PLJ 2022 Lahore 382
Present:
Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J.
AMEER
HUSSAIN--Petitioner
versus
GOVERNMENT
OF PUNJAB etc.--Respondents
W.P. No.
31145 of 2021, decided on 24.5.2021.
Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (XXXI of
1960)--
----S.
3--Detention of Tehreek-e-Labaik Activist--Extension of detention--Fundamental
duty of Government--As per reports of SP & District Intelligence Branch,
activities of petitioner’s nephew are prejudicial to public safety and maintenance
of Public Order 1960--Subsequently, Additional Chief Secretary (Home
Department) extended his detention for a further period of 30-days--Leadership
of TLP which was banned under provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by Ministry
of Interior was involved to create chaos in province of Punjab by blocking,
destruction of public and private properties, injury and harm to police
officials, harassing general public, instigating people against Government,
etc--This was a case of preventive detention under security of Pakistan Act,
1952--The apex Court ruled that if right of a person to a petition for habeas
corpus could not be syncopated--The Ameer of TLP has been demanding expulsion
of French diplomat from Pakistan as a mark of protest against publication of
irreverent caricatures in France-- The Court cannot substitute its discretion
for that of administrative authority--The first and most fundamental duty of
every government is preservation of order since order is condition precedent to
all civilization and advance of human happiness--The Provincial Government’s
action against Hafiz Saad seeks to preserve peace--Petition was dismissed.
[Pp.
384, 385, 390, 394, 395 & 396] A, B, G, H, I & J
2010 SCMR 27; PLD 1974 Lahore 7; PLD 2003 SC 442 ref.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Power of Judicial review--The High Court can
exercise power of judicial review only if it is satisfied that no other adequate
remedy is provided by law. [P.
389] F
PLD 1983 SC 21; 1993 SCMR 1798; 1999 SCMR 1881; 2009 PTD 1392;
2016 SCMR 842; 2011 SCMR 1813 ref.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Arts. 9 & 10--Deprivation from life and
liberty--Provision of safe guard--Article 9 commands that no person shall be
deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law and Article 10 provides
safeguards as to arrest and detention. [P.
386] C
Words and Phrases--
----Preventive detention--Preventive detention is a form of
administrative detention, ordered by executive authorities, usually on assumption
that detainee poses future threat to national security or public peace. [Pp. 386 & 387] D
Punjab Maintenance of Public Order
Ordinance, 1960 (XXXI of 1960)--
----S. 3(6)(a)--Communication of
detention order--Section 3(6) of Ordinance stipulates that authority making detention
order shall communicate grounds of detention to detainee within 15 days and he
would be entitled to make a representation there against to government. Section
3(6-a) lays down that if such a representation is made government would duly
consider it and, after giving an opportunity of hearing to detainee, modify,
confirm or rescind that order. [P.
387] E
Mr. Ehsan Ali Arif, Advocate
for the Petitioner.
Mr. Ahmad Awais, Advocate
General, Punjab.
Mr. Akhtar Javed Additional
Advocate General, Punjab.
Rai Shahid Saleem, Assistant
Advocate General.
Dr. Ahsan Munir Bhatti, Deputy
Secretary (Internal Security).
Date of hearing: 24.5.2021.
Order
Brief
facts giving rise to this petition are that the Deputy Inspector General Police
(Operations) addressed Letter No. 2048/DSP-L-Ops dated 12.04.2021 to the Deputy
Commissioner, Lahore (Respondent No. 2), for detention of the Petitioner's
nephew,
Hafiz Saad Hussain Rizvi son of Hafiz Khadim Hussain Rizvi, under Section 3 of
the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (the
"Ordinance"). The relevant excerpt from the said letter is reproduced
hereunder:
"2.
As per reports of SP Iqbal Town Division, Lahore and District Intelligence
Branch, the activities of Hafiz Saad Rizvi s/o Khadim Hussain Rizvi are
prejudicial to the Public Safety and Maintenance of Public Order, 1960.
3. SP Iqbal Town
Division, Lahore and District Intelligence Branch has further reported that the
above said person is the Ameer of Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasool Lallah[1]
He is in habit to harass the general public and oftenly takes part in
activities against Government. There is credible information that in his
meeting at 36-G Sabzazar on 11.04.2021 on Saturday, he has announced in the
presence of members of TLP that they will hold a country-wide protest including
road blocking processions and rallies in case the Government does not send back
the French diplomat from Pakistan. The above-named activist along with his
accomplices will create law and order situation and cause chaos amongst the
general public. In this way, he has become a potential danger to public peace,
law and order situation. Such like activists will give rise to a situation
prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order, if they are not
controlled. SP Iqbal Town Division, Lahore and District Intelligence Branch
have recommended his detention under 03-MPO 1960 for a period of 90 days in
order to keep the law and order situation in the city.
4. In order to prevent
the above-mentioned activist from acting in manner prejudicial to public
safety, maintenance of public order and tranquility, it is requested that his
Detention Order under Section 03 Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960
for a period of 90 days may be issued. Reports of SP Iqbal Town Division and
District Intelligence Branch, Lahore along with their enclosures are enclosed
for perusal and necessary action."
2.
Keeping in view the sensitivity of the matter, Respondent No. 2 immediately
convened a meeting of the District Intelligence Committee (DIC) and on its
recommendations, vide Order No. RDM/35 dated 12.04.2021, directed that
Hafiz Saad Rizvi should be arrested and detained in the Central Jail, Kot
Lakhpat, Lahore, for 30 days. Subsequently, vide Order dated 11.5.2021,
the Additional Chief Secretary (Home Department) extended his detention for a
further period of 30 days on the following grounds:
"i) The detenue [Hafiz Saad Rizvi] and other
leadership of the organization namely Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan which was
banned under the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by the Ministry of
Interior was involved to create chaos in the province of Punjab by blocking,
destruction of public and private properties, injury and harm to police
officials, harassing general public, instigating people against Government,
etc.
ii) He, being the
head of the proscribed organization has advocated and ensured such agitational
course of action, instead of displaying responsibility. He has not shown any
remorse on such actions, which has caused loss of lives and inflicted damage
and pain on society.
iii) Under the
leadership of detenue, the proscribed organization TLP has emerged as a
negative group striving hard to dictate foreign policies and internal affairs
of the country causing international and national pressure for the State and
government.
iv) Credible
information has been brought on record which has led the Provincial
Intelligence Committee to believe that the said banned organization under his
command, plans to restart the same agitation after the release of the said
individual from jail. This act on the part of detenue re-affirms the
apprehension of law enforcement agencies that if he is released, is likely to
repeat and glorify his activities for the said proscribed organization, which
would create law and order situation in the province thus giving rise to
situation prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order."
3. Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution"), the
Petitioner has challenged the detention of Hafiz Saad Rizvi.
4. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have submitted report and parawise
comments to this petition which are placed on record.
Arguments
5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that Hafiz
Saad Rizvi was the Ameer of Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), a party
duly registered under the law. He was a peaceful and law abiding citizen of the
country and he had never engaged in any activity which could disturb public
peace and tranquility. He maintained that the allegations against him were malafide,
false and vexatious and there was no material to substantiate them. The learned
counsel further contended that the grounds of detention were not communicated
to Hafiz Saad within the prescribed period which rendered his incarceration
unlawful.
6. The learned Advocate General,
Punjab, vehemently opposed this petition. He contended that it was not
maintainable because Hafiz Saad had not availed the statutory remedy provided
under Section 3(6) of the Ordinance. On merits he contended that no exception
could be taken to Hafiz Saad's detention. He was a big threat to public peace
and the Federal Government had even proscribed his party, Tehreek-e-Labaik
Pakistan, and enlisted it in the First Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997.
Opinion of the Court
7.
Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that every citizen, wherever he may
be, and every other person for the time being in Pakistan has an inalienable
right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law.
In particular, no action detrimental to his life, liberty, body, reputation or
property shall be taken except in accordance with law. Then, Article 9 commands that no
person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law and
Article 10 provides safeguards as to arrest and detention. Articles 9 and 10
are contained in Part-II Chapter-I of the Constitution which relates to Fundamental
Rights. In Ismaeel v. The State (2010 SCMR 27) the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
Pakistan observed that the rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 9 and 10 are
sacrosanct and jealously guarded by our Courts.
8.
Preventive detention is "a form of administrative detention, ordered by
the executive authorities, usually on the assumption that the detainee poses
future threat to national security or public peace."[2]
Article 10 of the Constitution empowers the legislature to enact preventive
detention laws to deal with persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the
integrity, security or defence of Pakistan, or any part thereof, or external
affairs of the country, or public order, or the maintenance of supplies or
services subject to the safeguards and protections provided by clauses (4) to
(9) of the said Article. In Begum Nazir Abdul Hamid v. Pakistan (Federal
Government) through
the Secretary, Interior Division, Islamabad and another (PLD 1974
Lahore 7) this Court observed that "the object of the framers of the
Constitution in giving constitutional status to preventive detention was to
prevent anti-social and subversive elements from imperiling the welfare of the
State."
9.
Ordinance XXXI of 1960 is one of the laws in force providing for preventive
detention and control of persons and publications for reasons connected with
public safety, public interest and the maintenance of public order in the
Province of Punjab.[3]
Section 3(1) is relevant for our present purpose which is reproduced below for
ease of reference:
3. Power of arrest and detain suspected
persons.--(1) Government, if satisfied that with a view to preventing any
person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the
maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, may, by an order in
writing, direct the arrest and detention in such custody as may be prescribed
under sub-section (7) of such person for such period as may, subject to the
other provisions of this section, be specified in the order, and Government, if
satisfied that for the aforesaid reasons it is necessary so to do, may, extend
from time to time the period of such detention, for a period of not exceeding
six months at a time.
Explanation I ...
Explanation II ...
Section
3(6) of the Ordinance stipulates that the authority making the detention order
shall communicate the grounds of detention to the detainee within 15 days and
he would be entitled to make a representation thereagainst to the government.
Section 3(6-a) lays down that if such a representation is made the government
would duly consider it and, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the
detainee, modify, confirm or rescind that order.
10. The question as to whether a representation under
Section 3(6) can be considered to be an "adequate remedy" within the
meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution so as to bar a person from filing a
constitutional petition straightaway before the High Court without availing the
said remedy has generated a lot of debate. The learned Advocate General has
also raised an objection regarding maintainability of this petition on that
basis so I take up this issue first.
11. In England the law is that
judicial review is a remedy of last resort: it is not a substitute for an
appeal. In R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Exparte Preston, [1985]
BTC 208, the House of Lords observed:
"A remedy by way
of judicial review is not to be made available where an alternative remedy
exists. This is a proposition of great importance. Judicial review is a
collateral challenge: it is not an appeal. Where Parliament has provided by
statute appeal procedures, as in the taxing statutes, it will only be very
rarely that the Courts will allow the collateral process of judicial review to
be used to attack an appealable decision."
12. Similarly, in Glencore Energy UK Ltd. v. Commissioners
of HM Revenue and Customs, [2017] EWHC 1476 (Admin), High Court (Queen's
Bench Division) held:
"The basic
principle is that judicial review is a remedy of last resort such that where an
alternative remedy exists that should be exhausted before any application for
permission to apply for judicial review is made. Case law indicates that where
a statutory alternative exists, granting permission to claim judicial review
should be exceptional. The rule is not however invariable and where an alternative
remedy is nonetheless ineffective or inappropriate to address the complaints
being properly advanced then judicial review may still lie."
13. In the English law, the doctrine of "other adequate
remedy" is vigorously followed only in relation to mandamus but is frequently relaxed in respect of certiorari.[4]
14. In India, Article 226 of the Indian Constitution empowers
the High Courts to issue such writs, directions or orders for enforcement of
the fundamental rights or "for any other purpose." However, the
remedy provided for in Article 226 is discretionary and availability of an
alternative remedy is one of the considerations which the High Court may take
into account to refuse to exercise its discretion. In Union of India v. T.R.
Varma (AIR 1957 SC 882), the Supreme Court of India observed:
"It is
well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to
a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the
special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true
that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court to issue a writ; but ... 'the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a
thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs.' And
where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse
to interfere in a petition under Article 226, unless there are good grounds
therefor."
15. Similarly, in Thansingh v. Superintendent of Taxes
(AIR 1964 SC 1419) the Supreme Court ruled:
"The very
amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised
subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not
intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or
other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a
petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative
remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious
remedy ... Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another
tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the
manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by
entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery
created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to
it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."
16.
Under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973,
the High Court can exercise power of judicial review only if it is satisfied
that no other adequate remedy is provided by law. In other words, "the
High Court can exercise the constitutional jurisdiction only on the proof of
non-availability of adequate remedy."[5] The
purpose of writ jurisdiction is not to create a competing remedy. It is rather
an additional remedy in the absence of an alternative adequate remedy subject
to the satisfaction of the higher Court.[6] In Tariq
Transport Company v. Sargodha Bhera Bus Service [PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 437],
Muhammad Munir, CJ. held:
"It is wrong on
principle for the High Court to entertain petitions for writs, except in very
exceptional circumstances, when the law provides a remedy by appeal to another
tribunal fully competent to award the requisite relief. Any indulgence to the
contrary by the High Court is calculated to create a distrust in statutory
tribunals of competent jurisdiction and to cast an undeserved reflection on
their honesty and competency and thus to defeat the legislative intent."
It is, however, important to point out that cases of absence of
excess of jurisdiction stand on a different footing and are treated as an
exception to the general rule stated above.[7]
17.
In Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others (2011 SCMR 1813)
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the expression "adequate
remedy" in Article 199 of the Constitution connotes an efficacious,
convenient, beneficial, effective and speedy remedy which should also be
inexpensive and expeditious. Further, the question as to whether a remedy is
adequate or not depends on the circumstances of each case. The apex Court laid
down the following tests for determination of the adequacy of relief:
"(i) If the
relief available through the alternative remedy in its nature or extent is not
what is necessary to give the requisite relief, the alternative remedy is not
an 'other adequate remedy' within the meaning of Article 199.
(ii) If the relief
available through the alternative remedy, in its nature and extent, is what is
necessary to give the requisite relief, the 'adequacy' of the alternative
remedy must further be judged, with reference to a comparison of the speed,
expense or convenience of obtaining that relief through the alternative remedy,
with the speed, expense or convenience of obtaining it under Article 199. But
in making this comparison those factors must not be taken into account which
would themselves alter if the remedy under Article 199 were used as a
substitute for the other remedy.
(iii) In practice the
following steps may be taken:
(a) Formulate the
grievance in the given case, as a generalized category;
(b) Formulate the
relief that is necessary to redress that category of grievance;
(c) See if the law
has prescribed any remedy that can redress that category of grievance in that
way and to the required extent;
(d) If such a remedy
is prescribed the law contemplates that resort must be had to that remedy;
(e) If it appears
that the machinery established for the purposes of that remedy is not functioning
properly, the correct step to take will be a step that is calculated to ensure,
as far as lies in the power of the Court, that that machinery begins to
function as it should. It would not be correct to take over the function of
that machinery. If the function of another organ is taken over, that other
organ will atrophy, and the organ that takes over, will break down under the
strain;
(f) If there is no
other remedy that can redress that category of grievance in that way and to the
required extent, or if there is such a remedy but conditions are attached to it
which for a particular category of cases would neutralize or defeat it so as to
deprive it of its substance, the Court should give the requisite relief under
Article 199;
(g) If there is such
other remedy, but there is something so special in the circumstances of a given
case that the other remedy which generally adequate, to the relief required for
that category of grievance, is not adequate to the relief that is essential in
the very special category to which that case belongs, the Court should give the
required relief under Article 199.
If the procedure
for obtaining the relief by some other proceedings is too cumbersome or the
relief cannot be obtained without delay and expense, or the delay would make
the grant of the relief meaningless this Court would not hesitate to issue a
writ if the party applying for it is found entitled to it, simply because the
party could have chosen another course to obtain the relief which is due."
18. Having discussed the law, let
us turn to Ordinance XXXI of 1960. There are a host of Single Bench cases which
hold that availability of alternative remedy by way of representation to the
government under Section 3(6) of the Ordinance does not fetter constitutional
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.[8]
However, the learned Advocate General has referred to two judgments of larger
Benches of this Court, Muhammad Siddiq Khan v. District Magistrate (PLD
1992 Lahore 140) and Sheikh Rashid Ahmad v. D. M. Rawalpindi etc. (PLJ
2004 Lahore 1221), which take a contrary view. The first case was decided by a
Division Bench on a reference by a Single Judge. The Court held that the right
to make representation is a vital right and cannot be whittled down. It
reasoned:
"From
a reading of sub-Article (5) of Article 10 of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, 1973 it becomes obvious that the Constitution insists not
only that the grounds for detention be communicated to the detenu but also that
he shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order. The right to make representation is thus not only statutory
in nature but also finds recognition in the Constitution itself, and therefore
stands on much higher padestal. The importance of this right cannot be whittled
down and it must be given effect to. Sub-section (6) of Section 3 has been
enacted to give effect to sub-Article (5) of Article 10 of the Constitution and
it must be viewed in that context. It is also to be noticed that sub-section
(6-a) requires the Government to hear the person concerned before deciding the
representation."
However, the
learned Division Bench ruled that in exceptional cases the constitutional
jurisdiction of the High Court can be rightfully invoked. It held:
"As already held
that Article 10(5) of the Constitution and Section 3(6) and (6-a) of the Punjab
Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, grant a right to detenu to make a
representation which must be decided by the Government. That being so we are of
the view that the remedy provided by Article 10(5) and sub-sections (6) and
(6-a) of Section 3 of the Ordinance is adequate within the meaning of Article
199 of the Constitution. By so observing we do not find to lay down an
inflexible rule and we should not be taken to have held that in no case a
constitutional petition can be filed without filing a representation. There may
be cases where it can be demonstrated that it is not possible to file a
representation for example, where no grounds of detention are communicated to
the detenu or where the filing of the representation would be a mere exercise
in futility. Similarly, there may be other cases like complete lack of
jurisdiction in the authority passing the order of detention where the filing
of representation may not be necessary. In the ultimate analysis the question
as to whether it would be necessary to file a representation in a given case
would depend upon the facts of that case."
19. Sheikh Rashid Ahmad's case was decided by a Bench of
five Hon'ble Judges. It held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 199 of the Constitution is subject to law and when the statute itself
provides a remedy it must be exhausted in the first instance.
20.
It, however, appears that the view expressed in the above-mentioned two cases
is at variance with the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Federation
of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad v. Amatul Jalil
Khawaja and others (PLD 2003 SC 442). This was a case of preventive
detention under the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. The apex Court ruled that
if the right of a person to a petition for habeas corpus could not be
syncopated. The relevant excerpt is reproduced below:
"The right of a person to a petition for
habeas corpus is a high prerogative right and is a constitutional remedy for
all matters of illegal confinement. This is one of the most fundamental rights
known to the Constitution. There being no limitation placed on the exercise of
this right, it cannot be imported on the actual or assumed restriction which
may be imposed by any subordinate legislation. If the arrest of a person cannot
be justified in law, there is no reason why that person should not be able to
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court immediately for the restoration of
his liberty which is his basic right. In all cases where a person is detained
and he alleges that his detention is unconstitutional and in violation of the
safeguards provided in the Constitution, or that it does not fall within the
statutory requirements of the law under which the detention is ordered, he can
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 199 and ask to be
released forthwith. (PLD 1965 Lah. 135). He need not wait for the opinion of
the Advisory Board before praying for a habeas corpus. (AIR 1952 Cal.
26)."
21. The law laid down in Amatul
Jalil Khawaja's case is binding on all Courts under Article 189 of the
Constitution. Hence, the objection of the learned Advocate General regarding
maintainability of this petition is overruled.
22. Inasmuch as "preventive
detention makes an inroad on the personal liberty of a citizen without the
safeguards of a formal trial before a judicial tribunal, it must be jealously
kept within the bounds fixed by the Constitution and the relevant law."[9]
Let us, therefore, examine the merits of the case.
23. In Amatul Jalil Khawaja's
case, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court laid down that an order of preventive detention must conform to the
following criteria:
"(i) the Court must be satisfied that the material before the
detaining authority was such that a reasonable person would be satisfied as to
the necessity for making the order of preventive detention;
(ii) the satisfaction should be established with regard to each of
the grounds of detention, and, if one of the grounds is shown to be bad,
non-existent or irrelevant, the whole order of detention would be rendered
invalid;
(iii) the initial burden lies on the detaining authority to show the
legality of the preventive detention;
(iv) the detaining authority must place the
whole material, upon which the order of detention is based, before the Court
notwithstanding its claim of privilege with respect to any document, the
validity of which claim shall be within the competence of the Court to decide;
(v) the Court has further to be satisfied, in
cases of preventive detention, that the order of detention was made by the
authority prescribed in the law relating to preventive detention and that every
requirement, of the law relating to preventive detention had been strictly
complied with;
(vi) the 'satisfaction' in fact existed with regard to the necessity
of preventive detention of the detenue;
(vii) the edifice of satisfaction is to be built on the foundation of
evidence because conjectural presumption cannot be equated with satisfaction;
it is subjective assessment and there can be no objective satisfaction;
(viii) the grounds of detention should not be vague and indefinite and
should be comprehensive enough to enable the detenue to make representation
against his detention to the authority, prescribed by law;
(ix) the grounds of detention had been furnished within the period
prescribed by law, and if no such period is prescribed, then 'as soon as may
be'."
24.
Hafiz Saad Hussain Rizvi is the Ameer of TLP. He has been demanding expulsion
of the French diplomat from Pakistan as a mark of protest against publication
of irreverent caricatures in France. The government was moved when he held a
meeting with his party's top leaders at Sabzazar on 11.4.2021 and announced
country-wide agitation, including march to Islamabad, to press for the
aforesaid demand. The DIC met, discussed intelligence reports and unanimously
recommended an action under Section 3(6) of the Ordinance for public safety,
maintenance of public order and tranquility. Consequent thereupon Respondent
No. 2 issued Hafiz Saad's detention order dated 12.04.2021. Although he was
arrested, the TLP activists came out on the streets and resorted to vandalism.
They also protested against his detention. The following week saw complete
breakdown of law and order in the province. According to the report submitted
by Respondent No. 3, three police officials were killed, 303 were injured, 28
were abducted in various incidents. Besides, 16 police vehicles, two oil
tankers and the Orange Train Stations were damaged. Roads were blocked and
private property worth crores of rupees, including cars and motorcycles, were
also set ablaze. Thus, the government's intelligence reports regarding Hafiz
Saad Rizvi and his activists proved correct.
25. The Federal Government
has issued S.R.O. 479(I)/2021 dated 15.4.2021 proscribing TLP and placing it in
the First Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The learned Advocate
General has submitted reports of the law enforcement agencies and the
recommendations of the Provincial Intelligence Committee which show that the
TLP has plans to restart agitation as soon as Hafiz Saad is released. His
activists would also glorify him and their organization. This would again cause
mayhem and disrupt public life.
