PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 774
[Lahore High Court, Lahore]
Present: Muhammad
Amjad Rafiq, J.
MUHAMMAD
SHAHZAD and another--Petitioners
versus
STATE
and others--Respondents
Crl. A. No. 642 & Crl. Rev.
No. 380 of 2017, heard on 16.11.2021.
Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (10 of 1984)--
----Arts. 46 & 47--Relevancy of certain evidence for
proving proceeding, the truth of facts stated--It requires that previous
statements under Article 46 & 47 would first be proved and then its
corroboration and contradiction would be taken up--In this case, first matter for
consideration is how to prove such previous statement--Trial Court has invented
to transpose the copies of previous statements into this trial from its own
record, Which practice is not warranted. To track the correct position, it is
observed that practice adopted by trial Court in this case is permissible only
in civil cases or it has some room in criminal trial as well. Unlike code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, there is no specific provision in Cr.P.C
which deals with transposition of statements in subsequent
trial; nor any provision exist relating to calling for record of any criminal
Court for the purpose of inspection and using it as evidence. [P. 782] A
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S.
94--Summons to produce documents or other thing--Criminal trial--Provision of
CPC cannot be stretched for inspection of Court record by a criminal Court in a
criminal trial--Though Section 94 of Cr.P.C and
Article 158 & 161 give power to the criminal Court to call for any document
yet it does not include Court record; even then those section simply authorize
to calling of document; as per provisions of Article 158 & 161, parties are
not exempted from producing the primary evidence of such document or the
secondary.
[P.
783] B
Qanun-e-Shahadat
Order, 1984 (10 of 1984)--
----Art. 71--Principle of evidence--Hearsay evidence-- Another
procedure which the prosecution could resort to is highlighted in proviso to
Article 71 of Qanun-e-Shahadat
Order, 1984 known as “Shahada ala
al-Shahadah” which runs as under:
Provided further
that, if a witness is dead, or cannot be found or has become incapable of
giving evidence, or his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of
delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case the Court regards as
unreasonable, a party shall have the right to produce, “shahada
ala al-shahadah” by which a
witness can appoint two witnesses to depose on his behalf, except in the case
of Hudood.
This method is lost
sight of our practitioners and the Courts which is based on Islamic principle,
introduced for the first time through said Order in 1984. This principle of
evidence is an exception to hearsay evidence and can successfully be used to
prove the case in a situation when witnesses could not appear as being dead or
for any other reason stated in the proviso under discussion. [P. 785] C
Witness or Documents--
----Witnesses or documents, not having notice by the defence, cannot be produced or tendered respectively in
evidence by surprise, therefore, it is incumbent upon the prosecution that
whenever, any such statement is intended to be produce or any witness for shahada ala al-shahadah is adduced, copy of such statements be handed over
to the defence well before their production. It
ensures the observance of Constitutional duty with respect to due process and
fair trial. [P.
786] D
1976 PCr.LJ 1040, 1983 PCr.LJ 1513
& 2019 YLR 2831.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 342--Even no notice of such evidence was given to the defence and was taken by surprise, that was the reason
against such admission of statements appellant has responded in his statement
u/S. 342 Cr.P.C that he reserves the right to assail
such practice of Court before higher forum and that was assailed by his counsel
before this Court during argument. In order to prepare his defence
against intended evidence, Prosecution is obliged to give copies of such
statements and documents to the accused before these are tendered in evidence.
In this case though prosecution has made an attempt to prove the case through
the statement of injured as
PW-6, yet this witness has failed in material particulars; therefore, his
testimony cannot be accepted. [P. 786]
E
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 512--Longstanding absconsion
of accused--Question of-- So far as the question of longstanding absconsion of accused is concerned; no evidence was brought
on record by the prosecution in the form of warrants or proclamation nor any
witness was produced in this respect; only a bald question No. 12 was asked about
proceedings u/S. 512 of Cr.P.C which was denied by
the appellant. Even copies of such proceedings were not brought on the record;
therefore, prosecution has failed to establish his willful absconsion
in this case for which the appellant cannot be held responsible in the
circumstance. [P.
786] F
M/s. Shahid
Azeem and Mudassar Naveed Chatha, Advocates for
Appellants.
Rai
Asif Mehmood, Deputy
Prosecutor General for State.
Rai
Munir Zafar Sangra, Advocate for Complainant.
Date of hearing: 16.11.2021.
Judgment
Muhammad Shahzad appellant was tagged
with charge of unlawful killing of Farman Ullah back
in year 1998; he jumped the bail and absented himself during the trial and by
the time all co accused who were carrying allegation of causing injuries to Imtiaz PW in the same occurrence stood acquitted from the
trial Court vide judgment dated 06.03.2017. He was re-arrested on
10.06.2015, put to trial again; his trial was concluded in the absence of Najeeb Ullah complainant; Najjabat Khan Patwari, Saeed Anwar SI Investigating Officer, all three being dead
and Hammed Ullah being won over. Only witness left to
stay was Imtiaz, injured PW-6. Prosecution procured
previous statements of complainant and Patwari
recorded in an earlier trial, whereas for Investigating Officer, who though did
not appear in earlier trial being a proclaimed offender yet was led through
secondary evidence and same is the position in this trial too; prosecution
selected Riaz Hussain
retired HC/159 as for secondary evidence after conclusion of trial in case FIR
No. 01 dated 07.01.1998 under
Section 302/324/34/148/149, PPC registered at Police station Bharrana District Jhang,
appellant was convicted and sentenced by the trial Court as under:
Imprisonment
for life under Section 302 (b), PPC with compensation of Rs.
500,000/- to be paid to legal heir of deceased, in case of default to further
undergo 6 months’ SI.
Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was
extended.
Appellant has assailed his conviction
and sentence through forecited appeal and Revision
brought by complainant for enhancement of sentence; both are being decided
through this common judgment.
2. Episode of crime in the prosecution case theory, encompassed
Muhammad Shahzad Ahmad appellant, Tariq, Nasir, Muhammad Farooq, Ikram Ullah and Fakhar all armed with Rifles in the canvas and framed them
as the perpetrators sitting ambushed near the house of Karam
Machhi on the way to Mouza Sardary Wala, when at about 3/30
p.m. on 7th January, 1998 Najeeb Ullah
Complainant along with Hamed Ullah
on one motorcycle, while Farman Ullah and Imtiaz on the other were halted, who alighted from their
bikes; appellant’s fire hit Farman Ullah over the
left ear and passed through the head; bullet from rifle of Tariq grooved in
left bicep of Imtiaz; all accused came out and
started indiscriminate firing upon complainant party, some more fires hit on
left bicep, left hand and thumb of Imtiaz. Motive as
alleged was murder of Khan Muhammad grandfather of Shahzad
appellant, around 37/38 year ago by Sher Muhammad
being maternal uncle of Farman and Cousin of complainant.
3. After usual investigation report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted in Court and the accused was charge
sheeted, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. During trial the
prosecution examined seven witnesses along with previous statements of Najeeb Ullah (complainant) as
PW-6 and Najjabat Khan Patwari
(PW-10) and closed its case. Thereafter, the accused when examined under
Section 342, Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution evidence,
however, neither produced any witness in defence nor
himself appeared in the dock within the meaning of Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. and on conclusion of trial he was convicted and
sentenced as detailed above.
4. Respective contentions of proponents were attended; record
perused in the light of such submissions.
5. In the impugned judgment, as per paragraph-16, learned trial
Court has disbelieved the recovery from the accused/appellant on the ground
that no crime empty was secured from the place of occurrence and recovery of
rifle effected on 13.02.1998 though found by FSL as in working condition cannot
be held with certainty that it was the very weapon used by appellant during the
occurrence. During statement of PW-2 Muhammad Ayoob
SI, he admitted that memo. of recovery in original was
not produced in support of recovery from the accused/appellant; such recovery
was rightly rejected by the trial Court.
6. Similarly, in paragraph-18, of impugned judgment, motive was
also slipped from the hands of prosecution and Court held that at the time of
occurrence appellant was of 19 years of age and might have been prompted by his
co accused who had in same relation. This Court has
also observed the same that motive in this case is inadequate and could not be
proved through any cogent evidence; even investigating officer neither in first
trial nor in this appeared as witness to confirm or null the motive part.
7. Medical evidence was brought on record by Dr. Muhammad
Sharif PW-3 who examined Imtiaz injured on the same
day at 7.30 p.m. (after four hours) and observed three injuries as follows;
i. A lacerated
wound of 1 c.m. x 1.5 c.m.,
shin deep on the front of outer and upper part of left shoulder. X-ray was
advised.
ii. Seven wounds
of 1 c.m. x 1 c.m. skin
deep, each in an area of 6 c.m. x 5 c.m. on the front of left upper arm upper apart below
Injury No. , the edges were lacerated and in a grazing shape. X-ray of left
upper arm was advised.
iii. A lacerated
wound of 2.5 c.m. x 1 c.m.
muscle deep on the palmer surface of left thumb.
Doctor observed duration of injuries as
6 hours and nature as caused by firearm weapon. Though all the accused were
armed with rifles but nature of injuries reflects otherwise, which was admitted
by the doctor as could be result of one fire; further admitted that injuries
were simple in nature and tone and tenor of such witness was indicative of the
fact that injuries were probably caused by .12 bore gun and not with rifle.
There is conflict in ocular and medical account particularly when no crime
empties were collected in this case. This conflict is further examined in the
light of his deposition for post mortem examination which was conducted with a
delay of 18/19 hour on the next day at 10.00.a.m. and observed following
injuries:
i. A lacerated
wound 1 c.m. x 1 c.m. with
inverted edges on the left side of his head at a distance of 3 c.m. above the pinna of left ear (Entry wound)
ii. A lacerated
wound of 2 c.m. x 2 c.m.
with inverted (sic) edges on the back of left side of head (Exit wound)
Doctor observed duration between injury
and death as 1 x 1½ hours while between death and postmortem as 16 to 20 hours.
he admitted as soon as he received the papers, he
started the examination. Though he had admitted to Court question that as per
book written by Parikh, death in like situation should have been instantaneous,
yet did not explain further with respect to injury in the present case. Defence tried through cross examination that brain was not
prolapsed from exit wound and it was not the serious injury, therefore, deceased
remained alive for 1 to 1x1 ½ hours. Though medical evidence to the extent of
present appellant is apparently corroborated yet it would be discussed in the
ocular account section ahead in the light of position of deceased, the
appellant and the site plan; however, it would be appropriate to throw light
first on the proposition that if deceased could remained alive for such a
longer period after receiving firearm injury into his head/skull.
C.K. Parikh in his Text book of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic
Medicine and Toxicology at page 4.51 (Q. 4.29.) commented upon ‘physical
activity after fatal firearm injury’ in following words;
“This depends upon
the site of injury and the organ involved. Unless there is gross destruction of
brain, cardiovascular system, or pulmonary system, some physical activity is
possible in many cases. However, it is shorter in firearm victim than in
victims of stabbing. In a pistol shot through the right temple perforating the
brain and exiting on the left temple, the victim was a position to sit and
answer questions nine hours after the shooting, though he succumbed to the
injuries then. A man who got a shot in his heart by a pistol could walk half a
mile before he collapsed. A victim of 0.32 caliber bullet,
which penetrated his heart, lung, and liver, fell to the ground, pulled out his
gun, and shot the assailant in the chest. He died 20 minutes later. Death is
instantaneous if there is a gaping wound of the heart or the medulla is
involved”.
Doctor has not explained the nature of
injury in this case properly, therefore, above condition of deceased can be
presumed which is in line with duration between injury and death.
8. Prosecution for ocular account has put Imtiaz
injured as PW-6 and took help from previous statement of Najeeb
Ullah complainant recorded in an earlier case for
corroboration yet it is lurking on legal premises with respect to its method of
tendering into evidence; Hamed Ullah
was given up being won over, therefore, only evidence of one witness requires
reappraisal. Though learned defence counsel has
categorically alleged that this witness has been disbelieved in earlier trial
with respect to his own injuries and all the accused stood acquitted who were
given role of firing upon the injured; therefore, in no case his testimony is
trustworthy for the role of present appellant. Learned complainant counsel was
of the view that injured after receiving injury fell down in a pit, therefore,
could not clearly see who actually had fired upon him, but to the extent of
role of present appellant he was conscious then. Before embarking upon his
testimony, role of appellant with respect to injury on the head of deceased is
examined in the light of medical evidence and position of parties at the crime
scene. Entry wound on left pinna of ear is not possible from point of presence
of appellant and the deceased with stated positions who were facing each other,
when the witness deposed that they alighted from their bikes. Other stance of
turning back the bikes though was not proved, yet for the sake of argument, if
it is considered that seeing the assailant, deceased tried to turn back and in
that position received the fire, then deceased must have fallen from the motor
bike and corresponding injuries due to fall should have been on his person
which are missing in the post mortem report and deposition of doctor; injured
was also sitting at rear seat but did not have such injuries on his person.
Evidence of injured witness PW-6 was examined in the light of respective
contentions; he admitted that both the parties related inter se and developed
enmity is also evident, he faced certain confrontation
during his deposition before the Court which he could not justifiably accounted
for. He admitted that near the place of occurrence, number of
populations reside but none of them came forward to support the
prosecution version. Accused/appellant also claimed his marriage with sister of
this witness who was later divorced yet this fact was denied by this witness.
Similarly, he denied the suggestion that he in fact committed the murder of
Farman Ullah, which was the first version of appellant
before Investigating Officer, yet prosecution could not rebut these facts due
to non-appearance of investigating officer. He admitted that he and Hamed Ullah are resident of Kot Sultan while Farman Ullah
deceased and Najeeb Ullah
complainant were resident of Sardary wala which is at a distance of 1 x 1½ kilometer from the
place of occurrence. He was resident of ¾ acres from the place of occurrence
and was aware of the area and the people around him, however, he reached the
hospital after 4 hours despite he was seriously injured, though doctor has
observed duration of his injury about six hours which create serious doubt
about time and place of occurrence, yet place of occurrence could also be not
proved because of the reason that investigating officer as well as draftsman
could not appear as being dead. Transposition of Statement of draftsman was not
according to law and secondary evidence for Investigating Officer does not
establish the fact under discussion. The testimony of this witness with
stammered presentation does not ring true particularly when he has already
stood disbelieved in the previous trial for his own injuries. His evidence
cannot be stretched against the appellant for sustaining the conviction and
sentence. Reliance on is on the case “Ishtiaq Hussain and another versus The State and others” (2021
SCMR 159) and “Nazir Ahmad versus Muhammad Iqbal and another” (2011 SCMR 527).
9. Coming to the proposition that as
to whether the statement of Najeeb Ullah recorded in an earlier trial could be read against
the appellant is responded with the observation that evidence declared relevant
through Qanun-e-Shahadat
Order, 1984 could be brought on record as being admissible. The relevancy of
statement recorded between the parties in an earlier trial is as follows:
Article-47.
Relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent proceeding, the truth
of facts therein stated: Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding
or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the; purpose
of proving, in a subsequent judicial, proceeding or in a later stage of the
same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the
witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is
kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained
without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the
case, the Court considers unreasonable.
Provided
that--
the proceeding was between the same parties or
their representatives-in-interest;
the
adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to
cross-examine;
the
questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second
proceeding.
Explanation: A
criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the
prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this Article.
Mere tendering of such statements
cannot be stretched as evidence unless to be proved as required by law. the relevant provision in this respect is cited in following
Article of forecited Order, 1984:-
Article-154.
What matters may be proved in connection with proved statement relevant under
Article 46 or 47:
Whenever any statement,
relevant under Article 46 or 47, is proved, all matters may be proved either in
order to contradict or corroborate it, or in order to impeach or confirm the
credit of the person by whom it was made, which might have been proved if that
person had been called as a witness and had denied upon cross-examination the
truth of the matter suggested.
It
requires that previous statements under Articles 46 & 47 would first be
proved and then its corroboration and contradiction would be taken up. In this
case, first matter for consideration is how to prove such previous statement.
Trial Court has invented to transpose the copies of previous statements into
this trial from its own record, Which practice is not
warranted. To track the correct position, it is observed that practice adopted
by trial Court in this case is permissible only in civil cases or it has some
room in criminal trial as well. Unlike code of Civil Procedure, 1908, there is
no specific provision in Cr.P.C which deals with
transposition of statements in subsequent trial; nor
any provision exist relating to calling for record of any criminal Court for
the purpose of inspection and using it as evidence. Following is the relevant
provision of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Order
XIII Rule-10, CPC
(1) The Court may
of its own motion, and may in its discretion upon the application of any of the
parties to a suit, send for, either from
its own records or from any other Court, the record of any other suit or
proceeding, and inspect the same.
(2) Every application
made under this rule shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be supported by
an affidavit showing how the record is material to the suit in which the
application is made, and that the applicant cannot without unreasonable delay
or expense obtain a duly authenticated copy of the record or of such portion
thereof as the applicant requires, or that the production of the original is
necessary for the purposes of justice.
(3) Nothing
contained in this rule shall be deemed to enable the Court to use in evidence
any document which under the law of evidence would be inadmissible in the suit.
This provision gives power to Court to
send for either from its own record of any other suit or proceedings. For
criminal trial ‘any other proceedings’ obviously relates to a previous trial as
mentioned in Article 47 above in following terms:
Explanation: A
criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the
prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this Article.
Yet
this provision of CPC cannot be stretched for inspection of Court record by a
criminal Court in a criminal trial. Though Section 94 of Cr.P.C
and Articles 158 & 161 give power to the criminal Court to call for any
document yet it does not include Court record; even then those section simply
authorize to calling of document; as per provisions of Articles 158 & 161,
parties are not exempted from producing the primary evidence of such document
or the secondary as the case may be.
Section-94
of code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
Summons to produce
document or other thing. (1) Whenever any Court, or any officer in charge of a
police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is
necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or
other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court
may issue a summons, or such officers a written order, to the person in whose
possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to
attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the
summons or order:
Article-158. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984
Production of
documents: (1) A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his
possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which
there may be to its production or to in its admissibility. The validity of any
objection shall be decided on by the Court.
(2) The Court, if
it sees fit may inspect the document unless it refers to matters of State, or
take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.
(3) If for such a
purpose it is necessary to cause any document to be translated, the Court may,
if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret, unless the
document is to be given in evidence; and if the translator disobeys such
direction, he shall be held to have committed an offence under Section 166 of
the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).
Article 161. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984
Judge's power to put questions or order production: The
Judge may in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask
any question he places, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the
parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of
any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be
entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the
leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply
to any such question:
Provided that the
Judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Order to be relevant, and
duly proved:
Provided also that
this Article shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any
question or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to
refuse to answer or produce under Articles 4 to 14, both inclusive, if the
question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor
shall the judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other
person to ask under Article 143 or 144; nor shall he dispense with primary
evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.
In the circumstances, right course
would be resort to certified copies of such statements for using as evidence
because statements recorded in an earlier trial are termed as public documents
as per Article-85(3) of Qanun-e-Shahadat
Order, 1984 with following expression;
“(3) documents forming part of the records of judicial
proceedings”
Certified copies of such documents can be
obtained under Article 87 and contents of such documents can be proved by
production of such certified copies under Article-88 of said Order of 1984
which is as follows:
Article 88. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984
Proof of documents by production of certified Copies:
Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public
documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.
When certified copies of such
statements are produced, these are treated as proved under the principle of
evidence in the form of presumption referred as follows;
Article-91. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984
Presumption as
to documents produced as record of evidence: Whenever any document
is produced before any Court, purporting to be a record or memorandum of
the evidence, or of any part of the evidence, given by a witness in a judicial
proceeding Or before any officer authorized by law to take such
evidence or to be a statement or confession by any prisoner or accused person,
taken in accordance with law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or
Magistrate or by any such officer as aforesaid, the Court shall presume— that
the document is genuine; that any statements as to the circumstances under
which it was taken, purporting to be made by the person signing it are true and
that such evidence, statement or confession was duly taken.
(Emphasize supplied)
Prosecution has not followed the
procedure highlighted above which was the requirement of law; the statement so
transposed are rejected from consideration.
10.
Another procedure which the prosecution could resort to is highlighted in
proviso to Article 71 of Qanun-e-Shahadat
Order, 1984 known as “Shahada ala
al-Shahadah” which runs as under:
Provided
further that, if a witness is dead, or cannot be found or has become incapable
of giving evidence, or his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of
delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case the Court regards as
unreasonable, a party shall have the right to produce, “shahada
ala al-shahadah” by which a
witness can appoint two witnesses to depose on his behalf, except in the case
of Hudood.
This method is lost sight of our
practitioners and the Courts which is based on Islamic principle, introduced
for the first time through said Order in 1984. This principle of evidence is an
exception to hearsay evidence and can successfully be used to prove the case in
a situation when witnesses could not appear as being dead or for any other
reason stated in the proviso under discussion.
11.
Witnesses or documents, not having notice by the defence,
cannot be produced or tendered respectively in evidence by surprise, therefore,
it is incumbent upon the prosecution that whenever, any such statement is
intended to be produce or any witness for shahada ala al-shahadah is adduced, copy
of such statements be handed over to the defence well
before their production. It ensures the observance of Constitutional duty with
respect to due process and fair trial. Reliance is on cases reported as 1976 PCr.LJ 1040 Ran Nawaz v. The State; 1983 PCr.LJ 1513 “Sultan Khan v. The State” and 2019 YLR 2831 “Muhammad
yasin and others v. The
State”.
12.
Once the earlier statements are proved as per procedure and requirement
highlighted above, it becomes imperative for prosecution to produce evidence in
corroboration of it. In this case prosecution has not brought on record the
statement of Najeeb Ullah
through the required process of law; therefore, such statement cannot be read
in favour of prosecution; even no notice of such
evidence was given to the defence and was taken by
surprise, that was the reason against such admission of statements appellant
has responded in his statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C
that he reserves the right to assail such practice of Court before higher forum
and that was assailed by his counsel before this Court during argument. In
order to prepare his defence against intended
evidence, Prosecution is obliged to give copies of such statements and
documents to the accused before these are tendered in evidence. In this case
though prosecution has made an attempt to prove the case through the statement
of injured as PW-6, yet this witness has failed in material particulars;
therefore, his testimony cannot be accepted.
13.
So far as the question of longstanding absconsion of
accused is concerned; no evidence was brought on record by the prosecution in
the form of warrants or proclamation nor any witness
was produced in this respect; only a bald question No. 12 was asked about
proceedings under Section 512 of Cr.P.C which was
denied by the appellant. Even copies of such proceedings were not brought on
the record; therefore, prosecution has failed to establish his willful absconsion in this case for which the appellant cannot be
held responsible in the circumstance.
14. For what has been discussed above, since the prosecution
has failed miserably to establish the charge against the accused/ appellant,
therefore, criminal appeal is allowed and by extending the benefit of doubt,
the accused/appellant is acquitted of the charges