PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: ORIGIN,
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICABILITY AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS
I.
A cursory glance
at the concept of estoppel:-
Concept
of promissory estoppel has emanated from the concept of estoppel. In order to
comprehend the notion of promissory estoppel, it is imperative to bear in mind
the basic principles and ideology of the concept of estoppel.
The
concept of Estoppel is based on the maxim, alleqans centraria non set
audiendus (a person alleging contradictory acts should not be heard) and
is that species of presumption jurts et de
jure (irrebutable presumptions of law),
where the fact presumed is taken to be true, not as against the world, but as
against a particular party.
“The
doctrine of estoppel is, in fact, an equitable doctrine, a rule of exclusion,
which implies that if a person has, by act or omission altered his position, he
will be estopped and be precluded or debarred from denying it or take a
position so as to alter his position to the detriment of the other person, the
opposite party”[1].
“Estoppe”,
says Lord Coke, “cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence the English
word stopped, and it is called an estoppel or conclusion, because a man’s own
act or acceptance stoppeth or closet up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.”[2]
The
foundation of the rule of estoppel is the equitable doctrine that, “it would be
most inequitable and unjust to a person that if another, by a representation
made, or by conduct amounting to a representation, has induced him to act as he
would not otherwise have done, the person who made the representation should be
allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his formal statement, to the loss
and injury of the person who acted on it”.[3]
The
principle of estoppel is based on equity and good conscience and the object is
to prevent fraud and secure justice between the parties by promotion of honesty
and good faith and by preventing them from approbating and reprobating at the
same time.[4]
II.
Promissory Estoppel: Origin of :-
The concept of promissory estoppel draws its roots from the concept of
the broad rule of justice stated by Lord Carins[5] by observing that, “It is the first principle
upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who ever entered into definite and distinct terms involving
certain legal results- certain penalties- or legal forfeiture afterwards by
their own act or with their own consent upon a course of negotiation which has the effect of
leading one of the parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the
contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who
otherwise might has enforced those rights will not be allowed to enforce them
where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which have thus
taken place between the parties”.
The principle had also been explained by Bowen LJ,[6]
who observed that it was not confined to penalties and forfeitures but extended
to all cases of contractual rights.
The concept of estoppel was so rigidly applied that it had given birth
to certain harsh rules. One was that estoppel applied only in respect of;
representations of fact, and not of statements of intention[7].
The other was that a representation, in order to work an estoppel, must be one
of the fact and not of law.
The effect of these two factors was diluted in the case titled as
Central London Property Trust Ltd v. The High Trees House
Ltd.[8]
The facts were that during the war many people left
“As I have said they are
not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises – promises
intended to be binding intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. Jorden v
Money can be distinguished, because there the promisor made it clear that she
did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the
proper inference was that the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the
court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under
the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it.”
“The courts have not gone
so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a
promise, but they refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently
with it. It is in that sense, and that sense only,
that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The decisions are a natural
result of the fusion of law and equity: for the cases of Hughes v Metropolitan
Rly Co, Birmingham and District Land Co v London and North western Rly Co and
Salisbury v Gilmore, afford a sufficient basis for saying that a party would
not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise to be recognized.”
“The logical consequence
no doubt, is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger
sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration:
and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much the better.
That aspect was not considered in Foakes v Beer ……………………………”
These historic words uttered by Lord Alferd Denning in the above
mentioned case, were recognized.
III.
Development of Principle of Promissory Estoppel:-
The principle of promissory estoppel, right from its birth, started
developing rapidly. As it mitigated the harshness of the strict application of
the principle of estoppel, it came up for discussion in number of cases and was
thereby refined resulting in the conceptual growth of the principle.
In the High Trees case there was an actual promise or assurance.
However, there were instances in cases involving sale of goods where conduct of
the parties gave rise to some promise or assurance. Now question arose as to
whether conduct was covered by the principle of promissory estoppels. In Charles
Richards Ltd v Oppenhaim, Mr. Oppenhaim[10]
wanted a body built on a chassis of a Rolls Royce ‘Silver Wraith’. In July 1947
the coachbuilders promised to deliver it ‘within six or at the most seven
months’. They did not deliver it in that time. Mr. Oppenhaim still pressed them
to deliver. They tendered delivery in June 1948 in accordance with his request, Mr. Oppenhaim refused to accept delivery? The
question was, whether he could refuse to accept the delivery? Lord Denning M.R.
delivered the judgment and held thus:
“If the defendant, as he did, led the plaintiffs to believe that he
would not insist on the stipulation as to time, and that, if they carried out
the work, he would accept it, and they did it, he could not afterwards set up
the stipulation as to the time against them. Whether it be
called waiver or forbearance on his part, or an agreed variation or substituted
performance, does not matter, It is a kind of estoppel.”
“By his conduct he evinced an intention to affect, a promise not to
insist on his strict legal rights. That promise was intended to be acted on
it…… It is a particular application of the principle which I endeavored to
state in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd.”
The verdict in Charles Richards Ltd v Oppenhaim proved to be a
breakthrough. It laid down the principle that even if the parties adopt such
conduct which gives necessary impression to the other party as if it were a
promise or assurance that strict rights would not be enforced, the party making
such promise by conduct would be bound by it.
The decision in High Trees case led many people to believe that the
doctrine of consideration had been abolished to a great extent, in that, a
promise was binding even if there was no consideration for it. During the years since 1946 there had been
much discussion about High Trees. This point needed elaboration. The same came
up for decision in Combe v Combe[11].
The facts of the case were that on getting a divorce, a husband, by a letter of
his solicitor, agreed to pay his wife an allowance of 100 pounds a year free of
tax. The husband did not pay. She had a bigger income of her own than he did.
After six years , she sued him for 600 pounds arrears.
The judge at first instance had considered that the High Trees principle applied.
But the Court of Appeal declined to extend it so. Lord Denning while sitting in
King’s Bench held :
“………………………… That principle does not create new causes of action where
none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his srtrict
legal rights. When it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having
regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. That is the
way it was put in Hughes v Metroplitian Railway[12]
, the case in the House of Lords in which the principle was first stated and in
Birmingham etc Land Company v
“It is also implicit in all the modern cases in which the principle
had been developed. Sometimes it is a plaintiff who is not allowed to insist on
his strict legal rights. ………”
“On other occasions it is a defendant who is not allowed to insist on
his strict legal rights. ………... It may be a part of a cause of action, but not
a cause of action in itself …………”
“The principle , as I understand it , is that , where one party has,
by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was
intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on
accordingly , then , once the other party has taken him at his word and acted
on it , the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal
relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must
accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has
so introduced , even though it is not supported in point of law by any
consideration but only by his word ……..”
“Seeing that the principle never stands alone as giving a cause of
action in itself, it can never do away with the necessity of consideration when
that is an essential part of the cause of action. The doctrine of consideration
is too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a slide – wind. Its ill effects have
been largely mitigated of late, but it still remains a cardinal necessity of
the formation of a contract, though not of its modification or discharge ………………………………………………….”
Was it necessary for there to be a ‘detriment’ in order for High Trees
to operate? Lord Denning, while delivering judgment in W.J. Alan & Co v El
Nasar Export[14],
replied in the negative. The operative part of the judgment reads:
“I know that it has been suggested in some quarters that there must be
detriment. But I can find no support for it in the authorities cited by the judge
…. If you study the cases in which the doctrine has been applied, you will see
that all that is required is that the one should have ‘acted on the belief
induced by the other party’. That is how Lord Cohen put it in the Tool Metal
case[15],
and that is how I would put it myself”.
This was accepted as correct by Mocatta J in
Bremer v Vanden with approval of Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords.
Before High Trees, even after 20 years of the
decision therein, payment of a lesser sum was not designated as discharge of
the complete debt. The effect of such a harsh principle was that if a merchant
or tradesman, who owed a sum of money, was asked to take less, cash down,
debtor pleading being in hot waters, then even if the creditor accepted the
proffered sum he was not precluded by law institute a suit for recovery of a
complete debt.
The law was so stated in 1602 by Lord Coke in
Pinnel Case[16]
and accepted in Foakes v Beer[17].
This principle was diluted in D and C Builders
Ltd v Rees[18]
wherein the Master of Rolls Lord Dennings held that, “when a creditor and a
debtor enter upon a course of negotiation, which leads the debtor to suppose
that , on payment of the lessor sum, the creditor will not enforce payment of
the balance, and on the faith thereof the
debtor pays the lesser sum and the creditor accepts it as satisfaction : then
the creditor will not be allowed to enforce payment of the balance when it
would be inequitable to do so”.
Thus the development of the principle of
promissory estoppels was marked by elimination of a rule which was causing
injustice of its own kind.
IV.
Promissory
Estoppel: Definitions:-
Having
elucidated the origin and development of the concept, a few refined definitions
of the notion of Promissory Estoppel need to be mentioned. The principle has been defined[19]
to mean that, “when one party has , by his own words or conduct made to the
other a promise or assurance which was
intended to effect the legal relation between them and to be acted on
accordingly , then once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on
it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to
revert to their previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had
been made by him , but he must accept their legal relations subject to the
qualification which he himself has so
introduced”.
“Promissory
estoppels proceeds on the footing that when on the representation of a
promisor, a promisee alters his position, the former must keep his word and is
not allowed to decade from his promise as otherwise it will work injustice on
the latter”.[20]
Ingredients of
promissory estoppel have been recognized to be[21]:
a.
“There
is a clear and unequivocal promise by one party, through representation to the
other party”,
b.
”The promisor
expects, that the representation should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promise”,
c.
“The
promise is intended to create a legal relationship to arise in the future”, and
d.
“Knowing
or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise
is made and it is in fact, so acted upon by the other party.”
In a Pakistani
case[22]
august Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that, “this doctrine has been
variously called 'promissory estoppel' 'requisite estoppel', 'quasi estoppel'
and 'new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and
though commonly named 'promissory estoppel'. it is
neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The true
principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his
words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is
intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in
the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party
to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party,
the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be
entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so
having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties and
this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre‑existing
relationship between the parties or not.”
“The rule of
promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be molded to suit the
particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one, the
objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an
equitable treatment to them. The doctrine should not be reduced to a rule of
thumb. Being an equitable doctrine it should be kept elastic enough in the
hands of the court to do complete justice between the parties”.[23]
Doctrine of
promissory estoppel being an equitable principle evolved by courts for doing
justice, it is not inhibited by the same limitations as estoppel in the strict
sense of the term.[24]
However, at the
same time, it is pertinent to observe that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
has not been kept unfettered and there have been prescribed limitations for
application of the same. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been held[25]
not to be available;
(i)
“against
legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions”;
(ii)
“against
the Government or public authority from enforcing statutory prohibition”;
(iii)
“to
compel the Government or a public authority to honor a representation or
promise which is contrary to law”;
(iv)
“to
compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or
promise which was outside the authority of the officer of the Government or the
public authority which made the representation”; and
(v)
“having regard to the facts, if it appears that it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or
representation made by it”.
Doctrine of
promissory estoppel has been applied against the governmental actions. Courts
in
V.
APPLICABILITY OF
THE CONCEPT OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN
The application of
principle of promissory estoppel in
Before 1968, Indian
Courts were not inclined to apply Doctrine of promissory estoppel against the
Government. Amar Singh v. State of
However, the Indian Courts responded to the dynamic needs of the society
and accepted the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against
the government in Union of India
v. Anglo Afghan Agencies[27].
In this case the Government of India announced certain concessions with regard
to the import of certain raw materials in order to encourage export of woolen
garments to
The law relating to
promissory estoppel has been liberally interpreted after the case of Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills v State of
“It is indeed the
pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on
the same footing as the private individual so far as the obligation of the law
is concerned the former is equally bound as the latter. If the Government wants
to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government
claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to
decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the
liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not
sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability, what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification
so the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what
the equity of the case demands[30].”
However the case of Jit
Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of
The Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Limited[32] soon removed this doubt.
The Court held that, “the law laid down in Motilal case represents the correct
law on promissory estoppel”.
The Court observed that “no doubt that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is available against the Government in the
exercise of its Governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of
executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked to
defeat the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel”[33].
In addition, the
apex court also pointed out the limitations which the doctrine of promissory
estoppel was applied subject to. It was held that “In India, the following
limitations of the above doctrine are recognized and it has been held that in
the following cases, the same shall not be available:‑‑(i) against
legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions; (ii) against the
Government or public authority from enforcing statutory prohibition; (iii) to
compel the Government or a public authority to honor a representation or
promise which is contrary to law; (iv) to compel the Government or a public
authority to carry out a representation or promise which was outside the
authority of the officer of the Government or the public authority which made
the representation; and (v) having regard to the facts, if it appears that it
would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise
or representation made by it.”
There is again a land
mark judgment given by the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Pvt. Limited v.
Union of India[34],
wherein the doctrine was applied to refrain the
government from cancelling an action of the Minister granting lease as granting
of the same was within his authority. Thus the fraud based on power was
stemmed.
Thus, the
Superior Courts in
In a much recent
pronouncement[36],
the august Court of India summarized the latest position as to the application
of doctrine of promissory estoppel and limitations thereto in the following
words:
“32. The doctrine
of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by catena of
decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or
intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee,
acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held
bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the
Government at the instance of the promisee notwithstanding that there is no
consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a
formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of
promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the
particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one, the
objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an
equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to
avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in
the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of doctrine
of promissory estoppel the promisee must establish that he suffered in
detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.”
“33. Normally,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and
defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the Court.
However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts
as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the
Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise
against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of
promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. Government can change the policy in
public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this
doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not
allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against
the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be
invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be
compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority
cannot be compell to make a provision which is contrary to law.”
VI. APPLICABLITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN
In
The basic case which envisioned the
application of doctrine of promissory estoppel against government was in 1991[37].
In this case the facts were that the Government of Pakistan notified a scheme
for import of second hand reconditioned machinery, which came to be known as
N.R.I. Scheme. It was provided in the Scheme that import of second hand
reconditioned machinery on repatriable basis would not require permission of
any Government agency provided that the conditions contained therein were met.
The respondent, acting upon the above Scheme, purchased certain second hand
machinery in
Consequently, he
filed a constitutional petition in the High Court of Sindh for an order
directing the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, to issue the import
licence, which was allowed. The Federation of Pakistan filed 4 petitions for
leave to appeal, which inter alia included a petition for leave to appeal
against the above judgment. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to
examine the legality of the judgments passed by The Learned High Court. The
learned Deputy Attorney General representing the Federation of Pakistan
contended that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not extend to legislative,
executive or sovereign functions of the State.
The Supreme Court repelled the said
condition and observed as under: “[T]he contention is
correct to the extent that doctrine of promissory estoppel does not indeed
extend to legislative and sovereign functions, but executive actions are not
excluded from the operation of the doctrine. The learned Deputy Attorney‑General
has basically relied for his contention on the decision given in Ram Niwas
Gupta and others v. State of Haryana through Secretary, Local Self Government,
Chandigarh and another AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 462 which was approved by
the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Messrs Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others AIR
1980 SC 1285, but both these decisions were overruled by the Indian Supreme
Court itself in Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Limited AIR
1986 SC 806...” .
The
Court went on to delineate the limitations of the principle:
“It may also be
observed that at the same time, it was also highlighted that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was subject to the following limitations”:
(i) “The doctrine of promissory estoppel
cannot be invoked against the legislature or 'the laws framed by it because the
legislature cannot make a representation”;
(ii) “Promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for
directing the doing of the thing which was against the law when the
representation was made or the promise held out”;
(iii) “No agency or authority can be held bound
by a promise or representation not lawfully extended or given”;
(iv) “The doctrine of promissory estoppel will
not apply where no steps have been taken consequent to the representation or
inducement so as to irrevocably commit the property or the reputation of the
party invoking it”; and,
(v) “The party which has indulged in fraud or
collusion for obtaining some benefits under the representation cannot be
rewarded by the enforcement of the promise”.
One
year after the above mentioned judgment, the matter again came up for
consideration before the apex court[38].
The facts of the case were that the appellants were engaged in manufacture of
sugar. Their sugar mills were situated at various places in the
The
Court took up the plea and summarized the law regarding applicability of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel against government in many jurisdictions and
held that:
“If
an exemption from payment of excise duty or any other tax, has been granted for
a specified period on certain conditions and if a person fulfils those
conditions, he acquires a vested right, he cannot be denied the exemption
before the expiry of the specified period, through an executive instrument like
a notification, but he can be denied his' vested right by a legislative
provision.”[39]
“The
doctrine of promissory estoppel is pressed into service in order to prevent the
exercise of legal rights where it would be unconscionable for the possessor of
those rights to do so[40].”
After going through all the concerned
judgments and legislative provisions the Apex Court finally held that, “The
doctrine of promissory estoppel is available in Pakistan against the Government
and its functionaries, subject to inter alia limitations highlighted by one of
us, Shafiur Rahnian, J., in the case of Pakistan v. Salahuddin (supra).”[41]
Ever since, the
superior courts in
-------------------------
*. The author holds a Masters degree in Law
and is a serving Civil Judge currently functioning at the Research Centre of
the Lahore High Court,
[1]. Gulfam v. Ali Muhammad,
PLD 1989 Kar. 499.
[2]. Lancilot Feilding
Everest, Everest and Storde’s Law of
Estoppel (3rd Ed., 1923) p.1.
[3]. Haji Muhammad Younas v.
Haji Muhammad Ismail, PLD 1959 Kar. 755.
[4]. Muhammad Fsar v. Muhammad Sharif, 1989
CLC 1850 see also Durga Dass v. Sansar
Singh,2003(1) PLJR666 (P&H).
[5]. Hughes v. Metropolitian
Railway Co. Ltd. (1877) 2 AC 439.
[6].
[7]. Jorden v Money, (1845)
5 HL Cas 185.
[8]. [1947] 1 KB 130.
[9]. Ibid.
[10]. Charles Richards Ltd v Oppenhaim, Mr.
Oppenhaim, [1950] 1 KB
616, 623.
[11]. Combe v Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215.
[12]. (1877)
2 AC 439.
[13]. (1888)
40 Ch D.
[14]. [1972]
2 Q.B. 189.
[15]. (1955) 1 WLR 761, 799.
[16]. (1602)
5
[17]. (1884) 9 App Cas 605.
[18]. [1965]
2 QB 617.
[19]. Halsbury’s Law of England, 3rd Ed; Vol. 15, p.175, para 344.
[20]. Sh.kimti
lal rahi v. union of
[21]. CRESCENT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL LTD v.
FEDERATION OF
[22].
[23]. M.C. Sarkar& S.C. Sarkar, Sarkar’s
Law of Evidence (Sixteenth Edition, Wadha and CO.
[24]. Mangalam Timber Products Ltd. V. State, AIR 1996 Ori. 13.
[25]. Messrs
Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd Versus Federation of
[26]. Amar Singh v. State of
[27]. Union of
[28]. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of
[29]. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of
[30]. Ibid.
[31]. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of
[32]. Union of
[33]. Ibid.
[34]. Express Newspaper Pvt. Limited v. Union of
[35]. See for
instance: Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Dharamndra Trading Co.,
AIR 1988 SC 1247, Steel Crackers v.
M.S.T.C., AIR 1992 Cal 86: (1991) 1 Cal LT 491, Ude Ram. State of Haryana, AIR
1994 P & H 175 at 179-180., Bharat Explosives Ltd v. Yhe Pradeshiya
Industrial & Investment Corporation
of U.P. Ltd, AIR 1994 All 123 at 133, Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 1991 LIC 1346 (DB), Prakash
Chand Dwivedi v. State of Utar Pradesh 1991LIC 2182, SASJN Inter College
v.Secy Board HS & Intermediate Examination 1991All LJS, DDA v. Lala Amar
Nat Educational Human Society AIR 1991Del 96, (1990) 42 Del LT 651 (DB), R
Manjunath v. Indian Institute of technology AIR 1987 Mad 22, Davinder Singh v
State of Jammu & Kashmir 1988 Kash LJ 127 (J 7 K), Rajendra Singh v
Allahabad Development Authority 1987 All LJ 842, 1987 All WC 1305 (DB); Anakh
Singh v state of Punjab AIR 1994 P&H 157, Kantilal v Chairman, Town
Improvement Trust, Ratlam AIR 1986 MP 134, 1986 Cur CIV LJ 245, (1986) 1 Cur CC
434, 1986 Jab LJ (DB), Sardar Vallabhabhai Patel Memorial Society v State of
Gujrat AIR 1984(NOC) 16 Guj, Tapti oil Industries v State AIR 1984 Bom 161
(para 23), 1984 Mah LJ 321, (1984) 86 Bom LR 67, Nihal Singh v Director of
Education 1983 LIC 1662, (1983) 2 Serv LJ 332 (Del), Gujrat State Financial Corp v M/S Lotus Hotels Pvt
Ltd AIR 1983 SC 848, 1983 Guj LH 977, Ikop Laidakol Fishinf Co-op Society v
State of Manipur AIR 1982 Gau 14, Laxmi
Film Lab v State (1986) 1 Guj LR 263 (GUJ), M/s Sri Jagannath Roller Flour Mill
v State AIR 1986 0ri 163, (1986) 61 Cut LT 369 (DB), Mcdowell & Co Ltd v
Union of India (1990) 45 ELT 236 (Bom), M/s Junghadra Sugar Works Pvt Ltd v
Union of India AIR 1989 NOC 35 (Del) (DB), Poornima Oil Mills v State of Kerala
AIR 1987 SC 590, 1986 JT (SC)1112; State of Bihar v Usha Martin Industries Ltd
1988 SCC (TAX) 116, STC ( Note) 430; Asst Comm, Commercial Taxes v Dharmendra
Trading Co AIR 1988 SC 1247, (1988) 3 SCC 570, Real Estate Agency v Model Co-op
Hsg Society (1990) 3 Bom CR 534 (DB), Food Corporation of India v M/s Babulal
Agrawal AIR 2004 SC 2926, Dr Rita Rastogi v DDA (1991) 43 DLT 111 (Del) (DB),
Bhim Singh v State of Haryana AIR 1980 SC 786, 1979 UJ (DC) 829., Maharaj v
Chand (1986) 3 All ER 107 (PC), Government International Pvt Ltd v Union of
India AIR 1991 Kant 52, State of Orissa v Mangalam Timber Products Ltd AIR 2004
SC 297, Pramodbhai v Officer on Special Duty No 2 (LA), Ahmedabad AIR 1989 Guj
187, American Dry Fruits Stores v Union of India (1990) 2 Bom CR 671, SKG Sugar
Mills v State of Haryana 1975 BJLR 192, AIR 1975 Par 123, Maxey charan
v.Rohilkhand University, Bareilly,AIR 1992 Del211 at p.217, Smita Shukla v.
University of Allahabad, AIR 1994 NOC 107(All), Mohd Asif Iqbal v Vice
Chancellor , Allahabad University 1989 All LJ 785 (ALL) Randhir Singh v State
of Rajasthan (1995) I WLC 644 (Raj), K Narmada v Secy , Medical and Health
Dept, Andhra Pradesh AIR 1988 AP 2, M Hussain v Bharathiya University ,
Coimbatoe AIR 1991 Mad 45, Smita Shukla v. University of Allahabad, AIR 1994
NOC 107 (All), Ashwin Prafulla Pimgalwar and etc. v. State of
Mahrashtra,AIR1992 Bom 233 at pp.242, 244.
[36]. Shree
Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Versus State of U.P. 2011 AIR
(SC) 1175.
[37].
[38]. Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited
and others v. Federation of Pakistan, 1992 SCMR 1652.
[39]. Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited
and others v. Federation of Pakistan, 1992 SCMR 1652.
[40]. Ibid.
[41]. Ibid.
[42]. See for
instance: Khyber Plastic and Polymer Industries (Pvt.) Ltd v. Government of Pakistan
(Ministry of Finance), 1997 PTD 1872; Messrs
Excell Builders v. The Karachi Metropolitan
Corporation, 1999 YLR 2659; Alcatel Pakistan Limited v. Collector of Customs,
1999 YLR 710; Lever Brothers Pakistan
Ltd v. Government of Punjab, PLD 2000 Lah 1; Federation of G-6 Welfare
Association, Islamabad v. Government of Pakistan, 2001 MLD 643; Messrs Lucky
Cement Limited v. The Central Board of Revenue, PLD 2001
Pesh. 7; Rukhsar Ali v. Government of N.-W.F.P., 2003
PSC 1453; Messrs Friendship Textile Mills v. Government of Balochistan, 2004
SCMR 346.
[43]. See for example; Azra Riffat Rana v.
Secretary, Minsitry of Housing and Works, Islamabad, 2008 PLC 995; Malik
Muhammad Majeed v. Government of Pakistan; Petrosin Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd.
Singapore v. Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. through Managing Director,
Islamabad, 2010 SCMR 306; Rubia Abrar v. Pakistan, 1993 MLD 1193; Mian Nazir
Sons Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan, 1992 SCMR 883, Abdul Wahid
Abdul Majid v. Government of Pakistan, 1993 SCMR 17; Messrs Moin Sons (Pvt.)
Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Capital Development Authority (CDA), Islamabad Capital
Development Authority (CDA), Islamabad, 1998 PTD 2557; Polyron
Ltd. v. Govt. of