JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE ON COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW OF HOMICIDE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ISLAMIC LAW OF HOMICIDE ITS PENAL CONSEQUENCES AND CRIMES OF HONOUR AND PASSION

By:
BARRISTER KHURRAM SALEEM BAIG
LL.B. Hons. (
London),
LL.B (
Osgoode Hall Law School (Canada)
LL.M. Hons (
Victoria) University of Wellington New Zealand
Advocate High Court.
Email: ksbaig@hotmail.com

I INTRODUCTION

The thesis explains and analyzes the English law of murder with comparable provisions of the law of murder under Islamic law. It is a  possible criticism on divergent issues to see if laws can be re-examined or modified to determine a system in order to minimise or to abolish the defence of honour killing.

This paper considers how the punishment for murder imposed on the offenders by the Courts under the respective judicial systems differs and what are the main areas of distinction on this issue. Under the English Legal System the crime of murder in all circumstances has different categories and is treated as an offence against the state and the society in totality. The crime of murder under the Islamic system, as prevalent in the Arab World and other Islamic countries is not always considered as a crime against the society or against the state but in some areas it is treated and considered as a private offence against the victim and his family. The family members in this scenario are considered as the arbiter in the process of awarding punishment or penalty.  Occasionally they also intervene during the judicial process of trial and exercise powers given under the Doctrine of Qisas and Diyat. In this paper, the emphasis is placed on the term "Qisas" and "Diyat" as defined in the Islamic law and how it is interpreted by the judiciary.

The legislation on this issue made and promulgated by the Government of Pakistan is known as Qisas and Diyat Ordinance. It will be seen as to what extent the powers and discretion of the victim’s family have been impaired and to what extent the discretion has been bestowed to the judiciary to overrule the will of the victim's family. It will also be seen as to how far the judiciary is acting as a judicial activist in this area and to what extent it has encroached upon the powers to inflict penalty available to the victim's family under the injunctions of Islam. The study also includes criticism and suggestions.

The Ordinance emphasizes that no one convicted of murder be given pardon by the State without permission of the victim’s family which is a drastic change in the prevailing system as under the previous British system, the State had the powers to pardon the one convicted of murder.

Under the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, Society represented by State, holds a direct control over serious offences concerning person and property. The launching of the prosecution, the withdrawal of the prosecution, reprieve and pardon after conviction and sentence by the State and its functionaries are all manifestations of this feature. The victim of the crime or his heirs have no say in the matter. Under the injunctions of Islam this is not so; at least in respect of offences against person. In Islam, the individual victim or his heirs retain, from the beginning to the end, entire control over the matter, including the crime and the criminal. They may not report it. They may not prosecute the offender. They may abandon prosecution of their free-will. They may pardon the criminal at any state before the execution of the sentence. They may accept monetary or other compensation to purge the crime and the criminal. They may compromise. They may accept Qisas from the criminal. The State cannot impede, but must to its best, assist them in achieving their object. There is another sweeping change. The State has no powers to pardon or reduce Qisas or diyat, punishments, which are the sole prerogative of the heirs of the victim. The State however retains the power to pardon or reduce the mitigated sentence, which is short of Qisas or Diyat. Similarly the heirs of victim have no powers to pardon or remit the sentence other than Qisas and Diyat.

The punishments for homicide under Qisas and Diyat have encouraged repetition of criminal acts. The Qisas and Diyat punishments have not been seen as a deterrent. The society experiences an upward trend in crimes. Strict legislation is suggested to create deterrence in the society. Although compromise and pardon by the legal heirs of the victim is acceptable by the Court but keeping in view the public interest, the Court may convict the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment. The study of the criminal law journal in Pakistan reveals repetition of crime by the offenders having been pardoned earlier by legal heirs, which therefore proves that option to pardon by the heirs reduces the element of deterrence.

In this article, the defence to murder under the pretext of provocation as being applied under the English Legal System and American System on the ground of defence of provocation has also been discussed. A comparative study of provocation as a defence to murder under the English Legal System, under the legal system prevalent in the Arab World as well as in Islamic countries with orthodox social system has been highlighted. In this regard, emphasis in the paper is made to pinpoint the misuse of defence of honour killing in Islamic countries as well as the rural societies of Pakistan. The paper further discusses as to what extent the defence to murder a female member of the family who is involved in illicit sexual affairs is recognized by the judicial system and whether such an approach is based on Islamic injunctions and tenets. A comparative review is made on this issue with a reference to the judicial approach in Pakistan and the approach of the legislation in other Islamic countries. Jurisprudential analysis are discussed in the context of honour killing, the impact of honour killing in the society, the moral and legal consequence of honour killing, the approach of the judiciary in Pakistan regarding honour killing, what role should the judiciary play in this context and how this problem can be solved if the State and religion are kept separate.

II COMPARATIVE VIEW OF HOMICIDE UNDER THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND UNDER ISLAMIC LAW

Homicide, according to the English law, may be (1) justifiable, (2) excusable, or (3) felonious. Justifiable homicide is of three kinds: where the proper officer executes a criminal in strict conformity with his sentence; where no officer of justice, or other person acting in his aid, in the legal exercise of a particular duty, kills a person who resists or prevents him from executing it; or where it is committed in prevention of crime attempted with violence.

Excusable homicide is of two kinds i.e. by misadventure, as where a man doing a lawful act without any intention of hurt by accident kills another; or where a man kills another upon a sudden encounter in defence of himself or his belongings.

Felonious homicide is of two kinds i.e killing one's self, or killing another which is either murder or manslaughter; and this either is voluntary, where a man doing an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, by accident kills another; or involuntary, where upon a sudden quarrel, two persons fight and one of them kills the other; or where a man greatly provokes another, and the other immediately kills him. Culpable homicide and murder are offences dealing with destroying the lives of human beings; an offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide.

An act of killing done with the intention to kill, or to inflict bodily injury likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that death is probable is prima facie a murder, committed with the knowledge that death will be a likely result. Where the act was not done with the intention of causing death, the difference between culpable homicide and murder is merely a question of different degrees of probability that death would occur. It is culpable homicide where death must have been known to be a probable result. It is murder where it must have been known to be the most probable result.

A.   The Classic Definition of Murder is given by Coke:1

Murder is when a man of sound memory and of the age of discretion unlawfully kills another human being, with malice aforethought either expressed by the party or implied by law, so as the party wounded, or hurt, etc, die of the wound or hurt, etc, within a year and a day after the same.[i]

The meaning of the term is of the utmost importance, for it is the presence or absence of preconceived malice, which determines whether an unlawful killing is murder or manslaughter. "Murder is unlawful homicide with predetermined malice. Manslaughter is an unlawful homicide without predetermined malice. "Malice aforethought is a concept of the common law. Although the common law of malice aforethought is now fully stated in the rule requiring an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

At common law, what was known as the felony murder rule; a killing while furthering another offence, was considered murder even though neither death nor personal injury was intended, although ultimately this was restricted to killings in the violent felonies.

A.         The Sentence for Murder

Until the Homicide Act 1957 2, all persons convicted of murder were automatically sentenced to death. By s.5 of that Act, certain types of murder were singled out and designated "capital murder". They continued to be punishable by death, while the remaining types of murder were punishable by imprisonment for life. In fact, we have had two degrees of murder. The distinction between the two degrees of murder proved to be most unsatisfactory, and the death penalty for murder was suspended by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, 3 which is to continue permanently in force. All persons convicted of murder must now be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

To get a comparative view, it is necessary to know as to how the intentional killing of a human being is dealt with under the injunctions of Islam. Professor NJ Coulson has summarised the historical background of Islamic Law as:

Under the pre-Islamic customary law a rough system of private justice, dominated by the notion of vengeance, had prevailed in these matters. The loss of a tribal member was to be avenged by the infliction of a corresponding loss upon the culprit's tribes who were collectively responsible for the action of one of their members. Until satisfactory vengeance had been wreaked, the soul of the victim could not rest in peace; and since the natural tendency was for a tribe to set an exaggerated value on the member it had lost, two or more lives might be claimed in revenge for a single victim. The Quranic maxim thus radically altered the legal incidents of homicide. Henceforth only one life-the life of the killer himself-was due for the life of the victim, and the distinction is marked by a change of terminology, the term tha's (blood revenge) being replaced by that of qisas (just retaliation). Islam allows only the killer himself (or several killers for one slain) to put to death, and only if he is fully responsible and has acted clearly with deliberate intent; Islamic Law further recommends waiving. The considerable restriction of blood feuds was a great merit of Muhammad's. It is once again noteworthy, however, that the basic structure of the existing law is left unchanged. Homicide remains an offence which falls into the category of civil injuries rather than that of public offences or crimes for it is the relatives of the victim who have the right to demand retaliation, accept compensation or pardon the offence. 4

Under the English Legal System a person convicted of murder is sentenced to imprisonment for life. However, under Islamic Law, the punishment is regulated by the Doctrine of Qisas and Diyat which is a primary distinction between the two systems.

Islamic law of Qisas and, Diyat summarised as the concept of retaliation was against the tribe of the offender though sometimes the actual offender can be punished through arbitration. Islamic Law modified the traditional Arab law in three ways: firstly, the blood feud was abolished; secondly, vengeance could be exacted only after determining the guilt of the accused through judicial proceedings. The crimes were to be proved by two witnesses or by confession; thirdly, different punishments were laid down for different offences according to the degree of culpability. In the case of homicide, four kinds of punishments have been laid down by the Shari'ah "qisas (retaliation), diyat (blood money), kaffarah (expiation), and prevention from inheritance" whenever relevant.

In pre-Islamic Arabia, the punishment for murder took the form of inter-tribal revenge which frequently led to the escalation of retaliation. However, Arabian Societies developed a mechanism of making compensation to the victim or his family without resorting to taking revenge.

Islamic law of homicide, like other branches of Islamic law, adopted and varied many areas of the pre-Islamic Arabian legal system. Islamic law described three categories of crimes i.e. Hadood, Tazir and Qisas. Hadood crimes are crimes against God, which prescribes penalties that cannot be established at the discretion nor can -be suspended or abolished by the aggrieved parties or authorities. Tazir crimes are based to preserve the public order. Judges are permitted to exercise flexibility and discretion in dispensing punishment and pardon. In contrast, the Qisas crimes relate to murder and causing intentional physical injury and harm. The control over the execution of punishment in Qisas, crimes are limited to the victim or his heirs. The Quran has prescribed a proportional standard of punishment i.e. life for a life or retaliation. The Quran also allows pardon or compensation. The right of the victim or his family is either to demand retaliation (Qisas), to forgive or to enter into a compromise. The State can prescribe the quantum of compensation (Diyat) to be paid to the victim or his heirs. The judges however consider several factors in determining the compensation i.e. seriousness of the assault, the intent of the offender and the financial status of the victim including the status and sources of the offender. The Quran recognizes retaliation as a mode of punishment; however, it also expects the believers to exercise calm and restraint in their action and against the action of others.

A.   Diyat (Compensation as a punishment for crime)

The conflict between the retribution and forgiveness, up to some extent, is being solved by Diyat. For intentional murders and attacks, the question may arise as to whether Diyat is designed to compensate the victim or it is a punishment for the offender. Diyat is considered as a device to extract from the offender, the compensation for the suffering of the victim. The Diyat however, may result in reducing the deterrent for the offender, as in some cases the offender is unable to pay for himself and the compensation in the shape of diyat is made by the family of the offender. The spirit of the diyat is that it must serve as deterrence in the form of punishment. However, the offender who pays diyat succeeds in mitigating his crime as such that it never proves to be a punishment for the crime.

The Qisas and Diyat Ordinance were promulgated in Pakistan in the year 1990. Prior to this, the criminal law was governed in the Country under the codified provisions contained in the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 “and in the Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code 1898 5. Under the British system as contained in the Pakistan Penal Code and under Criminal Code, a felonious crime was not compoundable. A close perusal of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance suggests three main issues which arise as a consequence of its implementation. The first issue relates to the problem of discrepancies in worth involving both the inability of a poor offender to negotiate settlement and inadequate deterrent effect of Diyat on a worthy offender. The second issue is whether the victim or his heirs may fully pardon the offender without claiming any compensation. The third issue involves distinction between the right of the victim and the heirs and the social demands and requirement of the community.

The first problem involves the poor offender and how he may be punished with mercy i.e. forgiveness rather than retaliation if he is unable to pay Diyat. The law is silent as to how a poor offender can be saved from retaliation. The victim or his heirs retain the choice between the retribution and Diyat. It is unlikely that they would choose anything less than the compensation. The third option, which is a total pardon for the offender attracts practical as well as legal complications as the heirs of victim of murder are always reluctant.

1        Legal Problem

The legal problem relates to establishing a minimum Diyat implying that complete forgiveness with pardon may not be proper if the victim or his heirs are merciful. The inability of some offender to pay diyat by the mercy may attract criticism about the fairness of the law. The other criticism is that for the wealthy offender, the Diyat is never an adequate deterrence. The need to maintain the deterrent value of Diyat is emphasised so that an offender could not imagine acquitting himself cheaply after destroying a life and paying blood money (Diyat).

2        Comparison.

The comparison of law of homicide under the English Legal System and the law of homicide under Islamic law is that, under the English legal system, the crime of murder in all circumstances is considered and treated as an offence against the state and the society in general. The aggrieved person's will or desire in the process of trial or conviction does not play any role nor the victim's family or legal heirs have been empowered or given any discretion to waive, adjust or compound the crime or offence. The offence of murder being felonious is taken as an offence against the society, which in all circumstances is to be punished if the same is proved as per law. Under Islamic law, the offence of murder is treated not as a public offence but as a private offence against the victim or his family who become aggrieved of the offender's aggression resulting into killing. The law of qisas and diyat empowers the heirs of the deceased victim to demand qisas (retaliation) punishment or waive, compound or compromise the offence. The discretion conferred on the legal heirs in this regard converts the offence from public into private.

3     The Effect of the Waiver

The effect of the waiver or compromise is very drastic which is that death penalty is converted into Diyat along with imprisonment which is also rarely been given by the courts. In Pakistan, the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 contained the provisions for punishment of the offences affecting the human body which were akin to the English Legal System. For the offence of murder, death penalty or imprisonment for life was available. The provisions have recently been amended by the criminal law Amendment Act 1997.

Now the state has got a secondary role whereas victims or heirs of victim have assumed a primary position and would be a necessary part at every stage of trial including bail stages with rights of appeal against adverse orders.

4        The Main Distinction

As Islamic law of homicide operates in private capacity, the powerful and rich lords misuse it and they go scot-free by using their influence and money etc. This criticism of injustice is valid on its face value in the tribal system as well as the rural society where the rich persons with resources exercise pressures of various kinds on the victim’s families which result into waiver, acceptance of Diyat (blood money) etc. by which capital punishment or life imprisonment is avoided and the hardened criminals are provided another chance to commit further killings.

The term Qisas (retaliation punishment) means "a person who has committed a given violation (i.e. murder under discussion), will be punished in the same manner by the same means. Now under the new system, the State executes murderers by death penalty. However, an optional remedy for the murder victims’ heirs is made available. If they chose to waive the punishment of retaliation (death penalty), they can substitute the payment Diyat (compensation) for death. The effect and implication of the exercise of power or option of waiver by the victim's heir will be discussed and seen. It has the effect of shift from the British system of State's control over the punishment under Pakistan's British written criminal Code. The new system recognises the right of the victim's heirs to choose between retaliation, pardon or negotiated settlement. The principle differs radically from the Western notions of criminal justice.

It was held by the High Court (PLD 2002 Quetta 42)6 that although compromise and pardon by the legal heirs of the victim was acceptable by the Court but keeping in view the public interest the Court convicted the accused to undergo 14 years rigorous imprisonment.

The main distinction therefore between Islamic Law and Western Law on homicide (Qatl-I-amd) is that in Islam, when the offence of homicide is committed it gives birth to two rights: one to a person (heir of the victim) and the other to the society / state. The heir has a right to claim Qisas, which is an eye for an eye etc. or would opt for Diyat or compromise or waiver. Whereas in the Western or English law there is no concept of a private right of a person who suffers from the death of his family member. Homicide is a crime against the state and the culprit is liable to be punished according to the law of the state, which was punishment of death. But recently, the majority of the Western States in the USA have abolished the death penalty and the maximum punishment to be inflicted on the accused for culpable homicide is imprisonment for life. In British Law, the offence of capital punishment for murder was abolished by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 19657  but the murderers face serious penal consequences, which results into life imprisonment.

III   CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The interpretation of the Quranic verse on the issue of complete pardon suggests that the Qisas victims and their heirs are entitled only to retributions by Diyat and are not empowered to grant complete pardon. It can be argued that the right of remittance conferred by the Quran upon the victim or his heirs, gives the right to pardon fully and without compensation.

Islamic Law gives preference to the suffered family by giving them the right of Qisas (retaliation), Diyat (blood money), or ufw (pardon/waiver). In case the murder is proved without any shadow of doubt, the person guilty of committing murder is liable to be punished with death penalty if the legal heir or heirs prefer Qisas (retaliation). In case the heir is a widow, a minor, or a widow with minor children having no source of income, he or she can choose Diyat (blood money as compensation) instead of Qisas (retaliation) in order to be compensated for the loss they have undergone and to plan for the future. They can also waive their right without any compensation due to any reason.

An adult heir of the victim may at any time, with or without any compensation, waive his right of Qisas (retaliation) i.e. right to claim death penalty is waived. However question may arise as to whether the victim's heir has a right to insist for Diyat and punishment short of death. The law is silent on the issue. However, the issue is left to the courts to settle. The issue, which at this juncture emerges is, where an offence has been waived or compounded, still the Court may, in its discretion, having regard to the facts of the case, acquit or inflict punishment (Tazir) to the offender. In this regard, the acquittal of a criminal with dangerous behaviour indicates a grave risk to the society as a whole.

Thus when an individual is responsible for systemic law breaking, the state must take control of his activities and inflict punishment. This matter may not be left at the sole discretion of the aggrieved victim or his family (heirs). In Saima Waheed v Raheel8,  earlier decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that waiver or compromise by the heirs of the victim shall have the effect of acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. In the later case of Amna v Zaheer 9, the Court was informed that a minor daughter of the victim had moved an application pardoning the accused offender (murderer). The court accepted the pardon but awarded Diyat (compensation/blood) money, which was to be assessed by the Federal Government. At the same time the Court also held that since there was hardly any justification for brutal murder, therefore in addition to compensation, the accused was liable to suffer imprisonment for a term of only three years.

The above judgement clearly indicates that by mere pardoning of the offender by the heirs of the accused, would not absolve him from paying the compensation (Diyat), but compensation is not adequate in this regard. The effect of pardoning the accused in these types of cases, results in the substitution of death penalty with a lighter punishment. The power to pardon therefore results into the removal of the death penalty or life imprisonment, which has the effect of encouraging a killer to repeat the offence. Hence the courts have assumed the discretion to award punishment keeping in view the gravity of the criminal act of killing.

In language that suggests broad judicial discretion, the Ordinance gives the state the power to impose punishments not requested by the victim but simply for vague social reasons. Likewise, the Ordinance prohibits the State from suspending remitting, or commuting any sentence that is the preference of victim's family. The drafters of the Ordinance chose to make pardons completely subject to the victim's permission. A pardon by the victim or his heirs may help in the patching up of differences, in diminishing the sense of vengefulness or vindictiveness and in cultivating amicable, harmonious relations between the parties. The right of the aggrieved to exact retribution, to forgive, or to enter into a compromise, exists throughout his lifetime and may upon the death of the aggrieved, go to his heirs. If there are no heirs, the right passes to the State. For intentional murders and attacks however, the question arises whether Diyat is compensation or punishment. Thus, Diyat may result in reduced deterrence and a refutation of the peace-keeping role for which Qisas was originally intended. First, the problem of discrepancies in wealth, involves both the inability of a poor offender to negotiate settlement and the inadequate deterrent effect of Diyat on a wealthy offender. The second issue is whether the victims or heirs may fully pardon an offender. Therefore, the Ordinance provides no opportunity for a poor offender to be saved from retaliation. The only exception for the poor offender is a provision that provides for a prison sentence in case of non-payment of Diyat.

This argument does not mean to imply that murderers deserve pardon (free or compensated). But even if retributive punishments in the Ordinance are to be considered fair and the opportunity for Diyat constitutes merely gratuitous mercy, the Government of Pakistan must address where the inability of some offenders to buy that mercy may undermine the fairness of the entire scheme.

Another problematic scenario, one which is addressed more competently by the Ordinance, is that of the wealthy offender for whom Diyat is not an adequate deterrent. The Federal Shariat Court considered this problem and emphasized the need to maintain the deterrent and lays much stress on 'Qisas' by saying that there was life in 'Qisas". Evidently it emphasises upon deterrent punishment so that an offender could not imagine acquitting himself cheaply after destroying a life and paying blood money.

Finally if an offender's wealth is so great that even this large amount has insufficient deterrent value, the judge may consider the financial situation of the convict and raise Diyat.

Heirs are entitled only to retribution or Diyat but may not grant complete pardon. Most commentators however, have argued that the right of remittance bestowed by the Quran upon the victim or heir gives the right to pardon, fully and without compensation. This is the position of the Ordinance that states, "in the case of intentional murder an adult sane heir may, at any time and without any compensation waive his right of Qisas.

Islamic law states that even after pardon or settlement, the State may improve a sentence in cases where the state or the community is affected. The general purpose of punishment is to protect the community and the public order. Its primary role, therefore, is to provide a deterrent to any criminal behaviour that threatens society as a whole. The safety of the community may even require that the State retains the right to impose punishment in the case of pardon or settlement. One further role of discretionary punishment, as articulated by the Federal Shariat Court, is to provide a secular punishment in a society of Muslims and non-Muslim.

The Supreme Court compromised between the two positions, determining that discretionary punishment could not include the death penalty, in case where the victim or heir has forgiven the offender. Where an offence has been waived or compounded, the court may, in its discretion, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, acquit or award punishment to the offender according to the nature of the offence.

But if the rights of the victim or heir are to be preserved to some extent, the law must distinguish between those cases in which State's intervention is necessary and those in which intervention constitutes an unacceptable usurpation of the victims' rights. But which cases of unjustified murder remain within the control of the victim and which constitute the State's control? Islamic jurists have long tried to define exactly when it is that an injury has been inflicted on the community. The Pakistan judges, debating the role of punishment in Qisas crimes, placed the question in terms of the "rights of man" and the "rights of God." The Federal Shariat Court elaborated, describing the kind of criminal whose behaviour posed a grave risk to the society as a whole.

One who masterminds the criminal activities of others and thus assembles around him other criminals; hardened, cold-blooded as well as potential, and in the advancement of any or all of these activities, commits or abets murder, is responsible for systematic law-breaking and the State must take control of his punishment.

The Federal Shariat Court argues, "murder is an offence which cannot be said to involve only rights of the heirs of the deceased; it also involves the rights of God, resultantly of Society”.

Murders in urban societies occur more randomly, between strangers and are less likely to arise out of long standing disputes. The consequences of a pardon may be that the offender disappears into the anonymity of urban life and is therefore more likely to victimize another stranger than to attack the same family. In this case, the heirs may be less worried about setting the offender free and thus less likely to demand retribution.

When discretionary punishment may not be used, it may be assumed that a judge is free to punish whenever he feels that the settlement has not adequately protected the society. The Ordinance would still leave judges with the option to accept private settlements. Indeed, it allows the judges enormous discretion, not only to determine the extent of punishment but also to decide whether an offender will be punished at all.

The final and least attractive scenario is the continued uncertainty. Unless the Pakistan Government or its judiciary develop a fair and consistent pattern of overseeing the Qisas and Diyat process, the Ordinance might lead to confusion and inequity and result in society's disillusionment with judicial arbitration.

IV   COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DOCTRINE OF PROVOCATION AS A DEFENCE TO MURDER

A plea of provocation is raised as a defence by a defendant accused of murder. Provocation is a defence to a charge of murder at Common Law entitling an accused to be convicted of manslaughter with a reduced punishment. The common law rule has been modified by the Homicide Act 1957. Section 3 of the Homicide Act 10 assumes the existence of common law defence. The section also assumes the existence of the dual test i.e.: Section 3,

1) whether the defendant lost his self control by provocation, this is a subjective test. 2)whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man to act in a manner he did, this is an objective test.

Lord Goddard in Kumarasinghege Don John Perera11  defined the conditions and circumstances causing provocation resulting into crime of murder. It was inter alia observed:

The defence of provocation may arise where a person does intend to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm but his intention to do so arises from sudden passion involving loss of self-control by reason of provocation. An illustration is to be found in the case .of a man finding his wife in the act of adultery who kills her paramour, and the law has always regarded that, although an intentional act, as amounting only to manslaughter by reason of the provocation received.

The Modem Law of provocation is based on reasoning, where the accused must prove that there was reasonable provocation that in fact he was provoked and being a reasonable man, he did not cool off in the interval between the provocation and the alleged fatal blow.

A     HONOUR    KILLING

Sudden Provocation And Honour Killing In Countries Following Islamic Law (Sharia)

As currently applied in many Islamic countries, the law recognises defenses for men who murder their wives for committing adultery.12 In Iran according to Article 100 (b):

If a man sees his wife in a sexual relationship with another man, he has the legal right to kill her without being prosecuted for murder. In the case of his daughters and sisters, he can also kill them, but a punishment of a few months in prison is possible.

In Iraq Article 40913  provides for the acquittal of men who kill female relatives suspected of adultery or pre-marital sex.

Men may kill their wives for adulterous acts and escape punishment. The laws in most Islamic countries require lower compensation ("blood money" or "diyat") for the families of female murder victims than for those of male murder victims. An example of a crime of honour is the killing of a woman by her father or brother for engaging in, "or being suspected" of engaging in sexual activities before or outside marriage. Killing in this scenario is not only based on sudden provocation but also on mere suspicion, which is contrary to the principles of sudden provocation in England and the West.

Killings committed in a "heat of passion" which is not in true sense the "heat of passion" are regarded valid by the courts especially in Pakistan, even though provocation here is based on mere suspicion and it is not sudden, which gives time for an offender's passion to cool. Even more striking is the fact that it is the paramour that is getting killed more often during honour killings.

In traditional Islamic society, a woman is the source of her family's honour that is being given a new term in Pakistani society (Gherat). By committing adultery or losing her virginity before marriage, she spoils this honour. Men carry no such responsibility; instead, social values often require them to avenge their female relatives' behaviour. Some countries like Jordan have given these values the force of law by acquitting men who kill female relatives who have violated the family honour. Viewing such women as "unbelievers," even mere suspicion on the part of men is sufficient enough to set them free.

Under Islamic tenet "a Muslim shall not suffer death for an unbeliever" to mean that the murder of an adulterous female relative should not incur Qisas (life imprisonment or death penalty). In extreme cases, men who murder adulterous wives receive no punishment at all. Since the family honour rests solely in women, there is no analogous defense for women who kill adulterous husbands. Adulterous husbands are also liable to be punished under Islamic Criminal Law for committing adultery. If defence of provocation is available to a husband killing his adulterous wife, such a right should also be available and may not be denied to a wife who kills her adulterous husband for lack of the element of honour in such situation.

B   Defence Of Sudden Provocation And The Issue Of Honour Killing In Pakistan.

The concept of sudden provocation is alien in Islam. Mere provocation, however serious and sudden, cannot reduce murder to manslaughter or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The doctrine of provocation was incorporated in the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 under section 300, which is an exception and a number of judgements in this regard were pronounced. The provisions of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were based on Common Law.

The grave and sudden provocation is not an exception per se and punishment of Qisas where, intentional murder is committed under grave and sudden provocation can be mitigated to life imprisonment if the requirements of four witnesses are fulfilled in the cases of adultery. Such as proof of Zina (illegal sexual intercourse) is established, which conforms to the required standard of evidence prescribed under the Islamic Injunctions. The concept of sudden and grave provocation is very much part of the western/common law and has a long history of evolution and was for the first time, given the status of a valid exception in the law by passing the Homicide Act, 1957. A plea of sudden provocation as a defence to murder is not available under the tenets of Islam. However, the accused involved in the killing of females develops this plea on the ground of the infringement of male family honour.

The Pakistan Penal Code does not formally recognize a defense for men who kill their wives, but courts have utilized the concept of "grave and sudden provocation" to serve similar ends. Under section 308 of Pakistan Penal Code "culpable homicide is not considered murder if the defendant lost self-control due to grave and sudden provocation". Such a defendant will receive a mitigated sentence or sometimes no sentence, he being justified by the courts for protecting his honour. Only men may take advantage of this defence, as it is based on the idea that the woman has insulted the family’s honour. The Lahore High Court, in Sher Ali v State14 explained the theory as:

To see one's wife, in an objectionable condition, or even mere suspicion that the wife is adulterous according to the background of social custom prevailing in our society and also moral values, notion of honour and chastity, it is regarded as the provocation of the gravest kind to witness.

However, “objectionable condition” has not been explained by the courts in Pakistan. More often, mistaken belief on the part of a male member, is regarded by the courts as a sufficient requirement for the defence sudden provocation.

So according to Adam's explanation, the offender's actual power of self-control or level of self-restraint is irrelevant and the court or the jury is required to imagine a person with the power of "self-control" of an "ordinary person". The offender’s personal characteristics are not relevant here. This includes disposition to lose one's temper, which more often happens in Pakistan.

The courts in Pakistan uphold mere suspicion or mistaken belief sufficient enough to prove provocation and the accused, as a result, does not face any serious penal consequences.

In Pakistan, the judiciary heavily emphasizes on the personal characteristics of the offender as opposed to the law of provocation in England. The concept of "Gharet" is regarded as being valid enough to provoke the accused even if his beliefs were based on mistake and his short-tempered attitude induced him to commit the act of honour killing, which is against the test of provocation as explained above.

The Supreme Court in Pakistan also accepted defence of sudden provocation. The right of self-defence is accepted when the person or property of the killer is seen in danger from foreign aggression. In case a husband, father or a brother finds his wife, sister or daughter is subjected to sexual aggression, the right of self-defence would be available, treating such females as part of the killer's person. In The State v Muhammad Hanif and 5 others15, the Supreme Court held "the defence of sudden provocation is available in situations where husband, father or brother, get provocation when they see or suspect the respective females involved in sexual acts with paramours".

In the majority of the cases, males who do not even witness these sexual acts kill their wives, sister or daughter on the ground of doubt. The courts in Pakistan and other Islamic countries accept doubt or suspicion as sudden provocation and men get acquitted by the court or face one or two years life imprisonment.

The act of killing of females for sexual activity is violative of fundamental right as enshrined in Article 8 (1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan which provides that "no person would be deprived of life or liberty except in accordance with law and any custom or usage in that respect is void under Article 8(1) of the constitution". But provisions of the Quran prevail over the constitution here. However the Division Bench in a case reported as Mumtaz Khan v Musarat Khan16  observed that:

What kind of world is it we live in where horrifying crimes such as `Honour Killing' are not merely given cover under law and custom or in the name of religion, but often perpetrated. One step forward has been followed by several steps back..

Victims of violence by male family members, sold or exchanged in marriage, killed in the name of honour for the crime of exercising control over their own lives and all this is being done in the name of Islam, custom and the Law.

The pretext of honour killing as argued by its supporters is two fold. One is the right of self-defence if chastity of a female member of the family is found to be in danger. The argument could give rise to a plea of acquittal altogether. The other pretext is sudden provocation on account of incidents of involvement of female members of the family in illicit relations with paramours. This is termed by them as honour killing by taking defence of sudden provocation. This misnomer of honour killing creates problems for prosecution to get adequate punishment for the accused.

Under the British made System prevailing and in vogue, in Pakistan prior to Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, the plea of sudden provocation on account of some act of the victim was accepted as a defence and mitigated sentence was awarded. The Supreme Court in Pakistan had dealt with this issue under Qisas and Diyat Ordinance in a number of cases with particular reference to a situation where a husband, a brother or father gets provocation on account of infringement of his honour as a result of sexual activity of the female victim. In Gul Hassan's Case, the Supreme Court observed that provocation could not be considered as a factor to mitigate the gravity of crime of killing. The Supreme Court however explained that in a situation where a husband witnesses his wife in a sexual activity with a stranger and since her act makes her liable to be killed under the tenets of Islam, it will not be permissible for the husband to take the law in his own hand. However, since the victim's behaviour warranted death penalty under the law, the husband would get mitigated sentence as the reason for the crime of murder was the criminal action of the victim. Such a view was followed by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Hanif's case17. In this case, the accused had fired at the deceased on account of grave and sudden provocation because he saw him in a compromising position with his sister, it was observed by the Court that intentional murder by husband will attract a punishment lesser than Qisas (death penalty) only if proof of commission of sexual intercourse existed. The Supreme Court followed the same view in Ali Muhammad's case18. The Supreme Court in a recent case of Muhammad Akram Khan19 observed that legally and normally speaking, nobody has any right nor can anybody be allowed to take the law in their own hands to take the life of anybody in the name of honour. Neither the law of the land nor the religion permits so called honour killing that amounts to intentional murder simplicitor.

The Division Bench of Quetta High Court in Mumtaz Khan's20 case rejected the plea of honour killing. However in a recent case of Nisar Ahmad, decided by the Division Bench of Lahore High Court the deceased who having developed illicit intimacy with sister of the accused, injured their sentiments and in consequences thereto having felt disgraced in the village due to the damage caused to their family honour, took the extreme step of killing the deceased. The Court ruled that there were sufficient mitigating circumstances in their favour for lesser punishment. Consequently, sentence from death altered to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court in Muhammad Hanif's case21 ruled that lesser punishment may be granted only if proof of commission of actual sexual intercourse existed. However, the Supreme Court in Gul Hassan's case22 completely ruled out provocation to mitigate the punishment of killing being alien to tenets of Islam. In Ali Muhammad's case23 the accused took a plea of sudden provocation when he saw the deceased with his wife lying on the same bed in an objectionable position. The Court accepted the plea of grave and sudden provocation and inflicted mitigating sentence. The Single Bench of Lahore High Court in Muhammad Jamil's case24 accepted the plea of grave and sudden provocation on mere suspicion.

We have seen that sudden provocation as per dictum of Supreme Court in Gul Hassan's case25, was ruled out being alien to the tenets of Islam. The Supreme Court however gave a unique reasoning for mitigating the sentence in case of murder of a wife involved in extra-marital sexual activity which is to the effect that since being involved in an act which attracts death penalty, the killer of that woman would not be given extreme penalty of death and would be entitled to a lesser punishment. In this case, neither the plea of sudden provocation nor the plea of infringement of honour was accepted. The critical analysis of other rulings of the Supreme Court discussed above reflects that in some cases a plea of honour killing is accepted whereas in others a plea of sudden provocation was given weightage, whereas in the case of Muhammad Jamil sudden provocation was accepted as a consequence of infringement of honour. In my humble opinion neither the law on the issue is clear nor the approach of the Courts is consistent.

C    Arab's View on Honour Killing

The Arab killing in a fit of fury in fact is in a state of passion. The idea of passion is based on the notion of excuse. Flagrante delicto is not an absolute requirement in a regime of honor, whereas it is in the case of passion. What is most crucial is the "dishonorability of the act committed by the victim. The offender commits the crime in a fit of fury having lost control over his reason. The element of flagrante delicto is therefore a key factor. The necessity to avenge the dishonour survives the initial moment of fury; the crime may be conceivable after that. Anyone dishonoured can commit a crime of honour. Dishonouring is a collective injury. Any dishonourable action justifies intervention by the one who is dishonoured, which covers a case of flagrante delicto, adultery based on sexual betrayal. The application of the excuse beyond adultery includes situations of an unlawful bed. The Iraqi Code is unique in that, it covers both the situation of adultery and what it called "her presence in one bed with her lover". The Algerian Code is unique in that, it treated both husband and wife as beneficiaries of excuse, which is limited to situations of adultery. The Algerian Code where both husband and wife benefit from reduction of penalty when one catches the other committing adultery.

Jordanian law regulates honour killings under Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code 1980. Article 340(i) allows a male who witnesses actual adultery complete exoneration from penalty. Article 340(ii) only provides a male leniency for witnessing his female relative in an "unlawful bed," which is a term that denotes the bed of a man who is not her husband. Both Article 340(i) and 340(ii) require a male's first hand observance of a female in a sexually suggestive situation. Logically, Article 340(ii), as written only grants a male leniency for observing a female relative in the bed of another man without witnessing.

Furthermore, as this kind of murder is not treated as intentional killing, mitigating circumstances are extended in favour of the accused, who takes a plea of self defence in the name of honour killing. This approach in Jordanian law is different than the approach of the judiciary in case of honour killing in Pakistan. The study observed that the practice of honour killing unfortunately, is accepted at several levels, including law enforcement and judicial levels. Thus the cases of this nature are often not registered or prosecuted and when they do reach the courts, the perpetrators of these crimes are usually able to get away with minimal sentences.

The conservative Muslims societies strongly inspired by religion and making that religion their culture, has deeply shapened internalised gender biases, which find its validation from religion and cultural traditions. What is even more unfortunate is the reality that the law, which is supposed to ensure justice to or on behalf of the victims of thecrimes not only allows this to happen but actually provides legal protection to the perpetrators of these crimes. The validation and static nature of Islamic law of Homicide and misinterpretation of the defence of sudden provocation by the judiciary in Pakistan has added fuel to the fire.

The judiciary in Pakistan has re-created the grounds of grave and sudden provocation, giving it an Islamic or cultural justification. Muhammad Jamil's case decided by Single Bench of Lahore High Court and M Ali Muhammad's case decided by the Supreme Court indicate this trend. This has allowed those murderers to get away with minimal sentences merely on the basis of their claim that they committed the act in order to protect their honour. Hence, we see courts freely using the ground of grave and sudden provocation to drastically mitigate sentences in cases where immorality on the part of the victim is alleged and the plea of honour is raised, justifying this on the basis of Islamic values or socio-cultural norms and traditions.

V          COMPARATIVE VIEW OF DEFENCE OF HONOUR KILLING IN UNITED STATES, THE WEST AND IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

In the United States, courts do recognize “cultural defense” in the realm of honour killing but the position in the United States is not that serious, as in Islamic countries. The acceptance of cultural defense does not mean that the offenders get acquittal by the courts. Sudden provocation in civilized countries is being treated as a defense, which carries the high burden of proof and seriouspenal consequences. If the act of killing, though intentional, is committed under the influence of passion or in the heat of blood, produced by reasonable provocation, disturbing the control of reason, the offence is regarded as manslaughter not honour killing.

Islamic jurist justify the act of honour killing on the ground that the same takes place in modern societies in the form of extreme emotional distress. But, there remains a sharp cultural cleavage between the Arab,Western and American legal systems. The killing of daughters, sisters, and mothers, for their sexual conduct, seems to be rarely ever tolerated in the American or Western system (as opposed to wives, ex-wives, girlfriends, and ex-girlfriends). Maher v People25, Regina v Mawbridge 26. No code in America unlike Jordan and Iran states that who ever kills his wife or sister on the suspicion of adultery will receive lighter punishment.

One way of representing honour and passion in the United States context is through historical narrative. The narrative would look something like this. A crime of passion in the United States is included in the legal literature under the “doctrinal concept of “provocation.” This is so because an intentional homicide committed in a sudden rage of passion engendered by adequate provocation, and not the result of malice conceived before the provocation, is voluntary manslaughter.” Provocation is a judicial construction that developed in England at a time when all homicides were punishable by death.

All common law forms of adequate provocation can be regarded as justification based for instance in cases of adultery, sexual unfaithfulness is seen as the highest invasion of a “husband” property Regina v Mawbridge. In Maher v People, a man attempted to kill another in a salon, shortly after the victim committed adultery with the attacker’s wife. In State v. Yanz27, the Court opted to ignore the requirement of finding a wife in the act of adultery and accepted the idea of what the accused actually believed had happened.

It is still a provocation even if the defendant’s belief was mistaken Kaplan and Wersberg’s  Criminal law 253 2d Ed 1991, which means that the excitement was the effect of belief which caused uncontrollable passion. In United States, the law of provocation stands at a cross roads. Some States follow common law category of adultery as a source for provocation. In some States it is in a statutory form. Such statutes existed in Texas, Georgia, and New Maxico until early seventeen when they were all repealed. In these statutes the one committing the killing was usually the husband and the victim was a paramour, to stop or prevent adultery. In State v Wgtkin28s, a case in which a man killed another man after his lover of eight years relationship abandoned him to marry the deceased, the Court considered the act in the heat of passion.

It is noteable that killing a woman in heat of passion was a common law category which required proof of actually witnessing the physical act of intercourse between his wife and paramour, however Price v State29 is a starting point departing from such a strict condition with “a belief” of commission of intercourse.

A crime of passion in the United States is included in the legal literature under the doctrinal concept of provocation. Melissa Spatz’ article, A Lesser Crime: Comparative study of Legal Defences for men who kill their wives reflects that the idea was that homicides committed as a result of provocation should be treated differently from other homicides, and it therefore developed that provocation reduced a charge from murder to manslaughter. As a crime, adultery itself may be established and proven by circumstantial testimony. Should the law hold the husband to a greater or higher degree of proof than itself requires to be established according to the facts of a case? The Supreme Court in Pakistan decided to displace the strict requirements of the category—“on fording his wife in the act of adultery”—for the idea of what the defendant actually believes has happened. “So it is still provocation even if the defendant’s belief was mistaken”.

Similarly People v Kelly30  interpretation of “taking the act of adultery” by treating twenty hours of waiting by the defendant before the actual act of killing not within the “heat of passion” requirement.

One basic difference, however, remains. Most women killed in the Arab world are daughters sisters and wives, and in the United States and in the West they are wives and girlfriends and the culprits face serious penal consequences as sudden provocation is not justified here on the ground of mere suspicion.

Perhaps the best known case—and an ultimate victory for women’s groups—was the trial of Raul “Doca” Street . Street, a Brazilian playboy, admitted shooting his girlfriend. The defense attorney argued that the victim was a “lascivious woman”. The lower court ruled that he had killed her in “legitimate defense of his honour.” He was thus found guilty of involuntary homicide and received two years suspended sentence. The appellate court overturned the verdict and sentenced him to fifteen years for murder. Many saw this as a victory for the feminist movement, and hoped that it would turn back the tide of male violence against women. As evidenced by the Supreme Court’s repudiation of the legitimate defense of honour, the Brazilian women’s movement has achieved much success combating violence against women.

VI        CULTURAL DEFENCE

Some courts in the United States have formally recognized other culture’s leniency for men who kill their wives. In several recent cases, defense attorneys and judges have relied on the “cultural defense,” which invokes racial, ethnic and religious factors to lessen a defendant’s responsibility for certain crimes. The defense rests on the theory that someone raised in a foreign culture should not be held fully accountable for conduct that violates law of United States but would be acceptable in his or her native culture. Courts have used the cultural defense to assess the defendant’s mental state, incorporating cultural factors into traditional defenses. For example, the defendant’s culturally-determined values may serve as evidence of diminished capacity.

VII     HONOUR KILLING AND MORALITY

An act of killing is illegal besides being immoral. But if we take into consideration the issue of honour killing, the act in Islamic countries is regarded illegal not immoral. Men kill their wives, daughters or sisters and claim that they have done a moral act by protecting their honour. The society also accepts that as such there is no stigma of killing on their part. Law is incomplete without morality, but what type of morality we are talking about, public or private morality. An Act of honour killing is justified as a private morality between a family, which does not affect society. But realistically when you kill someone it is a crime against the whole society and it affects the society as a whole. Society shares public morality and when that morality is breached it creates a bad impact on the whole society.

According to Hart31 laws are neither "good nor bad" and even if they are bad they are valid laws. According to him laws are to be kept separate from morality which signifies the point that Islamic Law of homicide even though a bad law is valid in its application.

If the application of a certain law is not in compliance with society's moral conceptions then the law should be changed. Kllewlyn32 theory was very similar to this idea, though he never mentioned the issue of morality in his theory, but justified it on the ground that society is in a flux, in a constant movement as such laws have to keep up pace with the changing needs of the society. Honour killing is an immoral act affecting the society as a whole. Consequently the defence of honour killing can only be abolished if the change is brought in the provisions of law of homicide.

VI    ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY

Throughout the world, men who murder their wives encounter legal systems that are lenient toward their crimes. Many legal systems treat the murder of a wife as a less serious crime than the murder of a stranger. Such systems permit men who kill their wives to avoid punishment or receive mitigated sentences through a variety of techniques, including the creation of statutory and common law defenses to criminal charges and non-enforcement of criminal laws. By such legal devices, countries around the world have in effect sanctioned these murders. A man's ability to kill his wife and escape punishment is not confined to any one country. The human rights community can and should address this problem by expanding its definition of human rights to include the right of wives to be protected by the state from violence at home. Since the problem of leniency for wife-murderers exists on an international scale and results from universally shared attitudes, it demands international attention.

The fact that husbands may escape punishment or receive mitigated sentences for murdering their wives presents a striking example of this phenomenon. In addition, the state does in fact play a large role in the murder of wives. Legislation, judicial decisions and police behaviour perpetuate these murders by failing to punish the men who commit them.

These actions are all in the "public" sphere, and thus open to attack even under the traditional, narrow definition of human rights. In Islamic countries, men may invoke statutory or customary law defenses if they kill adulterous wives.

In Brazil and the United States, they may appeal to judge-made defenses in certain situations. Religious or cultural explanations fail to account for these defenses. Islam itself does not give rise to mitigated sentences for murderous husbands or half-diyat rule; rather, they were derived from imported penal codes and long-standing cultural beliefs. The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that this problem reflects internationally shared attitudes about women's worth, their "proper" role in society and men's ownership rights in their wives.

VII   NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

Since the problem of leniencies for wife murderers exists on an international scale, it demands international attention. The short coming of local women groups are the result of inefficient staff funding, the inability of local group to convince the government to change the law and pressure on such groups to focus on an immediate solution to avoid violence on women, moreover the problem is based on international attitude therefore, legislation action alone cannot change the human behaviour.

Human rights action is therefore needed not only to change the laws in particular countries but to educate peoples and begin to change human attitude. State responsibility to address domestic violence seldom has been discussed at an international level. The Convention on the Eliminating on all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was a major break through for the international women’s rights movement because it stated principles to eradicate discrimination against women. The Human Rights activists believed that since domestic violence occurs in private affairs it is beyond the scope of human rights activities. Some activists therefore, conclude that acts of a husband against his wife are simply not human rights violence. Right to life, liberty and security of a person certainly bears on the problem of wife murder. This right is guaranteed in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as under International Convention. State must take effective steps to outlaw wife murder. Statutes that reduce the penalty for men to kill their wives clearly violate equal protection provision contained in the Universal Declaration as well as Convention on the Eliminating on all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Moreover, in order to truly guarantee equality in law to women, the State must address the issue of bias in the Courts, in the Police Force as well as social attitudes that perpetuate crimes against women. CEDAW does not contain any provision protecting women from domestic violence. Further, honour killings are committed on pretext of eradicating dishonour to the family. There is still a need for CEDAW's intervention that may address honour killing. In addition CEDAW must specifically prohibit the practice of honour killing because it is the premier authority on International women rights. It must contain specific provisions prohibiting honour killing to dispel the argument among some state parties that CEDAW did not address honour killing. In addition specific language condemning the practice of honour killing will help bring an end to honour killing internationally because women, specifically those in the Middle East would understand that such killings are prohibited under international law.

The recent events espoused by religious groups professing and applying rigid interpretation of the tenets and command of Islamic religion demand a more active role of the human right community in removing the established practice of mal-treatment of females which include permitted honour killing. In Afghanistan, the regime of the talaban practiced killing of adulteress females in public. As opposed to Afghanistan, the Turk Islamic Society has projected itself with a modern social behaviour. The countries like Afghanistan and North Frontier parts of Pakistan may also adopt the same attitude for which the human right community may play an important role.

CONCLUSION

In Islamic Countries, men invoke defence of honour killing if they kill an adulterous female of the family. Most women killed in the Arab world for adulterous behaviour are daughters, sisters or wives. A clear rejection of the cultural defence by the Courts would similarly teach immigrant men that murder of wives will not be tolerated in United States. The crimes against females in the Arab or in the Islamic Countries are committed as a result of infringement of family honour. The defence of honour killing is used in this sense; however, the honour killing in majority of the cases is linked to provocation as a consequence of infringement of honour when a female member of the family is seen in a sexual activity. The plea of sudden provocation used as an exception in the West does not achieve the same goal as in the east. The men involved in killing even when they are not in a fit of furry, in extreme emotion, provocation or infringement of honour always get mitigated punishment and these defences are accepted by the Courts, especially in Islamic countries. The foregoing study strongly suggests that the increasing trend of crime against females must be curbed by introducing legislation or at least true interpretation of the statutes by the judiciary.

REFERENCES:

1      Simth and Hogan Criminal Law (9th Edition) (Butterworths London 1998)

2      The Homicide Act 1957

3      The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965.

4      NJ Coulson MA Islamic Jurisprudence (3rd edition) (Sweet and Maxwell London) 1964.

5      Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.

6      Nasruddin and others Vs. The State PLD 2002 Quetta 42

7      The Abolition of Death Penalty Act 1965.

8      Saim a Waheed v Raheel [ 1997] SCMR 951 SC

9      Amna v Zaheer [ 1999] SCMR 403 SC.

10    The Homicide Act, 1957

11    Kumarasinghege Don John Perera [ 1953] AC 200 Goddard

12    Irani Penal Code

13    Iraqi Penal Code

14    Sher Ali v. State (1992) HC Lah PLD 430 HC

15    The State v Muhammad Hanif and 5 others (1992 SCMR 2047)

16    Mumtaz Khan V. Musarat Khan PLD (1996) HC Quetta 88

17    Muhammad Hanif's case (1992 SCMR 2047)

18    Ali Muhammad's case (PLD 1996 SC 274)

19    Muhammad Akram Khan (NLR 2001 Cr. SC 79)

20    Mumtaz Khan v. Musarat Khan PLD (1996) HC Quetta 88

21    Muhammad Hanif's case (1992 SCMR 2047)

22    Gul Hassan Khan’s case (PLD 1980 Peshawar 1)

23    Ali Muhammad's case (PLD 1996 SC 274)

24    M. Jamil’s case (PLD 1996 Lah. 190)

25    Gul Hassan Khan’s case (PLD 1980 Peshawar 1)

25    Maher v People [10 Mich. 212 (1862)]

26    Regina v Mawbridge (84 All Eng. Rep 1107)

27    State v Yanz 11 Mich. 215 (1872)

28    State v Wgtkins  12 Mich. 216 (1875)

29    Price v State  15N.W. 2d. 344 (Mich. CT. App. 1976)

30    People v. Kelly  14N.W. 2d 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)

31    HLA Hart The Concept of Law (3RD Edition) (London Sweet and Maxwell) 1969

32    K.Llewlyn Law Jobs Theory (2nd Edition) (London, Sweet and Maxwell) 1930.

 



 

1 Simth and Hogan Criminal Law (9th Edition) (Butterworths London 1998)

2 The Homicide Act 1957

3  The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965.

4 NJ Coulson MA Islamic Jurisprudence (3rd edition) (Sweet and Maxwell London) 1964.

5 Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.

6  Nasruddin and others Vs. The State PLD 2002 Quetta 42

7 The Abolition of Death Penalty Act 1965.

8 Saim a Waheed v Raheel [ 1997] SCMR 951 SC

9 Amna v Zaheer [ 1999] SCMR 403 SC.

10 The Homicide Act, 1957

11 Kumarasinghege Don John Perera [ 1953] AC 200 Goddard

12 Irani Penal Code

13 Iraqi Penal Code

14 Sher Ali v. State (1992) HC Lah PLD 430 HC

15 The State v Muhammad Hanif and 5 others (1992 SCMR 2047)

16 Mumtaz Khan V. Musarat Khan PLD (1996) HC Quetta 88

17 Muhammad Hanif's case (1992 SCMR 2047)

18 Ali Muhammad's case (PLD 1996 SC 274)

19 Muhammad Akram Khan (NLR 2001 Cr. SC 79)

20 Mumtaz Khan v. Musarat Khan PLD (1996) HC Quetta 88

21 Muhammad Hanif's case (1992 SCMR 2047)

22 Gul Hassan Khan’s case (PLD 1980 Peshawar 1)

23 Ali Muhammad's case (PLD 1996 SC 274)

24 M. Jamil’s case (PLD 1996 Lah. 190)

25 Gul Hassan Khan’s case (PLD 1980 Peshawar 1)

25 Maher v People [10 Mich. 212 (1862)]

26 Regina v Mawbridge (84 All Eng. Rep 1107)

27 State v Yanz 11 Mich. 215 (1872)

28 State v Wgtkins  12 Mich. 216 (1875)

29 Price v State  15N.W. 2d. 344 (Mich. CT. App. 1976)

30 People v. Kelly  14N.W. 2d 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)

31 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (3RD Edition) (London Sweet and Maxwell) 1969

32 K.Llewlyn Law Jobs Theory (2nd Edition) (London, Sweet and Maxwell) 1930.