is satisfied that the event as narrated by the witnesses did take place and there is no earthly reason for him to lie. (PLJ 2001 Cri.Cases Lahore 700).

It will be relevant to point out that the purpose of inquest report is only to find out the cause of death of a person and not the person who had caused the death; therefore, in the inquest report only description of wounds or other marks of injuries on body of the deceased, manner of causing injuries and kind of weapon used alone are required to be mentioned. To provide brief history of the case or details of place of occurrence and the name of accused is the responsibility of either the victim if survives before his death or the eye-witnesses of the occurrence. In this respect, reference can be made to a case titled Arif V. State & 2 others (PLD 2006 Peshawar 5).

It has been held time and again by the Apex Court that the infirmities while preparing inquest report and injury forms and even their non-production is not fatal to the prosecution case because these are hardly material if the case is otherwise established by the prosecution. There may be some importance of inquest report and injury sheet in certain cases when cause of death is doubtful but in the instant case, the defence has admitted itself that the deceased was killed by firing a shot by some unknown Pathan labour. In this regard, reference can be made to a case titled Abdur Rasheed & 3 others V. Abdul Ghaffar & 5 others (2001 SCR 240).

In the instant case, the next point which falls for determination is the evidence of recovery witnesses Allah Ditta (P.W.5) and Muhammad Farid (P.W.6). The evidence of both the above stated witnesses has been assailed by the learned counsel for the defence on the ground that they are closely related to the deceased, whereby on the contrary the learned counsel for the complainant has also submitted that the evidence of friends and relatives cannot be ignored on the ground of relationship. I have carefully perused the evidence of both P.Ws. mentioned above and did not find any material contradiction or glaring defect; therefore, the evidence of recovery witnesses cannot be discarded on the ground that it was not witnessed by independent witnesses of the locality. Similarly, mere relationship of the witnesses of recovery memos. is not a solid ground to reject their testimony dubbing the same as doubtful. (2001 SCR 240).

It may also be pointed out that it is well settled principle of law that when ocular evidence is reliable and satisfactory, the conviction in law can be recorded on such evidence alone without any further corroboration because corroboration is required only to satisfy the conscious of the Court that witnesses have spoken the truth and their deposition is worthy of credence. (2000 SCR 123).

In view of above stated ocular and corroboratory evidence alongwith the evidence of dying declaration, I reach the conclusion that the prosecution has established its case beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court does not suffer from any illegality, manifest error or perversity which has to be maintained.

So far as the case of awarding capital punishment is concerned, I am of the view that in the light of peculiar facts and surrounding circumstances of the case, the capital punishment should not be awarded to the convict-appellant for the following reasons:--

1.         There has been inordinate delay in the disposal of case. The occurrence took place on 5.4.2001 whereas the impugned judgment is being recorded after seven years and the accused has already undergone the agony of protected trial and remained detained in lockup for more than seven years. (1992 SCR 294).

2.         The convict-appellant was not awarded capital punishment by the trial Court who had the opportunity of recording the evidence of prosecution and was in better position to form its opinion on the appraisal of prosecution evidence; thus, he had an expectancy of life. (2000 SCR 124).

3.         The convict-appellant is 73 years old.

For what has been stated above, the appeal filed by Ghulam Mustafa, convict-appellant, having no force is hereby dismissed and the counter appeal filed by Mst. Nasreen Begum also fails. Resultantly, the impugned judgment dated 7.7.2005 recorded by trial Court is maintained.

(M.S.A.)           Appeal dismissed.