A REVIEW OF THE BOOK TITLED “JUDICIAL
By
JUSTICE ® DR. MUNIR AHMAD MUGHAL[1]
Title: Judicial
Edited by: Adam Dodek and Lorne Sossin
Publisher: Irwin Law Inc.,
Year of Publication: 2010
Pages: xix + 641
ISBN-13: 978-1-55221-195-3
Availability: http://www.irwinlaw.com/store/product/667/judicial-independence-in-context
Price: $85
The bar and the bench throughout the
world would agree that there are, among others, two main problems that call to
be addressed, namely, the Content of Judicial Independence and the context of
the Judicial
Judicial
The other contributors namely, Graem
G. Michell, Benjamine Alarie and Andrew Green, Jacob Ziegel addressed the need
for institutional reform in
The
book under review has a forward written by Justice Richard J. Goldstone, titled
as “The Challenges of Judicial Independence” (pp. ix to xix). It is divided
into four portions, namely,--
(A)
(B)
(C) Judicial
(D) Conclusion.
Referring
to the year 1994 the provisions of section 165 of the Constitution of South
Africa have been commended to the readers wherein it is provided, inter alia,
that:
1) The
judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.
2) The
courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.
3) No
person or organ of the state may interfere with the functioning of the courts.
4) Organs of state, through legislative
and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the
independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility, and effectiveness of the
courts.
5) An
order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organ of
state to which it applies. (pp. ix to xix)
An Introduction is written by Adam
Dodeck & Lorne Sossin. This is divided into four parts, namely,--
A. Unravelling Judicial
It has been stated that in this book
the aim is to explain both the theory and practice of judicial independence,
both in
B. The Canadian Context: The Provincial
Judges Reference and Depolitcization.
In the Provincial Judges Reference,[4] the Court looks to the Preamble of
the Constitution Act, 1867, and its statement that
C. Historical
Origins Of Judicial
The
principle of judicial independence first took concrete form as a binding rule
in the
While
judicial independence may have begun as contest between executive and
legislative control over the judiciary, today, the normative purpose of
judicial independence is more expressly tied to the fairness of the judicial
process for litigants. As former Chief Justice Lamer observed:
“The
over all objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to ensure reasonable
perception of impartiality, judicial independence is but a “means to this end.[6] Chief Justice Lamer emphasized that independence is
the corner stone, a necessary prerequisite, for judicial impartiality.[7]
While judicial independence may be
treated to various constitutional texts in
Before
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was adopted, the courts had held
that Part VII of the Constitution Act 1867 (Judicature), sections 96 to 100,
determined the limits of judicial independence for superior courts in
Part
VII contains the operative provisions of the Act of Settlement dealing with the
judiciary, namely the appointment of judges of the superior courts during good
behaviour and their removal on a joint address by the House of Parliament.
Prior to adoption of the Charter, Canadian courts had not dealt directly with
the question of judicial independence. They had simply referred to it in case
involving the interpretation of section 96 and the assignment to the lower
courts or to administrative tribunals of powers which were within the authority
of the superior courts.[10]
Situation
changed fundamentally with the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1982. In 1985 , the Supreme Court of Canada had occasion to rule on
the interpretation of section 11(d) of the Charter, which states that “ any
person charged with an offence has the right…(d) to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law in a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” [p. 6]
In
Valente[11] the Supreme Court had to rule on the status of the
Criminal Division of the
Justice
Le Dain identified the three essential conditions of judicial independence in
He
observed:
“…
that the judge be removed only for the cause, and the cause be subject to
independent review and determination by
a process at which the judge affected is afforded an opportunity to be heard.
The essence of security of tenure for the purposes of section 11 (d) is a
tenure, whether until an age or retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific
adjudicative task, that is secure against interference by the Executive or
other appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.[12]
While
explaining that the framework of evaluation of judicial independence, the
author quotes from the Provincial Judges Reference in the following terms (p.
13):
What
is at issue here is the character of the relationships between the legislature
and the executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. These
relationships should be depoliticized. When I say that those relationships are
depoliticised, I do not mean to deny that they are political in the sense that
court decisions (both constitutional and non-constitutional often have
political implications, and that the statutes which courts adjudicate upon
emerge from the political process. What I mean instead is the legislature and
executive cannot and cannot appear to, exhort political pressure on the
judiciary, and conversely, that members of the judiciary should exercise
reserve in speaking out publicly on issues of general public policy that are or
have the potential to come before the courts, that are the subject of political
debate, and which do not relate to the proper administration of justice.[13]
Critically examining the above
discussion in Pakistani context, I would like to refer here that the
Constitution of Pakistan 1973 has also embedded with the idea of trichotomy of
power as it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan[14] that none of the three organs of
State can interfere into the functions and domain of the other(s). For example,
in Muhammad Azhar Siddique v Federation of Pakistan, it has been held:[15]
With
the object of ensuring that said organs of the State remained obedient to the
Constitution, a simple and uncomplicated mechanism, which relied on the
trichotomy of powers, had been set out in the Constitution.
In Executive District Officer v Ijaz Hussain,[16] the Supreme Court of
Moving
forward in the book under review, in Part I, the legacy of the Provincial
Judges Reference, in Ch. 1, Peter W. Hogg has written on the bad idea of
unwritten constitutional principles: Protecting Judicial Salaries under five
heads, viz., Judicial Independence and Judicial Salaries, Express Guarantees of
Judicial Independence concerning Superior as well as inferior courts’ judges
with reference to England, Unwritten Constitutional Principles of Judicial
Independence, the Requirement of Judicial Compensation Commission and Judicial
Review of Judicial Compensation Commissions (pp. 25-36). Peter Hogg, while
concluding his Chapter has made the following remarks:
“It
is true that public sector salaries tend to be lower than private sector
salaries, but the importance and prestige of work in the public interest still
makes plenty of able lawyers want to be public servants, academics—and judges.
It is certainly true that if judicial salaries fell too low, it would become
difficult to recruit good people as judges, but I know that there are long
waiting list of well-qualified people for judicial appointments. In any case,
in my view, that is an issue of recruitment not independence. The expensive,
time consuming, complex, judicially reviewable processes that supreme Court
makes the country go through to fix judicial salaries—all in the name of
judicial independence and all on pain of a breach of the constitution—are proof
that unwritten constitutional principles are a bad idea.” (p. 36)
Chapter
2 of Part I deals with the case for dialogue in the judicial remuneration
process. This chapter has been written by Lorry Sterling and Sean Hanley. They
refer to the Provincial Judges Reference decision given in 1997 by the Supreme
Court of Canada that had set out new constitutional imperatives for judicial
financial security. The Charter was held to require an independence
compensation commission that would make recommendations on judicial
remuneration to the government. According to Lorry Sterling, while the
Commission recommendations would not be binding on the government, any
deviation from those recommendations would require a justification that would
be reviewable by a court. (p. 37)
Eight
years later in Bodner[19] decision, the Supreme Court was faced with the
consequences of the commission process that it previously held to be
constitutionally mandated and found that it had given rise to controversy
across the country and that the process had not diminished friction between
governments and the judiciary: instead, relations over judicial compensation
had become more adversarial and litigious. (p. 38)
The
paper evaluated weather a more conciliatory relationship has evolved between
judiciary and government in five years since court’s last pronouncement on
judicial compensation. Has the new approach resulted in less litigation? How
are governments across the country responding to commissions recommendations?
Finally, what alternative models for determination of judicial compensation
might promote a less adversarial relationship while still respecting the
constitutional principle of judicial independence?
Discussing
the core component of judicial independence, Lory Sterling and Sean Hanley have
mentioned that “the constitutional principle of judicial independence requires
that the judiciary be seen to be independent in terms of its relationship with
those who may have an interest in the outcome of legal proceedings,
particularly the executive branch of government. This means that a reasonable
person who is informed of the relevant statutory provisions, their historical
background and the traditions surrounding them, after viewing the matter
realistically and practically, would conclude that the tribunal or court is
independent.”
They
have then stated that there are three core components of judicial independence:
• financial security,
• security of tenure, and
• administrative independence.
Each
of these components consists of minimum guarantees that must be in place to
ensure the independence of judges and courts. (p. 39)
They
have concluded that “in spite of the legal uncertainty respecting the
appropriateness of pre-commission contact between the government and the
judicial associations over judicial remuneration, it is suggested that
consultation, discussion, and mediation would be appropriate to achieve a more
conciliatory relationship respecting judicial remuneration without undermining
judicial independence. A more purposive approach to judicial independence could
permit the use of these tools, which are frequently used to achieve mutually
acceptable agreements in interest-based bargaining.” (p. 61)
Chapter
3 is on the subject of “Between the Judiciary and the Executive: The Elusive
Search for a Credible and Effective Dispute-Resolution Mechanism”. This has
been authored by Lorne Sossin. The very first sentence is of great importance.
It reads:
“The
test of a mature constitutional democracy is how disputes between the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary are resolved.” (p. 63)
Part
II of the Book is on the subject of “In Need of Broader Reforms? Appointments
and Court Administration”. In its Ch. 4, the first article is of Graeme G.
Mitchell titled as “Be Careful What You Wish For?: Administrative Independence
and Alternative Models of Court Administration—The New Frontier.” (p. 97) The
article has been authored in a jurisprudential style of discussing the issue
historically, analytically and morally. There is also reference to the Canadian
Judicial Council and alternative models of court administration which is a
statutory body created by section 59 of the Judges Act.[20] It comprises of all Chief Justices and Associate
Chief Judges of
On the
question of public accountability of managing the administrative affairs of the
courts, the author analysis the proposed amendment by the Canadian Judicial
Council. The proposed amendment is:
“The
Chief Justices / Chief Judge of the Courts is responsible for managing the
affairs of the Courts. For that purpose, the Chief Justices / Chief Judge has
power to do all things that are necessary or convenient to be done.”
Graeme
G. Mitchell analyzes the above proposed amendment in the following words:
This
statutory language is breathtaking in its brevity. While it may prove
satisfactory to the judiciary, it provides no mechanism for public
accountability, an essential element if court administration is to be so wholly
or completely delegated to the judiciary. Accountability is a central concern
for any public administration model, especially one that seeks to remove as
much governmental or legislative oversight as possible. Senior judges together
with a court’s chief administrative officer, should expect to be called before
legislative or parliamentary committees to explain and, perhaps, even defend
their budgetary choices. This happens not infrequently in the
The
article has been concluded in the following words:
“Responsibility
for, and administration of, the court system is multifaceted. The judiciary
must be an active participant; however, further thought must be given to
weather whole sale judicial control over these wide ranging and inherently
complex matters is wise. The Constitution most certainly does not command it.
To be sure, the judiciary may have valid grievances about some governmental
decisions made in respect of court administration matters but they should not
be too quick to think that assuming control over these matters themselves is a
panacea. What at first blush, might appear to be the most desirable solution
may soon present a set of problems of a wholly different magnitude. The
judiciary should take heed: Be careful what you wish for, lest it come true!”
(p. 125)
Chapter
5 contains an article of Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green titled as “Should
they all Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality and Appointments to
the Supreme Court of
Chapter
6 contains an article by Jacob Ziegel title as “Promotion of Federally
Appointed Judges and Appointment of Chief Justices: The Unfinished Agenda” (p.
151). This Chapter is essentially a sub-set of the broader theme that has
occupied the minds of Canadian commentators and critics since nearly the
earliest day of confederation. The theme is how to ensure that the federal
government’s powers u/s 96 of the Constitution Act 1867 to appoint the judges
of the provincial superior courts and its powers to appoint the judges of the
federal courts created under section 101 of the Constitution Act 1867 are
circumscribed and regulated to bring about an exclusively merit-based and
transparent system of judicial appointments (p. 151).
Part
III of the Book under review is on Conceptual and Practical Challenges to
Judicial Independence.
In
Chapter 7, Sonia Lawrence has contributed an article titled as “Reflections: On
Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence”.
It begins with a quotation: “I am silver and exact. I have no
preconceptions.” (p. 193)
This
contribution is an effort to conceptualize the ways in which we might
understand the role that diversity on the bench plays in the independence of
the judiciary. Could a judiciary homogenous in terms of race and gender also be
an independent judiciary? (p. 193). The author has concluded:
Of
course a more representative bench is a goal that is both very much ambitious
and not ambitious enough. It is very ambitious because it will require more
than just changes to appointment processes—it will require that the
opportunities to become candidates are opened up as well. The long path to a
judgeship means many entry points need to be similarly ready to become more
open to a representative societal group. Yet at the same time, the goal is not
ambitious enough because it will not cure the injustices that we currently
create with our system of justice. For instance, judicial education will
continue to be critical in alerting judges to the experiences of the population
they are asked to judge.[21] Improving appointments is far from the only thing we
need to do to foster a truly inclusive society. (p. 219)
In
Chapter 8, the book contains Rosemary Cairns Way’s article “Contradictory or
Complementary? Reconciling Judicial
Judges,
individually, and Courts, as institutions, are central figures in public life.
Strong and independent judicial institutions ensure that governmental power is
exercised in accordance with the law. Healthy judicial institutions are a
symbol of neutrality of the state, and of its ability to deliver justice
regardless of race, creed, or beliefs. Wise judicial institutions constitute a
common space accessible to all, a place where people can peacefully resolve
their conflicts, a place where words, rules and ideas replace fists, weapons
and violence… Judicial education is an essential feature of strong judicial
institutions anywhere in the world…I do not suggest that better judicial
education will bring an end to an end to world conflicts, stop the spreading of
deadly diseases, or reverse the devastation of our environment. Here is what I
suggest it can do: judicial education can promote and uphold respect for the
rule of law, and sustain mutual understanding as we encounter each other in an
increasingly diverse world. [emphasis in original][22]
The
second quotation is of the Hon’ble Lynn Smith J. It reads (p. 221):
There
has been enormous progress over the past 15 years. From an almost forbidden
topic, raised in hushed voices as one tiptoed over eggshells and between
landmines, in a territory explored only by a few brave pioneers, social context
education has become the topic of [an international] symposium.[23]
The
author Rosemary Cairns Way has written that:
“a
remarkable shift in attitude and approach to judicial education has occurred
within the Canadian Judiciary over the last 25 years. Continuing judicial
education has evolved from a ‘patchwork quilt’ of programs delivered in an
ad-hoc manner and characterised by a lack of coordination, uneven coverage,
duplication, strained resources, and inequities in learning opportunities to a
seamlessly professionalized, nationally coordinated learning project, overseen
by the National Judicial Institute (the NJI), an organization whose staff has
mushroomed over the last fifteen years and whose mandate, structure, and
programming are internationally recognized. It is no more coincidence that this
revolution in judicial education has occurred at a time of profound change for
the Canadian judiciary, a change which was catalyzed by the entrenchment of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and cemented by the Supreme Court of
Canada’s broad and purposive approach towards constitutional rights protection.
Arguably, the centerpiece of this evolution of attitude and approach was the
social context education project (SECP)—a seven year special project of the
Institute—which has had a profound and continuing impact on the goals,
conceptualization, and delivery of judicial education in
The
author has quoted a speech of the Hon’ble Justice Beverley McLachlin made in
November 1995 as under (pp. 235-36):
Why
then has judicial education on equality issues, particularly compulsory
education, generated controversy? To understand one must evaluate it from the
psychological perspective of the judge who is to be educated. The first problem
arises from the assertion that the judge needs to be educated. Stripped of
candy-coating, the proposition that a judge needs to be educated on equality
amount in the eyes of some to saying that the judge is deficient, perhaps even
biased. That the bias may be sub-conscious and founded in his upbringing and
life experience does little to soften the affront the judge may feel. Moreover
the judge, training to scepticism, independence and a critical mind may view
those urging the proposition of bias as non-neutral representatives of an
interest group—and conclude that it is his duty to assess their message
critically, rather than in a spirit of acceptance. We should not be surprised
then that the judge may deny the need for such education or alternatively
participate in it only superficially, on the basis that while someone else
might need this, he or she is OK.[24]
Chapter
9 contains an article of Patricia Hughes titled as “The Significance of Public
Pressure on Judicial Independence” (p. 259).
The
article begins as under:
The
question of when public commentary about individual judges, the judiciary as a
whole, and the legal system might constitute inappropriate public pressure on
judicial independence permits no fine line answers. Determining when public
pressure becomes undue and what should be done about it when it does are
difficult matters, but they are characteristic of challenges
Chapter 10 is on “Judicial Independence as a
Public Policy Instrument”. This is an article written by Adam Dodek. The
important thing it contains is a statement of specific guidance on the issue of
appointment of Federally appointed Judges to Commissions of Inquiry. It reads
(pp. 314-15):
1) Every
request for a judge to take on an extra-judicial function should be made in the
first instance to the chief justice of the relevant court;
2) such
request should be accompanied by a reference to the statutory authority for the
proposed appointment;
3) the
request be accompanied with the proposed terms of reference for the inquiry and
indication of the time limit for it;
4) sufficient
time be given for the chief justice to discuss fully the request with the
relevant judge whose services are requested;
5) the
chief justice in consultation with the judge in question, should consider
whether the judge’s absence would significantly impair the work of the court,
and
6) the
chief justice and the judge should consider whether accepting the proposed
appointment could impair the future work of the judge as a member of the court.
In
particular, they should consider:
1) whether
the subject matter of the inquiry essentially requires advice on public policy
or involves issues of an essentially partisan nature;
2) Whether
it essentially involves an investigation into the conduct of agencies of the
appointing government;
3) whether
the inquiry is essentially an investigation of whether particular individuals
have committed a crime or a civil wrong;
4) who is
to select commission counsel and staff;
5) whether
the proposed judge is specially required for the inquiry, through particular
knowledge or experience, or whether a retired or supernumerary judge would be
suitable; and
6) if the
inquiry requires a legally trained commissioner, should the court feel obliged
to provide a judge, or could a senior lawyer perform this function equally
well.
The
conclusion of the author is that the key factors set out in the 1998 statement
remain the touchstone for consideration. First and foremost, judges should not
involve themselves in disputes that are of a partisan nature. Second, they
should not be used to conduct investigations which essentially involves
criminal or civil liability. Third, the executive must give judges sufficient
institutional support in terms of resources, time and independence in order to
be able to successfully complete their mandate. Fourth, is the proposed
extra-judicial activity essentially an attempt to relitigate an issue that the
executive chose not to pursue in the courts. Fifth, in each case, the judiciary
as an institution must inquire as to why a judge or a specific judge is
required for the desired action as opposed to a lawyer or another person. In
every instance, consideration of each public inquiry or extra-judicial
executive assignment requires a consideration of principle and pragmatism. (pp.
335-36)
In Ch.
11, Karen Eltis has written on the topic “The Impact of Technology on Courts
and Judicial Ethics: An Overview” (p. 337). The author sensitized over this
issue to its readers when she says: “Online court records and privacy, ex parte
email communication, inadvertently emailed draft decisions, and the issue of
government-owned and operated court servers as it relates to judicial
independence are but a few of the plentiful issues arising with greater—indeed
disconcerting—frequency. The cumulative effect of these, it stands to reason,
is ultimately to prompt courts to revisit the conventional construction of
fundamental concepts such as disclosure, accountability, competence—even
impartiality—and the balance to be struck between foundational values such as
transparency and privacy in the modern age.” (pp. 337-38) The author concludes
his paper with the following words:
The
illusion of accuracy fostered by Internet sources—both in terms of judicial out
of court expression, activities, and independent research, seems to lie at the
root of many of the concerns raised in this chapter. Approaching the networked
environment with cautions openness, rather than trepidation or unbridled
enthusiasm, is a simple but helpful stance. The internet age, with its promise
and hurdles, cannot bypass the judiciary, and reflection must ensue to ensure
that the benefits of technology are harnessed towards the better administration
of justice rather than subverted for undermining public confidence or further
curtailing necessary judicial activities.” (p. 377)
Part
IV of the Book deals with the “International Perspectives” of judicial
independence. Chapter 12 by Graham Gee focuses on “Defending Judicial
Independence in the British Constitution”. This chapter concludes that “Britain
is experiencing a period of constitutional transition, then it is unsurprising
that there should be renewed debate about the basic character of the
Constitution….while recognizing that recent interest in enhancing the
arrangements in place for realizing and defending judicial independence in Britain
can be read as evidence of, or at least closely identified with, the British
Constitution’s move towards something more akin to a legal constitution, it
would be complacent to overlook the real sense in which a model of a political
constitution remains relevant in making sense of (at least parts of) the
reforms instituted by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.” (p. 409)
Next
in line comes the article by Jameson W. Doig on the topic “Judicial
Independence and Impartiality in the
As
the earlier discussions makes clear, electing state judges tends to erode
judicial independence, although that process allows a provisional claim to
greater accountability to the people. Despite Justice Kennedy’s hopes, voter
turn out is low, campaign activities undermine the capacity of the public to
evaluate the quality of the candidates, and campaign funds distort the judgment
of compliant judges. It seems likely that some version of a merit system—with
appointment by the governor and a retention election that focuses on the
quality of the sitting judge—is the best we can expect in most of states, given
political realities. And in the
He
concludes:
An
independent judiciary can make a significant contribution to strengthening
democracy, if the judiciary—and especially the Supreme Court—displays a wide
diversity of backgrounds and judicial philosophies…”. (p. 437)
In
Chapter 15, Penelope Andrews writes his “The Judiciary in
The
In
Chapter 19, Justice Robert J. Sharpe & Michelle Bradfield have explained
the judicial “Crisis in
Chapter
20 also has another dimension of the Pakistani judicial crises wherein Janice
Gross Stein has presented her paper titled “Going Too Far, Too Fast: Judicial
Independence and Political Judgment” (p. 580). She focuses on three approaches
to judicial independence: institutional approach; judicial behaviour; and
strategic interaction between branches of government. (p. 583). The Chief
Justice Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry has been titled as “Heroic”
judge (p. 584). She further argues that the triumph of judges out of the crises
“politicized the courts in the process” and that “there are no easy answers to
the dilemmas of judges at moments when transition seems possible, but, at
times, justices need to leaven their heroism with a keen political sensibility
if they are to preserve and promote judicial independence in societies with a
deep authoritarian tradition.” (p. 598)
In the
Afterword, Justice Brian W. Lennox writes on the topic “Judicial Independence
in
If
effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability are to be acieve in the operation
of the court system as a whole, there is a growing sense that it can only be
achieved by creating a single point of accountability. The reality of common
law principles and of our constitution is that the only entity that could ever
exercise control over all of the disparate elements of the court system and its
administration (personnel, finance, administration, and the running of the
courts) is the court itself.” (p. 636)
He has
also emphasized the role of court administrators as “many judges, including
chief judges, are concerned about taking on responsibilities that have never
been inherently theirs and that are, for many, beyond their experience.” (p.
636). Giving logical conclusion of this inherent problem, he has highlighted:
It
will also be a recognition of the fact that the concept of administrative
independence has been followed to its logical conclusion and with success in a
number of other jurisdictions, including among common law countries, a number
of American states, the Federal Court of Australia, and the Court Services of
Ireland. The key to success appears to be that day-to-day administration of a Court
Service, of its budget, and of its personnel remains the responsibility of a
professional administrative court service, headed by an experienced and
professional administrator. The role of the chief judge, or of judges on a
board of judges is to deal with those matters reserved by the Constitution to
judges, to give direction to the Court service, and to decide on the matters of
general policy, while leaving the routine administration of the courts to the
Courts Service’s own professional staff. The model is a simple one, the number
of possible variations is great, but the ultimately beneficiary is the public
as well as all those who require access to an effective, accessible, and
accountable justice system.” (p. 637)
CONCLUSION:
The
book under review brings new dimensions of judicial independence particularly
with reference to the Canadian experience. At the same time, it has diversity
in its contents as it discusses issues and consults materials relating to other
jurisdictions, e.g., Pakistan Judicial Crises and South African Constitutional
Court’s role in establishing and maintaining the independence of judiciary in
their own contexts.
The
book is a monograph of valuable articles that are useful in judicial education.
To educate those who are actually in the field and facing on the spot situation
needs as clearly as possible to know judicial independence areas. Thus,
judicial appointments, judicial tenure, judicial salaries, judicial conduct,
judicial accountability, judicial respect, judicial immunity, judicial, viz. a
viz., Executive and legislative vires, judicial budget, judicial commissions,
judicial impeachment, judicial superannuation and retirement are all included
in judicial education. Judicial integrity, competence, efficiency and
effectiveness are also core values for a judicial career. When these are fully
understood subjectively and applied objectively, the delivery of fair justice
becomes easy and also visible to the
people who are the main arbiter of activities of all actors in whom they repose
confidence concerning the solution of their problems. Access to justice is
meaningless if it is not result oriented. Meaning come in an action when there
is knowledge and awareness. They are also of no practical significance unless
proper judicial education is a constant affair. The rationale behind judicial
academies was, is and will remain to achieve this end. The book under review is
certainly an addition to the modern knowledge in this age of science and
technology, especially, the information technology. The world is unfolding its
hidden secrets every next moment and the human role is to show that crown
creation has all the potential in all fields everywhere and those of them who
are engaged in administration of justice are no exception to it.
The Holy Qur’an and Sunnah
have also given much stress on education and education includes all useful
education for humanity. Every word of the Holy Qur’an is the law as it contains
injunctions for conduct of mankind. Injunctions include commandments as well as
prohibitions. The gist of Islamic teachings is service to mankind. Human being
is the subject matter of the whole Islam. Here justice is blended with thorough
fairness which comes by sense of responsibility which is of no meaning without
accountability.