SUBJECTIVELY FORMULATED DISCRETIONARY POWERS  AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

By
MR. FAKHAR MAHMOOD MAKHDOOM*

American administrative law is generally regarded as a highly developed system of law in many respects, In particular in relation to judicial review of questions of fact. It has evolved doctrines and principles to which the British courts are still feeling their way. Yet, in the area of judicial review of administrative discretion there was a remarkable gap until fairly recently. By contrast, there has always been a stimulating discussion among the lawyers in England on the subject1, which is evident from the pertinent quote here by H. W. R. WADE in his article “Anglo-American Administrative Law: more reflections”2, where he clearly mentions of the stimulating discussion among the contemporary lawyers as “If I am not mistaken it was my persistent complaint at this lacuna at the very heart of the subject that stimulated (or perhaps rather provoked) a learned friend and a colleague to write a valuable article which does much to fill the gap”. Reference is to Raoul Berger, “Administrator Arbitrariness and Judicial Review”, 65 Col L R. 55.

However, this is not to say that administrative law in Britain is anywhere near perfection.

De Smith3 helps to define, the legal concept of discretion as an implied power to make a choice between alternative courses of action, and if only one course can be adopted, it is not the exercise of discretion but the performance of a duty”.

The judicial mind is disturbed by irresponsible exercise of power and the result then is the inevitable judicial intervention.

Under the English law there are two important principles of general application which are constantly at work in this are: firstly, the discretionary powers must not be surrendered or abdicated by the repository and , secondly, the discretionary powers must not be abused and should be exercised for the furtherance of the purpose of the statute.4

Lord Diplock in Secretary of State explained the notion of discretion for Education and Science v Tameside M.B.C. 5  as under:

“the very notion of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred”.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCRETION:

i)          Unfettered Discretion:

Anglo-American attitudes towards discretion show a marked difference. Thus, while uncontrolled or unfettered discretion is open to Constitutional objection in the United States, British courts do not find any such objection to it provided that there is legislative authority for the conferment of such power.

On judicial review of administrative discretions in English law, one ought to start with a case like Carltona Ltd .v Commissioner of works.6 In this case, the validity of an order requisitioning certain premises was challenged. The order was made under a war-time statutory regulation which had provided that ‘a competent authority, if it appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of public safety…may take possession of any land’.

It was held that the Parliament had committed to the executive the discretion of deciding when an order for the requisition of premises should be made and with that discretion, if bona fide exercised, no court could interfere.

This case established the so-called ‘Carltona Principle’, under which powers granted to a minister can be exercised by his officials in the department. Although, Carltona was a war-time case and the courts’ view as to the scope of review over discretionary actions has changed over the years.

ii)         Unregulated Discretion: 

According to James Vorenberg in his article, “Decent restraint of prosecutorial power”7 where he points out that “There has developed a steady movement in the United States against the use of uncontrolled discretion. The demand is now for the regulation of discretion. Even the sphere of enforcement of criminal law is not immune from this movement” .Previously in The United States v Nixon8 the Supreme Court conceded ‘absolute discretion’ to prosecutors.

English courts on the other hand, have by and large adopted a policy of non-interference with prosecutorial discretion.9

iii)        Review of abuse of power:

The British courts will review administrative actions found to have involved abuse of power.

In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation,10 Lord Greene MR specified the grounds for such challenge, viz. bad faith, dishonesty, unreasonableness, considering irrelevant factors, ignoring relevant factors, not directing oneself properly in law etc.

Lord Diplock wrote in,”Administrative Law: Judicial Review “11that “The English courts have also resorted to ‘purposive interpretation’ of statutes to curtail discretionary powers. If the purpose or object of the statute cannot be reconciled with the exercise of discretion, the action is liable to be set aside.”

 The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into the laws of the UK which has a drastic impact over the control of discretion where it is abused by the authority. The courts and tribunals in England now while determining the question in connection with a convention right must take into account the relevant rulings of the European Court of Human Rights [s.2 (1)(a)]. It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with the Convention rights (s.6 (1). The Act came into force on 2 October 2000.

The principle of proportionality as developed by the European court of Human Rights involves two tests:

a)         the balancing test;

b)         the necessity test.

The former requires the balancing of the aims or objectives, e.g whether the right to information was fairly balanced against the need to protect the authority of the judiciary. The latter requires that where a particular objective can be achieved by more than one available means, the least harmful of these means should be adopted to realize the objective. Occasionally, a third test is also applied viz. suitability test, this requires the authority to employ means which are appropriate to the accomplishment of a given law.

While the ‘Wednesbury Principle’ will govern the scope of judicial review. Under ‘the Wednesbury Principle’, the burden of proving the illegality of administrative actions rests on the party seeking to challenge them. Thus, Lord Greene MR said in Wednesbury  case12 that “What then is the power of the courts? The courts can only interfere with an act of the executive authority if it be shown that the authority has contravened the law. It is for those who assert that the local authority have contravened the law to establish that proposition”.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT:

I)          Unfettered Discretion:

While the notion of ‘unfettered discretion’ is acceptable to the English courts it would be inconstant with the constitutional framework of judicial control in India. Thus, Art. 19(1)  of the constitutional guarantees the rights which are subject to the reasonable restrictions which the state may impose for the purpose specified in cl 2-6 of art 19  i.e. national security, foreign affairs, public orders, decency, public interest etc.  However, discretion is not open to constitution objection if ---(i) the circumstances or the grounds on which it can be exercised are stated; or (ii) if the law lays down the policy of the discretion; or (iii) if there are adequate procedural safeguards in law against the possible abuse of discretion.13

Thus in Virendra v State of Punjab,14 it was held that a law which empowered the executive to impose restrictions on freedom of the press if the executive were ‘satisfied’ that such restrictions were necessary to combat any activity prejudicial to maintenance of communal harmony was upheld as valid because under it an aggrieved person could make a representation to the court.

 Another constitutional bulwark against uncontrolled or unfettered discretion in Indian law is Art. 14 of the constitution which provides for the principles of ‘equality before of law’ and ‘equal protection of laws’. In this regard Fazal Ali J., said in State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali15  that “An Act which gives uncontrolled authority is discriminate cannot but be hit by art. 14”.

The linkage of the protection of the fundamental rights with judicial control has the consequence of enabling the courts to act on the proportionality principle and in some cases substituting their own decisions for those of the administrative authorities on the matter. In Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda v Presiding Officer, GCIT,16 where a bank employee made a false statement about his past criminal convictions in his application for a job, the supreme court of India held that this was not such a grave misconduct as to warrant a dismissal and ordered his reinstatement. Proportionality forms part of the jurisprudence of the ECHR. The House of Lords explained in the Brind Case,17 that proportionality is a different principle from the ‘Wednesbury Irrationality test’ and enables the courts to review the merits of a decision, going beyond the legality of it.

However, the Indian courts have not understood the Proportionality Principle. They have confused and equated it with the Wednesbury Irrationality. Thus, in State of Karnataka v H. Nagraj18, the S.C of India stated that the principle of proportionality can be invoked ‘only to a case where the punishment was totally irrational in the sense that it was an outrageous defiance of logic or of moral standards’. While Per Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service19, where he stated the meanings of principle in that “By irrationality, I mean what now can be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury’ Unreasonableness’. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or acceptable moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it”. While Lord Roskill said in Brind Case20 that to apply the Proportionality Principle would be for the court to substitute its own judgment of what was needed to achieve a particular objective for the judgment of the Secretary of state. In Naseer ullah Khan Babar v President, SMC (summary military court)21 it was observed that “While the Wednesbury Unreasonableness requires that the executive authority must have before it sufficient material on which a reasonable person could come to a particular conclusion.”

II)        JUDICAIL CONTROL—REVIEW OF SUBJECTIVE DISCRETION:

In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India,22 it was held that the ‘satisfaction’ of the detaining authority must be based on sound material having a nexus with the activity of the detainee. Thus, allegations unsupported by valid reasons or a fact relied on which is too distant in point of time, eg an offence committed in the past or a minor infringement of law claimed as an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order could but justify an order for detention.

The requirement of stating the grounds of discretionary actions is as well an effective measure in this regard. In Abdul Baqi Baloch v Govt. of Pakistan,23 an order of preventive detention could be justified only by ‘imminent and real necessity.’ Certain offensive pamphlets already formed the basis of the detention order in question. In view of these facts, the court held that such material was not sufficient to justify ‘imminent and real necessity’ for detention under the Defense of Pakistan Rules 1965.

In Mohammad Aslam v Government of Pakistan24 it was observed that “Such a  phrase as ‘of satisfied’ appearing in a statue implies that ‘satisfaction’ should be directly related to an act of omission or commission on the part of the detainee”.

III)      FAILURE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION:

where a public authority declines to exercise its discretion as decided in Balwant Singh v State of Bihar,25 where a public prosecutor withdrew a prosecution without applying his mind to the case, it was held that he surrendered his discretion.

IV)       SUB-DELEGATION OF DISCRETION:

It is observed by John Willes, “Delegatus non potest delegare”26 “A discretionary power must in general be exercised by the body on which it has been conferred. There is no unanimity as to the basis of this view. One view is that the maxim delegates non protest delegare is simply a rule of statutory interpretation.

V)        ABUSE OF DISCRETION—PURPOSE AND MOTIVES:

In the opinion of G. E. Treves, propounded in his article “Administrative Discretion and Judicial Control”,27 for effective judicial control of abuse of powers it is necessary to distinguish between improper purpose and ulterior motives. It is submitted that the purpose of an admin action is prescribed by law while motives relate to what prompts an administrator to do what is authorized by statute. A clear statement of this fact of abuse of discretion (improper purpose) appears in the judgment of Sardar Mohammad Iqbal J, in the case titled as Lahore Improvement Trust v Custodian, Evacuee Property28 that “The Act gave the Trust the power to acquire the land only if it was required for executing one of the schemes under the Act. Their willing to exercise the power at the request of the government for the benefit of the University is ultra vires the intent of the Act itself—The trust is authorized to take land compulsorily for definite purposes. It cannot exercise its power for different purposes and if it does so the courts can interfere.”

As for the relevancy of grounds of discretion it was observed in Vijay Narain Singh v State of Bihar29 that while the absence of some relevant factors or the presence of even a single irrelevant factor may render the case appropriate for review, adequacy or sufficiency of grounds is not a matter for review.

Professor De Smith argued30 that the test of relevancy is material only in so far as consideration taken or not taken into account affected the quality of an administrative decision.

SITUATION IN PAKISTAN:

 In Montgomery Flour Mills v Director Food Purchase,31 where petitioners challenged the reduction of their sugar quota under sugar and sugar products order 1948. The quota was admittedly reduced on the ground of an unsettled money claim. The respondents argued that issue of quota was a matter of discretion and it could be withheld or suspended at may time. The court issued the writ and quashed the order of director.

Justice kaikaus who wrote the judgment of D.B declared: “It should be remembered that no discretion vested in any executive officer is an absolute and arbitrary discretion. The discretion is vested in him for a public purpose and must be exercised for the attainment of that purpose. Even though there are no express words in the relevant legal provisions of that effect, the discretion is always circumscribed by the scope and object of the law that creates it and has at the same time to be exercised justly, fairly and reasonably”. Similarly in East & West Steamship Co. v Pakistan32 it was observed that “there can be little dispute about the preposition that where a statutory functionary acts malafide or in partial unjust and oppressive manner, the H.C in the exercise of its writ J has ample power to grant relief to the aggrieved party”. In S.S. Miranda Ltd. V Chief Commissioner Karachi33 The court approved the rule of reasonableness laid down in the celebrated Wednesbury case that an authority vested with a discretion must not act unreasonably or absurdly”.

Thus we find that these early case established the rules that discretion is never unlimited misuse of discretion is excess of Jurisdiction and ultra vires and exercise of discretion is subject to J.R on these grounds. These early cases were decided u/A 170 of 1956 Constitution, which was abrogated in 1958  and replaced by 1962 constitution u/A 98 of new constitution the writ J was remodeled and writs were defined by self-contained provisions.

The impact of new set up of writs was that, certiorari the usual remedy for controlling the exercise of discretionary powers was restricted to acts which were done without lawful authority. Courts adopted the concept of abdication of discretion and issued mandamus type orders and directed that authority must apply its own independent mind. So in Anjuman-e Ahmadia v D.C. Sargodha34 is illustration from amongst the cases where the misuse of discretion was corrected through the orders of mandamus.

In Presiding Officer v Sadruddin Ansari35 it is observed that “ It is true that mandamus does not lie where a duty is purely discretionary but from this it does not follow that a party upon whom the duty vests can exercise this discretion in any and every manner. The mere fact that there is an element of discretion in the duty to be discharged is not by itself sufficient to exclude relief by way of mandamus, for even discretion must be exercise reasonably and honestly and not arbitrarily, capriciously or in a bad faith”.

Article 98 of 1962 Constitution conferred power on the high court to issue orders similar to the famous English writs, abandoned the distinction of judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative and subject to the constitutional restriction, made every governmental activity amenable to the jurisdiction of H.C.

Similarly in Kafil-ud-din v Chairman PABNA Municipal Committee36 courts observed “The law was put on its own path after a few years and the courts reverted to quashing the misuse of discretionary powers under certiorari provision”.

Pakistan Barbers Association v Province of Punjab37 where the Shops and Establishment Ordinance 1969 required that every shop must remain closed for one day in a week. The barbers shops were exempted from this condition but the provincial govt. could withdraw this exemption which by a notification withdraw this exemption which by a notification withdrew this exemption and same was challenged in the H.C. Dr. Naseem Hassan Shah relying on EAST WEST SHIPPING CO. case held that if a law is administered in arbitrary, oppressive, partial & unjust manner, the action can be declared unlawful. He declared that notifications were issued without lawful authority”.

In Federation of Pakistan v Mohammad Asalam38 Supreme Court reiterated the rule that no discretion is obsolete or arbitrary, discretion is always circumscribed by the scope and object of the law and Shafi ur Rehman J held that “the limit now well recognized is that all executive power has to be exercised fairly and justly for advancing the object of the legislation. In other words, every such exercise of power has to satisfy the test of reason and relevance”.

A statutory functionary who is given discretionary powers under a statute is required to exercise these powers by applying his independent mind and without being influenced by others.

In this regard, in Province of East Pakistan v Jogesh Chandra39 Supreme Court laid down the rule prohibiting the exercise of discretion on the direction of Superior authority. C.J Munir observed, “it is perfectly clear from the Requisition proceedings that District Magistrate who made order under section 3 merely acted as a tool to the Land Acquisition Dept of the government and did not at all applied his mind to the situation, where it calls for whether it is necessary and expedient to requisition the property for a public purpose on this ground alone, the order must be held to be invalid”.

In Ghulam Mohi-ud-din v Chief Settlement Commissioner40 Hamood ur Rehman J,  observed that “ We are of the opinion that it behaved the chief settlement commissioner to apply his own independent mind to the questions raised before him or to deal with the three revision petitions put up before him according to law by merely countersigning the note of settlement commission is not exercise of discretion”. In  Sher Mohammad v Abdul Rashid41 where the delegate of chief settlement commissioner made his adjudication relating to the verification of claims entirely dependent on the findings of a 3rd party. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman termed such an action as abdication of jurisdiction, surrender of discretion and refusal to exercise jurisdiction”.

The excess or abuse of discretion in any disguise is the acceptable ground of judicial review of administrative action. The public officials are not allowed to exercise their powers in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. The word means according to what is right or lawful”. In Malina Rani Das v Province of East Pakistan42 Courts believe that legislature while granting any power to a statutory functionary expects that he would exercise them responsibly and not carelessly. Therefore, the courts demand that the repository of public power must apply his mind to all the relevant aspects of the matter before taking an action; otherwise the action would be invalid. Therefore, here the order of D.C to take over a cinema as enemy property under Defense of Pak. Rules 1965 made without application of mind and without giving any reason, held invalid”.

Mohammad Ali v Election Controlling Authority43 Courts have shown willingness to interfere when any power is exercised unreasonably. Here the controlling authority annulled the election of Chairman Union Council on highly technical ground, the action was held unreasonable and was set aside. In Caltex Oil Ltd. V Province of Sindh44

Where the revisional authority exercised suo motu revisional powers on the behest of a person whose revision application had been rejected, the action was held to be invalid”.

Thus robbing peter to pay Paul has been held mala fide and so has been an action based on extraneous motives. Such actions are clearly ultra vires the implied conditions of the grant of power, for the legislative cannot be presumed to have authorized a mala fide action. In case of Abdul Rauf v Abdul Hameed Khan45 Per KaiKaus J, it is that  “ A mala fide act is by its nature an act without jurisdiction. No legislature when it grants power to take action or pass an order contemplates mala fide exercise of power. A mala fide order means one which is passed not for the purposes contemplated by the enactment granting the power to pass an order, but for some other collateral or ulterior purposes. In Government of West Pakistan v Begum Shorish Kashmiri46  C.J Hamood-ur Rehman held “ a person acting in pursuance of a statute cannot be said to be acting bonafide if has no reasonable grounds for believing that the statute justified him in what he does.

”A public act may be condemned as mala fide when the authority fails to apply his mind to all the relevant aspects presumably in such cases the courts refuse to believe that the law has been violated and a responsible public official has taken an adventurous course, without an improper motive though they are not willing to attribute, or table to discover, any malice in fact. Malice in law is however not recognized as an independent ground of judicial review and is usually tagged with unreasonableness and improper purpose”. 47

In Pakistan, this question of mala fide as a ground of judicial review is interwoven in the history of judicial review. Prior to 1962 Constitution. an order not made in accordance with law, in other words suffering from an error of law, could be quashed by a writ of certiorari. However, Art. 98 of 1962 can restrict the scope of certiorari to the acts done without lawful authority and this expression received restricted interpretation and as a result of error of law as a ground for the onward of certiorari became some what doubtful. It was perhaps to overcome this difficulty that the courts resorted to the doctrine of mala fides in law. Now that the order of certiorari does not suffer from such restrictions any more. The mala fides in law has become irrelevant in the public law of Pakistan. Zafrul Ahsan v Republic of Pakistan48 it was observed that the mala fide is a very strong ground for seeking the J.R of admin action. Such an action is challengeable in the courts even when the statute excludes the jurisdiction of court. Similarly in Ajit Kumar Das v East Pakistan49 court observed though mala fide is very strong ground for Judaic Review however, it is most difficult one to succeed, because acts of public officials are presumed to be bona fide until proved contrary. In order to succeed in such situation, petitioner is required to establish a clear cut case, and mere suspicion is not enough for this purpose. In Federatin of Pakistan v Saeed Ahmad Khan50 Supreme Court laid down that mala fide must be pleaded with particularity, that when one kind of mala fide is alleged, other kind cannot be allowed to be proved, vague and indefinite allegation cannot be enquired into and that the initial onus of proof lies on the petitioner to prove mala fides. Normally H.C will not be readily willing to enter into a factual inquiry but if the disputed questions of fact can be ascertained from the documents on record, H.C can entertain the writ. However, the proper remedy is a civil suit instead of constitution petition. In Mohammad Bachal Memon v Government of Sindh51 it was observed that ‘Plea of mala fide is not available against the legislative action”. Surprisingly the law made by an individual i.e. chief Martial Law Administrator cannot be challenged on grounds of mala fides.

At times, legislature may purport to restrict judicial intervention in the exercise of discretionary powers by conferring powers in subjective language. Liversidge v Anderson [1942] is a notorious case on the issue of subjective versus objective discretion. The defense Regulations provided “if the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained” and House of Lords by a strong majority (Atkin J dissenting) held that the Secretary of State had subjective discretion which could be challenged in Judicial Review. Another phrase to give discretion is “if satisfied”. In Liversidge Case the sole dissenting Judge Lord Atkin accepted that if the Regulations had merely required the secretary of state to be satisfied, in that case he would have had complete discretion”. In Mardana Mosque Trustee’s v Mahmud52 the Privy Council while interpreting the words “where the minister is satisfied”held that there must be some grounds on which the minister could be satisfied.

This judicial trend was finally approved in House of Lords in Tameside Case,53 “if a judgment requires before it can be made the existence of some facts, then although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court must inquire whether those facts exists and have been taken into account”. Again in ex parte Ross Minister54 Lord Diplock acknowledged that Liversidge case was wrongly decided and Lord Scarman confidently declared that the ghost of that case need no longer hunt the law”. But the ghost reappeared on judicial scheme in ex parte Zamir55 House of Lords subjectively interpreted the objective words of immigration Act 1971 and allowed wide discretion to the minister”. After a few years in ex parte Khawaja,56 this situation in U.K again became uncertain over the question.

Privy Council in India in Sibnath Banerji Case applied the Liversidge rule. But after independence our courts started ignoring it for example as early as 1949. The Sindh Chief Court in  Ghulam Mohammad Khan v Crown57 held that the satisfaction of detaining authority was not subjective and is required to show that it had carefully considered the facts and law”. In  Sakhi Daler Khan Case58 Lahore High Court held that satisfaction of detaining authority must be based on some material. In Ghulam Gilani v Government of West Pakistan59 C.J Cornelius laid down that satisfaction of detaining authority must be a state of mind which has been induced by the existence of reasonable grounds for such satisfaction. In Federation of Pakistan v Mohammad Saifullah Khan60 where regarding the discretionary power of president to dissolve National Assembly Supreme Court held that “President has to form first his opinion objectively and then it is open to him to exercise his discretion one way or the other i.e. either to dissolve the assembly or not to dissolve it. An obligation is cast on the president that before exercising his discretion he has to form his opinion that a situation of the kind envisaged u/A 58(2)(b) has arisen which necessitates the grave step of dissolving the N.A”.

Epitome:

Historically, judicial control of admin discretion in the Indian sub-continent has been shaped by common law. But common law had its limitations. Nonetheless, the law particularly in India has made a good recovery from the shackles of common law owing largely to the constitutional provisions governing judicial review. Adequate provisions, it is hoped would go a long way towards establishing the principle of detournement de pouvoir in the laws of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In short courts are not willing to accept that their constitutional jurisdiction can be ousted by the use of subjective language, the repository of the discretion is expected to exercise his own independent judgment without being influenced by dictates of any other person. However, the role of court is indispensable to promote the object of law by Judicial Review of the discretionary powers”.

END NOTES:

1.     H W R WADE, “ANGLO-AMERICAN ADMINSTRATIVE LAW: MORE REFLECTIONS”  [1966] 82      LQR 226

2.     [1966] 82 LQR 226 at 249

3.     De Smith----------

4.     Associated Provincial Picture House v Wednesbury Corp[1948] 1 K.B. 223

5.     [1977] A.C. 1014

6.     [1943] All ER 560

7.     94 HARV L. REV [1981] 1581

8.     418 U.S. 683 (1974)

9.     R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 1128

10.   [1948] 1 KB at 229

11.   [1974] 33 (2) CLJ 233

12.   Associated Provincial Picture House v Wednesbury Corp[1948] 1 K.B. 223

13.   S.P Sathe, “Admin Law” 4th edn

14.   AIR 1937 SC 896

15.   [1952] SCMR 1108

16.   AIR 1999 SC 912

17.   [1991] AC 696

18.   (1998) 9 SSC

19.   [1985] AC 374

20.   [1991] AC 696

21.   PLD 1989 Pesh. 216

22.   AIR 1978 SC 597

23.   PLD 1969 Karachi 87

24.   PLD 1968 LAH. 667

25.   (1977) 4 SCC 448

26.   (1943) 21 CAN. BAR .REV 257

27.   (1947) MLR 276

28.   PLD 1970 Lahore 257 at 273

29.   AIR 1984 SC 1334

30.   MOD L REV in [1972] vol. 35 at p. 416

31.   PLD 1957 Lah. 914

32.   PLD 1958 SC 4

33.   PLD 1959 SC 134

34.   PLD 1966 SC 639

35.   PLD 1967 SC 579

36.   PLD 1968 DACCA 733

37.   PLD 1976 LAH. 769

38.   1986 SCMR 916 at page 928

39.   11 DLR SC 411

40.   PLD 1964 SC 829 (840)

41.   PLD 1980 SCMR 928 (930)

42.   PLD 1968 DACCA 177

43.   PLD 1963 LAH. 346

44.   PLD 1978 KAR. 948

45.   PLD 1965 SC 671

46.   PLD 1969 SC 14

47.   De-Smith  in “ Administrative and Constitutional Law” at page. 324

48.   PLD 1960 SC 113

49.   PLD 1959 Dacca 586

50.   PLD 1974 SC 151

51.   PLD 1987 KAR. 296

52.   1967 AC 13

53.   [1977] AC 1014

54.   1980 AC 952

55.   1980] AC 930

56.   [1984] AC 24

57.   PLD 1949 SIND 12

58.   PLD 1957 LAH. 813

59.   PLD 1968 SC 373

60.        PLD 1989 SC 166 (189)


*.       Mr. Fakhar Mahmud Makhdoom (LL.M, Punjab University Law College, Lahore ) is presently working as Assistant Professor of Law in International Islamic University Islamabad.