21.  Protection of Judges, [....] Counsel, Public Prosecutor, witnesses and persons concerned with Court proceedings.--(1) The Court may, subject to the availability of resources, make such necessary orders to take such measures, as it deems fit, within available resources, for the protection of a witness, judge, [Member] [* * *] public prosecutor, counsel and other persons concerned in proceedings for an offence under this Act, which may also include the following measures:--

(a)        Proceedings may be held in camera, or under restricted entry of members of the public, where necessary for the protection of the judge, [Member] witnesses or a victim's family members or to prevent persons from crowding or storming the Court to intimidate the judge [Member] or to create a threatening atmosphere;

(b)        The names of judges, [Members] counsel, public prosecutor, witnesses and persons concerned with Court proceedings shall not be published; and

(c)        During any inquiry, investigation or Court proceedings, whenever the matter of the identification of the accused arises, adequate protection shall be provided to a witness identifying any accused, in order to protect the identity of the witness from the accused.

(2)  For purposes of protection of the judges, [Members] accused, witnesses, prosecutors and defence counsel and anyone concerned with the Court proceedings, the Government may adopt such other measures as may be appropriate or may be proscribed [and the Armed Forces shall also provide comprehensive protection and securing to the judges, members, accused, witnesses, prosecutors, investigators, defence counsel and all those concerned in the Court proceedings].

(3)  The Government shall extend protection to a judge, [Member] a counsel, public prosecutor and the witnesses during investigation of an offence and proceedings under this Act, and thereafter, as may considered necessary.]

[21-A.  Cordons for Terrorist Investigation.--(1) An area is a cordoned area for the purposes of a terrorist investigation under this Act, if it is so designated under this section.

(2)  A designation may be made only by an officer not below the rank of a [Deputy Superintendent of Police or a member of a Joint Investigation Team] if he considers it expedient for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.

(3)  If a designation is made orally, the officer making it shall confirm it in writing, as soon as is reasonably practicable.

(4)  The officer making a designation shall arrange for the demarcation of the cordoned area, so far as is reasonably.

(5)  An area may be designated a cordoned area for a maximum period of fourteen days, which may be extended in writing from time to time, with each extension specifying the additional period:

Provided that a designation shall have no effect after 28 days beginning with the day on which it was made.

(6)  Where a person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a terrorist investigation is being conducted or is proposed to be conducted, a person commits an offence if he--

(a)        discloses to another, or others, anything which is likely to prejudice an investigation; or

(b)        interferes with material which is likely to be relevant to an investigation.

(7)  Whosoever commits an offence under sub-section (6) shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than six months and not exceeding two years, and fine.

(8)  It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under sub-section (6) to prove--

(a)        that he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the disclosure or interference was likely to affect a terrorist investigation; or

(b)        that he had reasonable excuse for the disclosure or interference.

(9)  For the purposes of this section--

(a)        a reference to conducting a terrorist investigation includes a reference to taking part in the conduct of, or assisting, a terrorist investigation; and

(b)        a person interferes with any material if he falsifies it, conceals it, destroys it or disposes of it, or if he causes or permits another to do any of these things.

21-B.  Terrorist investigation.--(1) A policeman in uniform, [or a member of a Joint Investigating Team] may--

(a)        order a person in a cordoned area to leave immediately,

(b)        order a person immediately to leave the premises which are wholly or partly in or adjacent to a cordoned area,

(c)        order the driver or person in charge of a vehicle in a cordoned area to move it from the area immediately.

(d)       arrange for the removal of a vehicle from the cordoned area,

(e)        arrange for the movement of a vehicle within a cordoned area;

(f)        prohibit or restrict access to a cordoned area by pedestrians or vehicles,

(g)        enter and search any premises in a cordoned area if he suspects anyone concerned with terrorism is hiding there,

(h)        search and arrest any person he reasonably suspects to be a person concerned in terrorism :

            Provided that any search of a person shall be done by a Police person of the same sex; or

(i)         take possession of any property in a cordoned area he reasonably suspects is likely to be used for the purposes of terrorism.

21-C.  Training.--(1) Weapons Training: A person commits an offence if he provides, without valid authorization from the competent authority, any instruction or training in the making or use of--

(a)        fire-arms;

(b)        explosives; or

(c)        chemical, biological, and other weapons.

(2)  A person commits an offence if he provides without valid authorization from the competent authority, any instruction or training to any child under sub-section (1) and, conviction, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and fine.

(3)  A person commits an offence if he receives instruction or training from anyone, without valid authorization from the competent authority, to give such instruction or training or invites another, specifically or generally, to receive such unauthorized instruction or training in the making or use of--

(a)        fire-arms;

(b)        explosives; or

(c)        chemical, biological, and other weapons.

(4)  A child commits an offence if he provides, without valid authorization from the competent authority, any instruction or training, or if he receives such unauthorized instruction or training or invites another, specifically or generally, to receive such unauthorized instruction or training in the making or use of--

(a)        fire-arms;

(b)        explosives; or

(c)        chemical, biological, and other weapons.

(5)  A child guilty of an offence under sub-section (4) shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than six months and not exceeding five years.

(6)  A person guilty of an offence under sub-sections (1) and (3) shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or fine or with both.

(7)  Training in Terrorism--

(a)        A person commits an offence if he provides, generally or specifically, any instruction or training in acts of terrorism.

(b)        A person commits an offence if he receives any instruction or training in acts of terrorism or invites another, specifically or generally, to receive such instruction or training.

(c)        A person guilty of an offence under sub-sections (a) and (b) shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment of either description for a term of not less than one year and not more than ten years and fine.

(d)       A person is guilty of an offence if he provides, any instruction or training in acts of terrorism to a child, and on conviction, shall   be  liable  on  conviction  to  imprisonment  of  either description for a term not less than one year and not more than ten years and fine.

(e)        A child commits an offence if he provides, generally or specifically, any instruction or training in acts of terrorism, and on conviction, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than six months and not more than five years;

(f)        A child commits an offence if he receives, generally or specifically, instructions or training in acts of terrorism, and on conviction, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than six months and not more than five years.

(8)  A Court by which a person is convicted of an offence under this section, may order the forfeiture of any thing or property which it considers to have been in the person's possession for purposes connected with the offence, after giving any person, other than the convicted person, who claims to be the owner or is otherwise interested, an opportunity of being heard.

COMMENTARY

An offence of terrorism can be tried only by an Anti-Terrorism Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the age of the offender has no relevance to the question of such jurisdiction. " Child" below the age of 18 years can legitimately be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, have the overriding effect over all other laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. (PLD 2004 Lahore 779)

21-D.  Bail.--(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 439, 491, 496, 497, 498, 498-A and 561-A of the Code, no Court, other than an Anti-Terrorism Court, a High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan, shall have the power or jurisdiction to grant bail to or otherwise release an accused person in a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court.

(2)  All offences under this Act punishable with death or imprisonment [* * * ] exceeding three years shall be non-bailable.

Provided that if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that any person accused of non-bailable offence has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for [...] less than ten years, such person shall [....] be released on bail.

(3)  Subject to sub-section (2), the Court may admit a person to bail, unless satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not), would--

(a)        fail to surrender to custody;

(b)        commit an offence while on bail;

(c)        interfere with a witness; otherwise obstruct or attempt to obstruct the course of justice, whether in relation to himself or another person; or

(d)       fail to comply with the conditions of release (if any).

(4)  In exercising its powers in relation to a person seeking bail under this Act, the Court shall have regard to such of the following considerations (as well as to any others which it considers relevant)--

(a)        the nature and seriousness of the offence with which the person is charged;

(b)        the character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the person;

(c)        the time which the person has already spent in custody and the time which he is likely to spend in custody if he is not admitted to bail; and

(d)       the strength of the evidence of his having committed the offence.

(5)  Without prejudice to any other power to impose conditions on admission to bail, the Court admitting a person to bail under this section may impose such conditions as it considers--

(a)        likely to result in the person's appearance at the time and place required, or

(b)        necessary in the interests of justice or for the prevention of crime.

(6)  It shall be lawful for the person to be held in military or police protective custody in accordance with the conditions of his bail.

(7)  The Government or the Court may, under this Section, at any time, in respect of a person charged of an offence under this Act, if it considers it necessary, by special or general order, direct special arrangements to be made as to the place at which the person is to be held in order--

(a)        to prevent his escape; or

(b)        to ensure his safety or the safety of others.

COMMENTARY

Power of Anti-Terrorism Court to grant bail and cancellation of bail was subject to certain conditions. No doubt, no express provision of cancellation of bail to an accused of offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 existed but a Court, which had power to grant bail to an accused, was empowered to recall or cancel the same. Where any Act or provisions conferred power to make order, same essentially included power to add, to amend, vary or rescind said order. Was not correct to say that there was no scope to cancel bail allowed by Anti-Terrorism Court because under S.21-D of the Act, Anti-Terrorism Court could grant bail. (2005 MLD 13)

Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 was a special law within the meaning of S.41, P.P.C. and where a statute had created a special procedure for the trial of such offence, it was that procedure that must be followed and not the ordinary procedure. (2005 P.Cr.L.J. 768)

Cancellation of pre-arrest bail-Application for--Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court . Pre-arrest bail granted to accused by Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court had been sought to be cancelled on two counts; first, that judge, Anti-Terrorism Court had no jurisdiction to grant pre-arrest bail; second, that bail granting order was not speaking order and that facts of the case had not been considered. Validity. Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court had jurisdiction to grant pre-arrest bail by virtue of provisions of S.21-D of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997--Impugned bail granting order had shown that Judge, Anti Terrorism while granting interim pre-arrest bail and confirming the same had considered facts and had kept in view that for the purpose of granting pre-arrest bail, condition precedent was to show mala fide on part of prosecution. Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court had observed that Political rivalry existed between the parties and they had been litigating up to Supreme Court and after considering all said facts had come to the conclusion that it was a fit case for grant of pre-arrest bail--Relevant consideration for grant of pre-arrest bail having been discussed by Judge, Anti-Terrorism, it could not be said that bail granting order was not a speaking order. Order granting pre-arrest bail, being not open to any exception, application for cancellation of bail, was dismissed. (2005 YLR 1791)

Police Officers were the accused in the present case, who, during the operation in a jail, had restored to indiscriminate firing killing a number of persons; prima facie no caution, care or tactics were adopted to carry out the operation; investigation was carried out in a partial and dishonest manner; clothes and crime weapons were not taken into custody just to spoil the case of the prosecution; Site plan had not shown as to from where the police party had fired; doctor who had examined one of the deceased had given report showing favour to the police party; trial Court was yet to decide as to whether operation was undertaken in good faith or not after recording evidence; State Counsel could not refute that it was not only gross criminal negligence of the accused who had ordered for the operation and by implication, S. 302, P.P.C. still held the field. All the accused police officers were present at the spot at the time of operation. No case of bail before arrest, in favour of petitioners accused was made out in circumstances. Bail petition of the accused was dismissed. Another accused who came in the jail premises along with mother of one of the under-trial prisoners, used filthy language about the accused under-trial prisoners and it was then that they were infuriated. Said accused also remained absconder for sufficiently long time and there was apprehension that he will abscond after he was allowed bail, the provisions of S. 21D, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were also attracted to his case. 2005 PCr.LJ 768.

High Court or the Supreme Court only have the jurisdiction to grant bail or release an accused person on bail in a case triable by Anti-Terrorism Court. Power of Anti-Terrorism Court to grant bail is subject to conditions specified in sub-sections 3 and 5 of Section 21-D. 2005 Cr.LJ 158.

21-E.  Remand.--(1) Where a person is detained for investigation, the Investigating Officer, within twenty-four hours of the arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court, shall produce the accused before the Court, and may apply for remand of the accused to police custody, [or custody of any other Investigation Agency joined in the investigation] for which the maximum period allowed may be fifteen days:

Provided that, where an accused cannot within twenty-four hours be produced before the Court, a temporary order for police custody, [or custody of any other Investigation Agency joined in the investigation] not exceeding twenty-four hours may be obtained from the nearest Magistrate for the purpose of producing the accused before the Court within that period.

(2)  No extension of the time of the remand of the accused in police custody, [or custody of any  other  Investigation  Agency  joined  in  the investigation] shall be allowed, unless it can be shown by the Investigating Officer, to the satisfaction of the Court that further evidence may be available and the Court is satisfied that no bodily harm has been or will be caused to the accused:

Provided that the total period of such remand shall not exceed thirty days.

(3)  The Court shall be deemed to be a Magistrate for purposes of sub-section (1).

21-F.  Remissions.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or prison rules for the time being in force, no remission in any sentence shall be allowed to a person, other than a child, who is convicted and sentenced for any offence under this Act, unless granted by the Government.

COMMENTARY

Accused was sought to be released from Jail by allowing remissions granted to the convicted persons by the President of Pakistan from time to time. Authority which had granted remissions had withheld the same in the case of convicts of terrorist acts. Accused having been found guilty under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was not entitled to grant of remissions as per instructions contained in the Circulars relied upon and placed on, record on behalf of accused. Grant of remissions to the accused being a child under S.21-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was also irrelevant as the same could be granted in accordance with the said Circulars and the Court could not substitute its opinion while exercising jurisdiction under S.491, Cr.P.C.. Detention of accused in Jail could not be declared as illegal because according to the report of the Superintendent Jail he had still to undergo about 15 years imprisonment. Petition was dismissed in circumstances. (2006 YLR 91)

21-G.  Trial of offences.--All offences under this Act shall be tried [exclusively] by the Anti-Terrorism Court established under this Act.

COMMENTARY

Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court to try juvenile offender. On reading S.21(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and S.12 thereof, it could be concluded that after enforcement of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 it was felt by legislator that juvenile offenders had to be tried by Juvenile Court under the said Ordinance, 2000 and Anti-Terrorism Court could not try them and to meet the object of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial for heinous offences, S.21(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, had been incorporated and Anti-Terrorism Court had been authorized and given jurisdiction to try all offences under the said Act, meaning thereby the ouster of jurisdiction of all other courts including juvenile courts to try offenders in respect of offences under the said Act. Keeping in view object of law, if a juvenile committed any offence provided under Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, then Anti-Terrorism Court (Special Courts) would have exclusive jurisdiction to try such juvenile and to follow the procedure under Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Difference between Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and Juvenile Justice System Ordinance,. 2000, was that in earlier two statutes, Courts acquired jurisdiction if the offence was triable by them, whereas in later cases, Courts acquired jurisdiction if offenders were juvenile, irrespective of the nature of offence committed by them. Section 21(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had provided that all offences under said Act would be tried by Anti-Terrorism Court established under said Act. Special Court established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, had complete jurisdiction to try an offence irrespective of the fact whether offender was minor or not. (2006 P.Cr.L.J. 921)

21-H.  Conditional admissibility of confession.--Notwithstanding anything contained in the Qanoon-e-Shahadat, 1984 (President's Order No. 10 of 1984) or any other law for the time being in force, where in any Court proceedings held under this Act the evidence (which includes circumstantial and other evidence) produced raises the presumption that there is a reasonable probability that the accused has committed the offence, any confession made by the accused during investigation without being compelled, before a police officer not below the rank of a District Superintendent of Police, may be admissible in evidence against him, if the Court so deems fit:

Provided that the District Superintendent of Police before recording any such confession, had explained to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it may be used as evidence against him and that no District Superintendent of Police has recorded such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, the District Superintendent of Police had reason to believe that it was made voluntarily; and that when he recorded the confession, he made a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect:

"I have explained to (....name....), that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence, and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him.

            (Signed)

            Superintendent of Police."

COMMENTARY

Accused were arrested long before date of alleged occurrence. Recovery of hand-grenades from possession of accused was not witnessed by any independent witness. Police officials, no doubt were as good witnesses as any other from the public, but when in a case the very occurrence on the alleged date and spot was highly doubtful, recovery of incriminating material in the absence of independent witness, had to be looked askance at. Alleged confessional statement of accused though had been recorded after fulfilling all legal formalities, but same having been recorded by a police officer, would cast a serious doubt on its voluntariness despite its admissibility under S. 21-H of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. (2004 MLD 1337)

21-I.  Aid and abetment.--Whoever aids or abets any offence, under this Act shall be punishable with the maximum term of same imprisonment provided for the offence or the fine provided for such offence or with both.

21-J.  Harbouring.--(1) A person commits an offence if he harbours any person who has committed an offence under this Act.

(2)  A person guilty of an offence under sub-section (1) shall be liable on conviction to punishment as provided in Sections 216 and 216-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860).

COMMENTARY

Accused, who were doctors, were convicted and sentenced for causing disappearance of evidence of offence, and harbouring offender who had escaped from custody. Allegation against accused persons was that they had provided medical treatment and harboured one who was involved in a crime. Prosecution had relied upon evidence of a witness who was declared hostile and his evidence was not sufficient to prove said allegation without any corroborative piece of evidence. No allegation was available against accused that they had given false information to screen offender, but prosecution case rested upon allegation that accused caused evidence of commission of offence of crime to disappear. Prosecution was required to prove that accused had knowledge that offence was committed and evidence of that offence was caused to disappear by them, but prosecution had not produced any evidence to show that any evidence collected by prosecution in said crime was caused to be disappeared by accused. Main ingredients of S.201, P.P.C. under which accused were convicted, were not attracted in the case. Special Prosecutor had conceded that provisions of S.216, P.P.C. were also not applicable in the case. Prosecution had also failed to produce any evidence to prove alleged harbouring of accused involved in the crime. Confession of an accused could be used against co-accused if they were being tried together for one and the same offence. Accused were not tried together with the Doctors/accused persons. Allegation made in confessions could not be used as circumstantial evidence against accused persons. Said confessional statements carried no weight. Prosecution was required to prove case against accused beyond reasonable doubt and then defence could be examined in juxtaposition with prosecution case. Weakness in defence, if any, would not be taken adversely against the accused. Prosecution having failed to prove case against accused, there was no justification to examine defence of accused in detail. Prosecution having failed to prove case against accused, their conviction and sentence, were set aside and they were acquitted and set at liberty. (2006 YLR 1317)

21-K.  Offences triable by way of summary procedure.--All offences under this Act punishable with imprisonment for a term of not more than six months with or without fine shall be tried by way of summary procedure.

COMMENTARY

Accused being police officer was investigating a criminal case, but he, having

not completed investigation within time as provided under S.19(1) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, moved the trial Court for extension of time which was granted from time to time. Lastly on relevant date accused moved another application for extension of time which was dismissed and accused was simultaneously convicted as he was found guilty of not submitting challan within time which fell within ambit of contempt of Court in terms of S.19(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997--Accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for seven days without issuing him any show-cause notice or framing charge against him and without recording his evidence or statement under provisions of S.32 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 were applicable before Anti-Terrorism Court, if those were not inconsistent with the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Separate procedure in the shape of summary trial had been provided under provisions of S.21-K of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the trial of offences which were punishable for not more than six months--Accused, in view of said separate procedure, having been sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for only seven days, procedure of Chap. XXII-A of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was not applicable.

Anti Terrorism Court being Court of Session, could invoke provisions of Chap. XXII

of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 for trial of class of cases mentioned in S.21-K of

Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Ss. 262 to 265 of Chap. XXII of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898  were   not  inconsistent  with  any  provision  of  the  said  Act. No  such  procedure having been adopted in convicting and sentencing accused, conviction and sentence awarded to him by trial Court were set aside and case was remanded to trial Court for further proceedings and trial in accordance with law. (2003 PCRLJ 1468)

21-L.  Punishment for an Absconder.--Whoever being accused of an offence under this Act, absconds and avoids arrest or evades appearance before any inquiry, investigation or Court proceedings or conceals himself, and obstructs the course of justice, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than [five years] and not more than [ten years] or with fine or with both.

COMMENTARY

Manner in which the incident took place and the presence of the absconding accused at the place of occurrence were not open to any doubt. Eye-witnesses being not inimical towards the accused were natural and independent witnesses. Mere fact of the witnesses  being  levies personnel, would not make them interested as they had no reason to substitute the absconding accused for the real killer. Incriminating articles recovered in the case, according to the report of Chemical Examiner, were stained with human blood. Ocular testimony was corroborated by medical evidence, circumstantial evidence and abscondence of the accused. No mitigating circumstance for awarding lesser penalty of imprisonment for life was available in favour of accused who had committed the brutal murder without any justification acting as a desperate and hardened criminal sharing common intention. Conviction and sentences of accused were upheld in circumstances answering the murder reference in affirmative. (2005 PCRLJ 794)

21-M.  Joint trial.--(1) While trying any offence under this Act, a Court may also try any other offence with which an accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged, at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence.

(2)  If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any offence it is found that the accused person has committed any other offence under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the Court may convict an accused for such other offence and pass any sentence authorized by this Act or, as the case may be, such other law, for the punishment thereof.]

COMMENTARY

Under provisions of S.12 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, accused being Juvenile, could not be awarded punishment of death and they could not be ordered to labour, etc.. In view of clear bar contained in the law, which was applicable to facts and circumstances of the case, petition for enhancement of sentence was not competent. Legislature had clearly provided maximum punishment for the Juvenile, who was covered under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. Petition for enhancement of sentence to death, was not maintainable and same was dismissed. (2006 YLR 1036)